

Contours of Change

A Decade of Transformative

Inquiry at CAS SEE

Ed. Sanja Bojanić & Valeria Graziano

CAS SEE
EDITIONS



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Contours of Change
A Decade of Transformative Inquiry
at CAS SEE

Ten Year Anniversary Publication

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
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Introduction



SANJA BOJANIĆ

Transformative Commitments:

Reflecting on Ten Years of

CAS SEE

This volume is a homage to the memory of Erhard Busek, the tireless quester of youth, inventiveness, and peace in the regions of Southeast Europe.

At the outset, my sincere gratitude goes to my fellow researchers. Lest we forget, over a hundred of them have spent research time at the University of Rijeka, which has remarkably coincided with ten years of Croatian membership in the European Union. Were it not for the one hundred and thirty-eight fellowship recipients and the several hundred who applied to the CAS SEE biannual calls for applications—sometimes multiple times—there wouldn't be ten years of work behind us to reflect upon. Each of you, in a unique way, has participated in building the narrative of the Center for Advanced Studies Southeast Europe at the University of Rijeka.

Thank you to our keynote speakers, guest lecturers, and moderators at our events, who were all architects of ideas: Judith Butler, Jonathan Wolff, Etienne Balibar, Avner de Shalit, Bernard Stiegler, Axel Honneth, Manuela Bojadžijev, Rada Iveković, Peter Eiseman, Eric Fassin, Wolfgang Merkel, Adriana Cavarero, Florian Bieber, Fabienne Peter, John Keane, Maurizio Ferraris, John Heathershaw, Anne Querrin, Ugo Mattei, Yanis Varoufakis, and many others, too numerous to mention here, but always remembered with gratitude. You inspired and nourished our thoughts and supported us in our daily work with local researchers, academics, post-docs, and students at our university.

Thank you, Jeremy Walton, who was among the first generation of Fellows in 2014, for providing an insightful and careful introduction to this volume. Also, thank you, Valeria Graziano, who joined us as a Fellow during the pandemic, marking what could be considered a second beginning in our program of activities, for your dedicated editing of this volume alongside me. We are grateful to Tena Prelec, a colleague and former Fellow, for being our fresh eyes in the final editing stage. Our thanks also go to Snježana Prijić Samaržija, Vedran Džihić, and Petar Bojanić for their stamina in directing the Center. We appreciate Gazela Pudar Draško, who is more than a companion to us. None of this would have been possible without Andrea Mešanović, Kristina Smoljanović, Tea Marković, Marko Luka Zubčić, Kristina Stojanović Čehajić, Sarah Czerny, Lucija Polonijo, Tina Perić Lukačević, Stefania Petris, and Andreja Malovoz. And, if not for Erhard Busek, Hedvig Morvai, Boris Marte, Andreas Treichl, and Ivan Vejvoda, we would not exist. They recognized our need to articulate new forms of funding, especially for those who, after hard work on their doctoral thesis, do not have access to established structures of higher education and research institutions in Southeast Europe, the Western Balkans, or the broader European South.

...

Research in the social sciences and humanities does not always align with funding priorities, making it challenging to navigate the academic landscape and develop a successful career trajectory. Societal needs that coincide with individually meaningful topics are demanding but often receive less financial support. Respecting emerging concerns and working concepts that sometimes significantly shift research paradigms also requires courage from funders. Their understanding and acceptance of researchers and creatives, who often require months of preparation, reading, and even procrastination, may stand in opposition to the pursuit of efficiency, immediate results, and straightforward objectives. Not everyone can become a prolific author or a less inquisitive investigator right from the start of their career. Indeed, it takes time and effort to become knowledgeable, increase expertise, and assume a substantial responsibility for the future.

Thus, we have found our purpose in pioneering the early career paths of researchers, achieving what was possible given the circumstances and through collective action. We believe that joint research, as well as efforts associated with the more tedious aspects of academic service, such as exhaustive reporting and archiving, can help improve the world we share. Since its inception, the Fellowship scheme provided six hundred and ninety research months of support for early and mid-career researchers. It was designed to offer scholarships during transitional periods between various grants and in the pursuit of transdisciplinary inquiry. In Rijeka, recognizing their generative power, we aimed to rekindle their interest in producing knowledge in and about the Balkans, the southeastern region of Europe, in counter-tendency to the at the time prevalent transitional decline in education, science and the creative sector, and the phenomenon known as “brain drain,” still ongoing.

This was our motivation and driving force in 2011 when we joined the European Institutes for Advanced Study (EURIAS) network and represented the region. This involvement shaped future policies for the international development of the University of Rijeka, a city and university known for its diversity. We pioneered the postdoctoral program in Croatia and registered the center in late 2013. What has happened since then? Several economic and political polarizations have obscured the vision of academia and our place within it, yet these very factors have also driven us to persist in spite of these polarizations. Rapidly eroding the meaning and integrity of change and threatened by a neoconservative descent into what Max Weber might call a polar night of icy darkness and harshness (Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation”), the ensuing years have challenged our ambitions not only in the Balkans but also in the broader European context and globally. As we

entered the 21st century, we hoped for progress and positive changes, confronting the economic, nationalistic, ideological, and cultural realities that have been deeply rooted in Southeast Europe for three centuries as a consequence of its colonial past, where countries have been more or less treated as a colonized region.

In our commitment to certain core values—such as human rights, diversity, affective inclusivity, multi-layered forms of social justice and the harmonization of relations between humans, non-humans, and inanimate objects—we, along with our early career researchers, notice when they are absent. Paradoxically, values are often articulated and recognized when they are lacking; we seek them because their scarcity compels us to engage in a path of restoration, gaining knowledge and experience in respecting them, thereby restoring the smallest elements of truth, justice, honesty, trust, authenticity, and equality in various aspects of our coexistence. The significance of each value is never taken for granted, and analytically, they are continuously interrelated.

Those who have followed our work will recognize the values we stand for reflected in the topics outlined across over twenty open calls for applications, which invited contributions on issues such as migration, the possibility of the end of violence; European identity in all its forms; forms of solidarity in times of war and crises; ecology, justice in cities and beyond; cultures of rejection; illiberalism, authoritarianism, and possibilities for peace; the resilience of democracy; and legal frameworks that harmonize relations between humans, non-humans, and inanimate objects. These calls have also addressed imagined and real frontiers and borders of Europe, the Global South, and the Western Balkans. Each call has addressed a facet of reality, thereby envisioning the future. Through them, we have consistently strived to comprehend where we are, where we have come from, and where we are heading.

In times when we are unable to stop wars, restrain injustice, and diminish suffering, we cling to the right—and the responsibility—to strive to provide resources for creativity, research, and imagination. Through critical analyses of values and considering research practices necessary to cultivate those that are lacking, our aim is to remain sincere and steadfast in supporting the potential for knowledge creation in Southeast Europe. This includes both countries within the European Union and those on its symbolic or actual borders. Only through these actions can we lay the foundations of understanding, peace, and a unified Europe, or in our part of the world heal the ravages of disputes, misunderstandings, wars, atrocities, and, above all, the ignorance of others' vulnerability and grief.

What will the future bring if we are not Pythias, if we speak not from resentment but from experience and the residue of past battles and

articulated commitments? We hope to continue evolving with new allies, respecting the memory of the past and the journey we have undertaken. Why should the future have the contours of certainty? Isn't it sufficient that with our example, with the legacy we leave, we are fulfilling the mission we outlined ten years ago: to devote time to research work, to appreciate the inventive power of thought, and, above all, to pursue the intentions that reduce miseries and nurture affective equalities.

JEREMY F. WALTON

Introduction:

*On the Generality of
Violence and the Violence of
Particularity*

JEREMY F. Walton has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement n° 101002908) for work on this project.

For if violence is a means, a criterion for criticizing it might seem immediately available. It imposes itself in the question whether violence, in a given case, is a means to a just end or an unjust end. A critique of it would then be implied in a system of just ends. This, however, is not so. For what such a system, assuming it to be secure against all doubt, would contain is not a criterion for violence itself as a principle, but, rather, the criterion for cases of its use. The question would remain open whether violence, as a principle, could be a moral means even to just ends.
 – Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” *Reflections* (1978: 277).

Are my thoughts, which are good and right, worth any less than someone else’s identical thoughts in Rome or Paris? Simply because I’ve conceived them in this mountain gorge known as Travnik? Certainly not. What is to prevent my thoughts from being jotted down and appearing between the cover of a book? Nothing! And even if things seem to be disjointed and chaotic, they are nevertheless linked together and interdependent.
 – Ivo Andrić, *Bosnian Chronicle* (1963: 263-264).

...

We begin with two motifs that initially appear antithetical: the generality of violence and the violence of particularity. On one hand, and in tandem with Walter Benjamin’s reflections, the universality of violence poses a productive challenge for our collection of essays, *Contours of Change: Mapping a Decade of Transformative Inquiry at CAS SEE*. Like Benjamin, our contributors comprehend violence and the political as mutually constitutive: necessarily mediated by each other. On the other hand, and echoing Ivo Andrić’s exclamation, both the frustrations and the affordances of marginality animate our discussions. The violence of particularity—the pernicious expectation that words penned from a Balkan periphery matter less than those forged in western European crucibles of culture—incites us to discourse. Against the violence of parochialization, our essays concur with Andrić’s contention that “things (that) seem to be disjointed and chaotic...are nevertheless linked together and interdependent.” While our plethora of arguments and sites cannot be reduced to a single theme, the effort to synthesize a critique of violence in general with an interrogation of the violence of particularity undergirds our volume as a whole.

Such a synthesis of the general and the particular also defines the structure of the collection and the institute whose work it commemorates. Our authors are all alumni of the Center for Advanced Studies of Southeast Europe (CAS SEE) at the University of Rijeka, and share the sensibility that this unique center cultivates. The collection's two sections, "Exploring Regional Realities: Insights from the Southeastern Frontier" and "Reimagining Power and Possibility: Essays on Political and Critical Thought," correspond to the two defining commitments of CAS SEE: a regional-geographic focus on the Balkans, the Adriatic and southeast Europe, on one hand, and engagement with the urgent debates and dilemmas of contemporary political philosophy, on the other. This distinction should be understood under the sign of mutuality rather than as an expression of the exhausted division between local and global. Our essays shuttle from regional specificity to universal critique, from general concepts to particular contexts, with admirable dialectical agility. The abstract and the concrete cannot do without each other.

Violence in its many iterations occupies our contributions, both in relation to southeastern Europe and to contemporary public culture generally. Recent histories of warfare and its aftermath in the region provide a tragic context for theorizing violence. Damir Arsenijević begins our collection with a powerful denunciation of the "continuation of war-time logic" after the formal cessation of military conflict in Bosnia—as he shows, the multiple forms and rhythms of "environmental violence" persist in rendering life as waste in the post-war context. In a different vein, Christian Costamagna examines the war in Kosovo from the perspective of diplomatic history to offer a subtle incrimination of political actors at a variety of scales, both regional and global.

A host of theoretical explorations supplement our fine-grained accounts of recent political violence and warfare. By ventriloquizing Jacques Derrida, Giustino de Michele proposes a "negotiation" with violence that affirms the "deferrals" of becoming and alterity as ultimately less violent than essentialist images of being and identity. From de Michele's perspective, deconstruction is a method for avoiding the reduction of violence to its most overt and spectacular avatars. Such attention to the subtle contours of violence also inspires Letizia Konderak's contrast between Hannah Arendt and Carl Schmitt. Although Arendt and Schmitt propose opposite visions of the relationship between violence and the political—for Arendt, politics necessarily excludes violence, while for Schmitt the political is always a recalibration of violence—they both attend to dynamics of friendship, enmity, and strangerhood that bear violent potentials and effects. Tomáš Korda introduces another conceptual forbear to our analysis of violence by proposing a dialectical, Hegelian interpretation of morality and war that

situates them in their “concrete universality,” a formulation that resonates with the overarching spirit of the volume as a whole. Javier Toscano’s meditations add further layers to our collective critique of violence by mapping its multiple forms, including structural violence, symbolic violence, and mimetic violence. In light of the heterogeneity of violence, Toscano argues forcibly for a “culture of peace...based on practices of mutual care” that, in a Mouffean vein, acknowledges agonism and conflict as an expression of democratic plurality rather than its antithesis. Finally, Andreas Wilmes offers a cogent account of historically new forms of violence, based on Johan Galtung’s conceptual departure from traditional definitions of violence based on force, intent, and harm. His conclusion is ominously ineluctable: Even as traditional images of violence wane, “new violence’s future looks bright.”

Gendered violence, in particular, takes on multiple forms at the intersection of “new violence” and longstanding practices of discrimination against and debilitation of women. Many of our contributions inveigh against gendered violence in order to open new avenues for feminist and LGBTQIA+ empowerment. Leda Sutlović examines the interventions of contemporary feminist groups in Montenegro, Serbia and Croatia as expressions of a “counterarchive of Yugoslav feminist history,” which infuses activism with “playfulness, passion and fun,” an effective and affective set of tactics in response to gendered violence. Endi Tupja vividly conveys the intersections of gendered and ethnic Othering that marked her experience as an Albanian woman residing in Italy. Her tale of the tragic death of Adelina Alma Sejдини, who was kidnapped, forced into prostitution as a teenager and trafficked by the Albanian and Italian mafias, reveals the sinister interdependence between quotidian modes of gendered violence and femicide. By developing a notion of “translation of gendered experience,” Alenka Ambrož interrogates the discursive violence of hegemonic “feminisms which, while aspiring to make sense of the situation of all women, actually leave some of them out.” The relationship between modalities of violence against women is also central to Marina Christodolou’s intervention, with its concern for mimetic representations of women’s deaths in art. Concluding this sustained critique of gendered violence, Zona Zarić invokes Nancy Fraser’s influential distinction between recognition and redistribution to recentre questions of democratic participation squarely on the inclusion of “women as citizens,” with an eye toward “lay(ing) the foundations of another relationship to power and a new democratic model.”

Gender and sexuality are by no means the only sites at which violence and the political overlap and take shape in our essays. Achille Zarlenga delineates the manner in which psychiatry and psychology have disciplined and pathologized migrants, both historically along the Italian-Yugoslav

border and today: “migrants’ physiological conditions are often misjudged and hurriedly categorized as mental illness or psychological distress, a much more convenient and inexpensive way than understanding their problems and needs.” Like gendered subjects, the subjects of psychiatric practice exhibit a formative relationship among knowledge, power, and violence. Paul Blamire traces a parallel formation of violence and discourse in relation to the universalization and “supersessionism” of Christian theology. By silencing the Jewish roots of Christianity through abstraction and secularization, political theology amounts to a violent suppression of minority traditions and positions, together with their insurgent potentials. In contrast to the genealogies of disavowed violence provided by Zarlenga and Blamire, several other contributors examine contemporary political and economic formations that harness violence and recapitulate injustice. Valerio Fabbrizi queries the recent global ascendancy of right-wing populism with an eye to the consequences for liberal constitutionalism as a political model generally, while Emilia Marra assesses cryptocurrency as both a utopian intervention into monetary exchange that both promises decreased institutional mediation yet risks becoming “a source of new inequalities.”

A final thread that courses through *Contours of Change* is the inextricable relationship between past histories of violence and their ongoing legacies in the present. The ubiquity of collective memories of violence throughout southeast Europe fosters ample opportunities for reflecting on the violence of memory itself. Nikolina Židek offers a sensitive comparison of two cardinal sites of violent collective memory for Croatia today: Bleiburg, where many fascist Ustaše and their supporters were apprehended and killed by Partisans in the final days of World War II, and Jasenovac, the infamous concentration camp run by the Ustaše, whose victims included Jews, Roma, Serbs, and leftists. Židek illustrates how the recent proliferation of “European memory regimes” entails the danger of relativizing violence in the past, due to the dubious equality of victims across political divides. Public acknowledgement of victimhood can constitute violence in its own right. As Damir Arsenjević sharply observes in post-war Bosnia, “during commemoration...you can speak as a victim and nothing more; maybe, one day, the community gets a small plaque commemorating those who fought the violent extraction of their very means of survival.” The comforts of commemoration are cold, and the politics of memory requires scrutiny. As Tamara Banjeglav astutely points out, collective memory of war privileges violence and the antagonistic narratives of heroism and enmity that accompany military violence. By contrast, “peaceful reintegration... is largely absent from collective remembrance.” Commemoration of past violence easily mutates into a precedent for future violence, and the politics of the past is inseparable from the violent potential of the present.

...

The conclusion of Benjamin's "Critique of Violence" arrives bracingly. After inveighing against both lawmaking and law-sustaining violence and criticizing the repressive logic of mythical violence, Benjamin salutes the possibility of productive violence, what he calls "divine violence": "If mythical violence is lawmaking, divine violence is law-destroying; if the former sets boundaries, the latter boundlessly destroys them; if mythical violence brings at once guilt and retribution, divine power only expiates; if the former threatens, the latter strikes; if the former is bloody, the latter is lethal without spilling blood" (1968: 297). This "divine violence," the only violence that Benjamin figures as desirably revolutionary, clearly resonates with the famous concept of "messianic time," "the time of now" (*Jetztzeit*) that he introduced in his "Theses on the Philosophy of History" (1968: 263).

It is fitting for a volume dedicated to a critique of the universality of violence and the violence of particularity to strike an analogous, open-ended note. Repressive universalisms and carceral particularisms both invite revolutionary responses. As the contributions to our volume amply demonstrate, such a revolutionary critique must not—cannot—recapitulate the forms of violence that it interrogates. Its lethality is necessarily bloodless. Such a bloodless revolution, which refuses both the violent comforts of universalist teleologies and the violent defeatism of parochiality, is an apt emblem for both our authors and CAS SEE as a whole, as we continuously strive to map the contours of change in the future.

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PART I

Exploring Regional Realities:
*Insights from the Southeastern
Frontier*



DAMIR ARSENIJEVIĆ

**Recuperating the social:
challenging environmental
violence through art-activist
practices in Bosnia and
Herzegovina**

On 9 March 2019, a fire erupted in the privatized “Energetika” building within the former Incel pulp and paper mill complex in Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Carcinogenic oil containing polychlorinated biphenyls leaked into the ground during the incident. Incel, established in 1954 as a pulp mill, employed over 6,100 workers by 1989. Post the 1992-1995 war, Incel was privatized and fragmented. Hazardous chemicals, like at other privatized sites in Bosnia and Herzegovina, remained untreated.

Polychlorinated biphenyls – PCBs – are electricity-conducting but heat-insulating compounds, commonly used as insulators in electrical transformers and capacitors due to their chemical stability. PCBs dissolve in fats, accumulate in the body, and move easily through the food chain, causing genetic mutations by entering DNA and RNA. Although PCBs are artificially produced in special furnaces, their destruction can release phosgene and diphosgene, highly harmful war poisons. The environmental consequences of PCBs pollution are irreversible.

In 2005, research revealed carcinogenic PCBs storage in Incel used for cooling transformers. The European Commission warned the Republika Srpska entity, recommending oil removal (Milojević). The buyers, during the privatization of Incel, failed to comply, and the Republika Srpska inspectorate did not ensure fulfillment of contractual obligations.

Following the March 2019 fire, Banja Luka’s inspection authorities analysed soil contamination in the Incel complex. Data on the extent of the environmental disaster was not disclosed to the public. Between April and November 2019, official inspection services provided data deliberately understating pollution levels in the Incel area. No data outside the Incel circle, near urban settlements and the Vrbas River, is available, leaving uncertainty about risks to the population.

In autumn 2019, the City of Banjaluka’s ecological inspection reported PCBs levels in some Incel areas exceeding permitted amounts by about 33,000 times, reaching up to 6,722.49 milligrams per kilogram. 101 new soil samples were taken for PCB analysis (Obradović, 2019). Groundwater, fish, chicken meat, and vegetable samples were also collected for heavy metal analysis, but the results were not disclosed.

Between 2019 and 2022, two Bosnian companies, hired by the Republika Srpska Government and the Institute for Environmental Protection of the Republika Srpska, conducted mutually contradictory soil sampling for PCBs contamination.

The presence of PCBs couldn’t be downplayed after initial expert reports, despite attempts by the RS Government and Banja Luka City

representatives. However, the government later admitted that the European Commission's report on PCBs in the Incel industrial complex was missing. Minister Srebrenka Golic of The Ministry of Construction, Urban Planning, and Ecology stated, "We are looking for that study, but it is nowhere to be found. We have requested a copy from the European Commission" (2019, Milojević).

In 2019, the Government of the Republika Srpska justified its lack of action in permanently addressing soil contamination with the PCBs by awaiting relevant and reliable soil contamination analyses. Despite this rationale, no remedial measures were undertaken in the aftermath of the pandemic in 2020. Throughout 2021, the Republika Srpska authorities neglected the PCBs issue, with exclusive attention paid by the authorities of the City of Banjaluka. This attention arose after the alteration in local authorities following the 2020 local elections and the involvement of specific non-governmental organizations.

However, the City of Banjaluka lacks the jurisdiction to resolve this matter, thereby exacerbating the complexities associated with land remediation. Moreover, the former Incel industrial complex area continues to host numerous workers, encompassing companies, institutions, and even a private university situated within its premises. The ongoing development of adjacent residential areas raises apprehensions about the safety and well-being of an expanding populace.

In December 2023, the Center for the Environment of Banjaluka filed a criminal complaint with the District Public Prosecutor's Office in Banjaluka. The complaint pertained to the suspected criminal offense of environmental pollution with waste materials and the potentially unlawful transportation of soil contaminated with PCBs from the Incel area to the surrounding settlements near Banjaluka.

Four years after the fire at the Incel complex, resulting in contamination with one of the most toxic substances globally, citizens express concerns regarding the alleged non-compliance with orders by the competent inspectorate concerning the removal of contaminated soil. The authorities' delayed response and scandals have only intensified public anxieties.

In December 2023, residents from communities in the outskirts of Banjaluka – Bistrica, Čokorska polja, Zeleni Vir, and Lauš – contacted the Centre for the Environment concerning the dumping of soil waste in their settlements in illegal dumping sites, citing potential environmental hazards (Ponavlja li se nezakonito odlaganje piralena?). The soil waste was suspected to originate from the Incel circle, an area affected by a fire resulting in PCBs pollution. The Centre for the Environment treated these reports seriously but refrained from publicizing them due to an inability to independently verify the allegations. The information did eventually become

public when the Banja Luka Department for Inspection Affairs and the municipal police informed the news portal Capital.ba that no relocation of contaminated land from the Incel area had occurred (Momić, 2023). Subsequently, Igor Kalaba from the Center for the Environment reported that a video depicting the excavation, loading, and removal of contaminated soil from the Incel fire site was published on the Guerrilla portal a few days later (Ponavljja li se nezakonito odlaganje piralena?).

This extended vignette on the circulation of toxic waste in Bosnia and Herzegovina is presented to contend that such waste should be regarded as symptomatic of both toxic privatization and a toxic mode of governance perpetrated by an increasingly authoritarian ethnic elite within the nation. The concept of toxic waste serves as a red thread, illustrating how the disintegration of former socialist industrial complexes through privatization adhered to an extractivist logic. In this process, value was extracted from industrial plants, while the resultant toxins were left to adversely impact and contaminate local communities.

Recent allegations involving the transport of contaminated soil to illicit dumping sites situated in small communities on the outskirts of the city of Banjaluka exemplify how specific populations are considered disposable and, in turn, are treated as waste by the ethnic authoritarian elites. However, a crucial continuity is also discerned here: the concealment of the crime. In parallel to attempts to conceal war crimes through clandestine mass graves, this same logic is now extended to environmental violence.

Untangling toxicity—theoretical concerns

Crucial to comprehending ecological incidents and catastrophes within the successor countries of the former Yugoslavia is the recognition that these events are not isolated “accidents” but rather manifestations of a purposeful strategy of sustained violence orchestrated by ethnic authoritarian elites. Ranging from the appropriation of extensive land areas through the strategic deployment of landmines to the treatment of natural resources as spoils of war – illustrated by the decision of “the Croat Republic Herceg-Bosna,” a Bosnian Croat ethno-capitalist wartime fiefdom, to cede the use of Buško jezero to Croatia for a hydro power plant at Orlovac – and the disposal of industrial toxic waste from privatized and dismantled factories by concealing and burying it in undisclosed locations, a consistent thread emerges a continuation of wartime logic.

Environmental violence constitutes an integral component of the strategic repertoire of ethnic authoritarian violence, manifesting its concrete materiality decades after overt military activities have ceased. It is

strategically managed as an enduring threat to a substantial portion of the population, serving as a means of weaponizing nature and fostering a pervasive sense of anxiety about the uncontrollable fate looming over the country. When significant environmental catastrophes occur, their agency is promptly attributed to “nature,” “chemicals,” or “toxic waste.” “Simultaneously, the slow, insidious effects of toxic waste, inadequately secured or disposed of, transform contaminated sites into totemic and feared symbols within communities, erasing their true histories and origins.

Environmental violence functions as a potent tool for ethnic authoritarian elites to weaponize nature, sustaining and asserting their dominance while staging the spectacle of ongoing human sacrifices determined by fate. This includes communities where childhood cancers prevail, metal-pickers exposed to chlorine inhalation in former industrial sites, impoverished agricultural communities relying on contaminated water for sustenance, and individuals venturing into unmarked areas with landmines meeting tragic fates.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, in its entirety, serves as a shrine where a daily sacrificial ritual unfolds, marked by deaths resulting from environmental violence—whether swift or gradual—in the post-war aftermath. Populations unwittingly surrender their lives, while ethnic authoritarian elites, akin to high priests, perpetuate an insatiable demand for further deaths, assuming the role of rulers over time and space, determining when enough lives have been sacrificed. This narrative unfolds within the realm of the mythic and the domain of destiny, where subjectivity finds no space for expression.

Is this not a prime example of a nihilistic aspect of what has recently been termed “mutant neoliberalism” (Callison and Manfredi, 2020) in that, as Wendy Brown asserts ‘this desublimated will to power, aggrieved by its wound, emancipated by neoliberal reason from social responsiveness and democratic precepts of equality and power-sharing, spirited by valorisation of individual freedom, turns its back or worse on the predicaments and vulnerabilities of other humans, other species, the planet’ (Brown, 2020: 39-60). Arguing with Wendy Brown, this is how ethnic authoritarian elites in Bosnia and Herzegovina have managed to devalue traditional morality, that would otherwise prohibit extractivist destruction and the sacrificing of one’s ethnic population for profit, whereby ‘morality itself “falls back” to its elementary form, its will to power, as nihilism shatters its foundations’ (Ibid., 54). Freed from such foundations, ethnic authoritarian elites can in a free-floating fashion combine religion, machismo, contractuality of human and more-than-human life, extractivism, and turbo-charged violence.

This, I contend, is a version of our own “gore capitalism” (Valencia) of the European periphery in which ethnic authoritarian elites attack the social by instilling “wasting as social wealth” as a form of social domination (Arsenijević, 2023). Such social domination is boosted further by the

position of Bosnia and Herzegovina, along with other countries that are not EU members but are surrounded by EU-member states, as one of a deliberately created political waste ground; these countries are zones of exception, in which toxic narratives of instability and hopelessness are circulating: a ‘political dump’ surrounded by ‘political paradise.’

I find it productive to examine this predicament through the conceptual framework termed Wasteocene, as proposed by Armiero and De Angelis (2017: 345-362). Wasteocene redefines waste as a dynamic process of wasting, directing attention towards socio-environmental relationships that initiate and perpetuate the degradation of individuals and their surrounding environments. Within the expansive array of “-cenes” prevalent in academic and activist discourse, such as the Anthropocene and Capitalocene, the Wasteocene serves as a dual designation: a characterization of the contemporary state of life under capitalism and a heuristic tool employed for its analysis. In contrast to approaches that lament the omnipresence of waste or nostalgically yearn for an idealized environmental purity, the Wasteocene functions as an analytical instrument to examine how capitalist ecologies enforce abstract forms of domination.

The Wasteocene’s emphasis lies in scrutinizing the “effects of capitalism on life” (Ibid., 10) and, consequently, in exploring how the violence inherent in capitalism, assimilated by humans, non-humans, and diverse ecosystems, is obscured and kept invisible. By foregrounding socio-environmental relations and advocating for the significance of the body as the locus where the metabolic processes of capitalism unfold, the Wasteocene seeks to reintroduce proper political dimensions into our socio-ecological crises. The concept posits that wasting is fundamentally a relational phenomenon rather than a predicament to be merely solved.

In the subsequent section, I will examine and analyse the repoliticisation of environmental violence through the artistic-activist productions within Bosnia and Herzegovina, specifically focusing on the Zemlja-Voda-Zrak platform. This artistic-activist platform serves to redefine, unite, and invigorate disparate endeavours aimed at challenging the socio-environmental toxicity perpetuated and sustained by the ethnic authoritarian elites.

Zemlja-Voda-Zrak: challenging the logic of wasting through activist-art

Zemlja-Voda-Zrak is a digital platform that I launched in 2019 to establish and promote environmental humanities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The platform’s premise is to focus on the basics: our limited earth, water, and air resources. This challenges the ethnic authoritarian imperatives of limitless

human labor and natural resources extraction. The platform challenges the logic of wasting by facilitating collective community practices and counter-toxic narratives that prioritize the material experience of environmental violence. This aims to expose and widen the fault lines within the power structures that enable the Wasteocene logic to operate. Environmental crises are seen as a result of social and economic inequalities perpetuated by ethnic authoritarian elites who seek to extract natural resources at the expense of human and other species' lives for profit.

Zemlja-Voda-Zrak combines arts, activism, and academia to promote innovative, imaginative, and courageous collaborations between activist organizations, scientific research, and artistic practices for the protection, conservation, and improvement of the environment (zemljavodazrak.com). The work of Zemlja-Voda-Zrak draws on the lessons learned from the 2014 Protests and Plenums in Bosnia and Herzegovina, bringing together artists, activists, and academics (Arsenijević, 2014).

The process of community reconstruction is intricately woven with artistic and activist interventions, which are much needed to repoliticise the situation. Zemlja-Voda-Zrak focuses on all omitted, discarded, destroyed, weakened, and depleted by authoritarian ethnic elites. This includes our communal capabilities to conceptualize and actualize demands for a more inclusive justice and societal transformation. Additionally, through community reconstruction, the often-overlooked forms of life, emerging life forms, and new subjectivities that bear witness to the violence inherent in the Wasteocene and those individuals who actively seek strategies to bring about its cessation are sustained. By valuing, safeguarding, and fostering these aspects through our artistic and activist interventions, we aim to strengthen our communal ability to liberate ourselves from the anti-social will to power of the logic of wasting.

The fourth installment of the graphic novel series addressing environmental violence by Zemlja-Voda-Zrak was developed as community reconstruction (*Katana*). It underscores whistleblowing as a form of political breathing within the Wasteocene, encouraging its practice. The central character, Tatjana Mišić, is the coordinator of the Environmental Inspectorate of the City of Banjaluka. In 2019, she spearheaded an investigation into contamination as the initial responder following a fire incident at Incel. The graphic novel delineates her struggle to enforce the mandated procedures for examining the contaminated Incel site within a context where authoritarian ethnic elites in Banjaluka, with the backing of international organizations such as UNDP, delegate soil sampling to international contractors. By June 2020, her insistence on adherence to regulations and identification of procedural deficiencies of international contractors led to her exclusion from the investigation into PCBs contamination at Incel.

The graphic novel on Incel critically examines the convergence of international organizations, local ethnic authoritarian elites, and international independent contractors in the context of extractivism. Notably, international contractors levy exorbitant fees for their services, offering minimal value to pollution-caused communities. This practice results in the multiple extraction of value from these communities, serving to further dispossession. The graphic novel underscores the importance of narrating stories of courageous political expression in the form of whistleblowing, emphasizing its political commitment to defending and recuperating the social.

Conclusion

What is at stake in recuperating the social in the fight against environmental violence is upholding the act of survivance (Hodžić, 2023: 1-22) – that which goes beyond a victimized position into which citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been trained since the beginning of the war in 1992. The act of survivance is best exemplified by the courageous women of the village of Kruščica, situated near Vitez in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who stood up against the construction of two mini hydropower plants, a development that posed a threat to the river Kruščica and its natural ecosystem. Their assertion, “our rivers connect us,” reflects an awareness of interconnection through shared natural habitat and underscores a form of interconnection that transcends identity politics, upon which ethnic authoritarian elites often rely. The latter form of interconnection, expressing solidarity beyond divisive identity politics, was violently confronted by the police in Kruščica. In practical terms, what transpires is not merely an expression of anger but an organized, politically productive, and emancipatory anger that advocates for the concept and practice of social well-being and care for all. This emancipatory struggle faces suppression, concealment, devaluation, and avoidance of discussion locally and on wider scales, regionally and internationally.

This resistance poses a significant challenge to various neocolonial initiatives, ranging from international transitional justice endeavours to the localized projects championed by ethnic authoritarian elites (Arsenijević, 2022). In these neocolonial scenarios, the women of Kruščica would become sacrificial figures, the river would succumb to destruction, and the village would, in return, receive a monument and a day of commemoration. Presently, this epitomizes the current state of affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina: individual lives gain recognition – both as voices and bodies – during commemorative events, where victims can speak, yet they are restricted to this role alone. Violently, lives are either sacrificed, or rivers

are extracted, subsequently leading surviving community members into prolonged, decades-spanning efforts to seek redress through legal channels. Ultimately, the community might receive a modest plaque commemorating those who resisted the violent extraction of their vital means of survival. Thus, a commemorative plaque and a substantial legal bill epitomize the contemporary manifestation of justice in its liberal democratic form. Against such depoliticized life, survivance sheds light onto a much-needed fight back – both violent and non-violent – against extractivist enclosures of natural resources and the disposability of a devalued population, all the while practicing care for human and more-than-human lives.

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TAMARA BANJEGLAV

Give peace a chance:

*Breaking the silence about
peace initiatives in the
memorialization of conflicts.*

As a research field, memory studies have primarily focused on studying events, such as wars, conflicts, and genocide, and remembrance of these events at different sites and on other occasions. Public commemoration of conflict is primarily represented in anniversaries, monuments, museums, and memorials. These rituals of remembrance constitute what Jenny Wüstenberg calls ‘fast memory’ (Wüstenberg, 2022) because it is readily available and easily consumed. However, as Wüstenberg argued, conflicts are not the only events worth commemorating that scholars should consider. This essay focuses on a process rather than an event. It examines the collective memory of a peace process in Croatia’s Danube region after the 1991 – 1995 war or the Homeland War. It is argued that by remembering only violent events, such as military battles, violence becomes normalized and seen as an inevitable result of a conflict. Instead, the essay emphasizes peaceful resolutions to a conflict and the remembrance of peace processes and initiatives.

The war in Croatia ended with military operations, but the final integration of the occupied territory into Croatia’s constitutional and legal framework was achieved with a peaceful reintegration. A peace agreement was signed in Erdut, Croatia, on 12 November 1995 to reintegrate the occupied region and its population into Croatia’s political and institutional order under the auspices of the UN Transitional Administration (UNTAES). Although UNTAES is considered one of the most successful UN peacekeeping missions, its success is mainly absent from Croatian collective remembrance. Military operations, such as Operation ‘Storm,’ play an important role in Croatia’s commemorative calendar and occupy a central place in the collective memory of the war. However, while military actions are regularly marked under the auspices and in the organization of the state, peace initiatives are still at the margins of state memory politics.

UNTAES Mission and Peaceful Reintegration of the Danube Region

The start of peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube region was made possible by signing the Basic Agreement on Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem in Erdut on 12 November 1995. It began on 15 January 1996 when the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1037, establishing a Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonija, Baranja, and Western Srijem (UNTAES). UNTAES was tasked with demilitarizing the area, creating conditions favorable to the return of Croat and Serb refugees, reintegrating the civil and public administration, forming a temporary police force, organizing free elections, and establishing an atmosphere of

inter-ethnic trust (United Nations, 2023: 3). The UNTAES mission radically differed in form and purpose from previous UN missions to Croatia (United Nations Protection Force/UNPROFOR, United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation/ UNCRO). As Bandov and Hajduković write, “the UNTAES mission had a precisely defined political and security mandate, clear objectives and had a firmly set timeframe for their implementation” (2019: 154). Research conducted in 1997 about attitudes and opinions of the displaced persons from the Croatian Danube basin regarding the Plan of Peaceful Reintegration showed that the majority of the displaced preferred a peaceful solution and that general opinion about the Plan was prevailingly positive (Šakić, Rogić, and Sakoman, 1997: 241)¹.

UNTAES is considered successful because it achieved the following: territorial integrity of a state, a peaceful, negotiated resolution of a dispute, and the rights of refugees and displaced persons. The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan argued that the success of UNTAES represented “a positive precedent for peace throughout the former Yugoslavia” (quoted in Šimunović, 1999: 129). However, some authors argued that the success of UNTAES needs to be judged on the extent to which it helped to develop a process of reconciliation and a culture of tolerance and dialogue (Ibid., 139).

In 1997, President Franjo Tuđman founded the multi-ethnic National Committee for the Establishment of Trust, Accelerated Return, and Normalization of Living Conditions in the War-affected Regions.² On 3 October 1997, Croatia submitted to the UN Security Council President the text of its Programme for the Establishment of Trust, Accelerated Return, and Normalization of Living Conditions in the War-affected Regions of the Republic of Croatia. The Programme’s goals were: the creation of a general climate of tolerance and security; the realisation of equality of all citizens about the State administration; the establishment of trust between all citizens; the creation of general social, political, security and economic conditions for normalization of life; the speedy, secure and organized return of all Croatian citizens to those regions of Croatia from which they had been expelled or displaced; the inclusion of all citizens in building a democratic society; and creation of a political framework for the implementation of relevant legal norms (United Nations, 1997: 329). The existence of this National Committee for Reconciliation showed that attempts for improving the human rights situation and for reconciliation existed at the govern-

1 However, one-third of those interviewed thought occupied territory could not be returned without military action.

2 The National Committee ceased to exist in 2000. http://digarhiv.gov.hr/webpac-hidra-imnt/?rm=results&show_full=1&f=IDbib&v=ITC39816&filter=hidra-imnt

mental level. However, as Sandra Kasunić argued, “National Programme for Reconciliation was initiated largely to satisfy the requirements imposed on Croatia by the international community. Moreover, it can serve as an indicator for the unwillingness of the Croatian leadership to foster the reconciliation of the population” (Kasunić, 2018: 57). Thus, one of the main criticisms of the peaceful reintegration was that it achieved reintegration of the territory, but not of the people. In Vukovar, primary and secondary schools, as well as kindergartens, have remained divided along national lines to this day. According to Kasunić, the fact that “Vukovar’s children belonging to the Croatian or the Serb ethnicity attend different classes can serve as an indicator that the long-term objective of the UNTAES – the reconciliation of the local population – has not been accomplished because the division along ethnic lines continues” (Ibid., 4). Although there is no physical separation of communities or dividing lines, Vukovar still functions as a socially divided city.

Moreover, as Katarina Kruhonja argued, “the National Program for Return and Restoration of Trust, which is supposed to deal with residual or emerging problems in rebuilding trust and the actual integration of people, has never really come to life” (Kruhonja, 2010: 69). After the UNTAES mission had ended, the state stopped investing in the process of reconciliation, and the people, who had once been on opposing sides during the war, were left to live next to each other without any real institutional support. There was no organized and structured dialogue between the two communities, and the reconciliation process was left to individuals and civil society organizations. This was mainly because the peace process was seen merely as a technical process with a clear start and end date (Bosanac, 2016: 10). UNTAES is, however, generally considered one of the most successful UN peacekeeping missions, but it is rarely marked and celebrated in Croatia as a successful nonviolent initiative.

Memorialization or militarization?

As scholars have argued, conflict remains part of the post-conflict transformations of structures and relationships (Dybris McQuaid, 2023). In conflict transformations where the main goal is only to end violence (i.e., to establish the so-called negative peace), conflict is only frozen but not resolved, as there are no attempts to reach an understanding about what had been happening in the past and to act in the direction of reconciliation. This is because the main goal of political elites might only be to end violence but not to engage in active reconciliation due to certain political aims and goals. For example, the aim of ruling elites may be to build political legitimacy

drawn from narratives about winning in heroic military battles, but not from narratives about peaceful settlement of a conflict. This, in turn, might affect the entire society in a way that only military victories are celebrated and only fighters are commemorated as heroes, whereas attempts at peaceful resolution of a conflict and peace initiatives are neglected and remain at the margins of memory politics. When military victories are normalized in public space and discourse, this constantly reminds us of the trauma that follows conflict and which is then internalized. As Lutz argues, militarisation is “a discursive process, involving a shift in general societal beliefs and values in ways necessary to legitimate the use of force,” and is intimately connected to “the shaping of national histories in ways that glorify and legitimate military action” (2002: 723). This can be observed in post-conflict Croatia where, as Bosanac argued, “Croatia has partially built its own national identity on “military victory” and a militaristically developed identity was an essential part of Croatian sovereignty. Not much room was left for the recognition of non-military (civilian) engagements in recent conflicts” (Bosanac, 2014: 112). Fridman and Pavlaković (2023: 4) further argue that peace initiatives in the entire post-Yugoslav space are obscured in memory politics by the militarized scenes from the battlefields.

In the following sections, I aim to show how memorialization practices and memorial landscape in Croatia exclusively focus on military battles and do not make space for the memorialization of the conflict, which would also include the memory of peace initiatives and peaceful alternatives to violence.

Memory of peace in memorialization of conflict

The fall of the town of Vukovar, the town where peaceful reintegration took place, occupies the central role in Croatia’s collective memory of the war. It has been marked in Vukovar, every year since the peaceful reintegration took place in 1998, with an annual commemoration (‘Memory procession’). Since 2006, the highest-ranking state officials (the president, prime minister and Parliament speaker) have joined the Memory procession almost every year. Its importance for the collective memory of events that happened during the war in Vukovar is visible from the very high numbers of attendees at the annual commemorations. In more, the Parliament declared 1999 the date when Vukovar fell (18 November) as the official Memorial Day, i.e., the Day of Remembrance of the Victim of Vukovar 1991. In 2019, it was also declared a public holiday. Military operation ‘Storm’ was declared a public holiday in 1996 and is celebrated as Homeland Thanksgiving Day. Since 2001, it has also been known as The Day of Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving,

and since 2008, Croatian War Veterans' Day. It is marked yearly with a central state-organized celebration in the town of Knin. It plays a vital role in Croatia's commemorative calendar and occupies a central place in the national narrative of Croatia's victory in the war.

Contrary to this, peaceful reintegration is mainly absent from the national narrative. Only in 2019, after more than 20 years, did the Croatian government recognize the importance of peaceful reintegration, declaring it a so-called national day. Thus, while military actions and battles are regularly marked under the auspices and in the Croatian government's organization and declared public holidays, the peace process is still at the margins of official memory politics. Peaceful reintegration is, however, marked on the same date (January 15) as the international recognition of Croatia in 1992. For this reason, the anniversary of peaceful reintegration often remains in the shadow of this other event from Croatia's recent history on the same date. For example, President Stipe Mesić, the president of Croatia in two mandates from 2000 to 2010, regularly marked international recognition of Croatia on January 15, but not the end of peaceful reintegration. Only 14 years after it ended, in 2012, President Ivo Josipović made a precedent and sponsored the marking of the peaceful reintegration on January 15, organized by a local non-governmental organization from Vukovar. This symbolic gesture was repeated by the next President, Kolinda Grabar Kitarović, in 2016, who attended the marking of the end of peaceful reintegration. In 2018, Grabar Kitarović's office organized an event to mark the 20th anniversary of the end of peaceful reintegration, but this practice was not continued by her successor Zoran Milanović. In 2021, President Milanović only issued a message to the public on the occasion of marking the Day of International Recognition of the Republic of Croatia and the Day of Peaceful Reintegration of the Croatian Danube Region. In the message, peaceful reintegration is mentioned only once as an event "which we also commemorate today" as "an example of success in peacebuilding and democratic development of the Republic of Croatia in the years after international recognition" ("Message from the President of the Republic"). However, on the 25th anniversary in 2023, the City of Vukovar organized a ceremony to mark the event, which was attended by the President and the representatives of the government and the Parliament. Thus, slow progress in commemorating this date or in bringing attention to its importance is reflected in the fact that it took more than 20 years after the end of the conflict for the state to declare the end of peaceful reintegration as a national day and 25 years for representatives of all highest-ranking state institutions (the president, government and the Parliament) to attend an official ceremony marking the event.

The absence of the memory of peace is also reflected in Vukovar's memorial landscape. The war is today publicly remembered in Vukovar with conventional means of commemoration, such as numerous monuments, memorials, memorial plaques, museums, and memorial centers that are scattered around the town and its surroundings in order to serve as constant daily reminders of the horrors of the war and contribute to the creation of an urban landscape dominated by sadness and pain. As Britt Baillie argues, "In Vukovar, the violence of the siege has not been expunged from the landscape but has rather metamorphosed into memorial form" (2012). One of the more recent additions to Vukovar's memorial landscape is the "Memorial to the Grenade from the Homeland War," the real tale of an 82 mm mortar shell dug up in one of the town's neighborhoods. Moreover, in 2023, a new memorial was erected, marking the event of shooting down the first Yugoslav army aircraft during the war. The Memorial Centre of the Homeland War in Vukovar also displays tanks, cannon artillery, armored fighting vehicles, aircraft, and other military equipment used in the war, but today, serving as museum exhibits. Although displaying military equipment from the war is nothing new or unusual in memorial museums commemorating conflicts, what is perhaps surprising about this memorial museum is the recreation of violent episodes and situations from the war. Thus, the visitors can learn what it was like at the battlefield or walking through a minefield, as the exhibition offers a simulation of both fields (Paun, 2017: 8).

Moreover, the museum also offers a virtual reality experience under the title "Vukovar is burning" that takes visitors back to the war and 1991. By putting on virtual glasses and entering an aircraft, visitors can experience a virtual flight over Vukovar during the war while the plane was being shelled (Paun, 2019: 11). Although it offers plenty of opportunities to engage with violent events and violent situations from the war, the mentioned museum does not allow its visitors to learn more about the peaceful settlement of the conflict. Furthermore, a memorial that would commemorate peaceful reintegration or the peace process in public also does not exist in Vukovar. This silence about a peaceful resolution of the conflict suggests no alternative to violence.

In conclusion

This essay represents an attempt at thinking through the memory of peace in the memorialization of the war. It attempted to show how memorialization of the war in the public space and constant reminders of the war creates an environment inscribed with the memory of violence in which there is no space for memory of peaceful settlement of the conflict and non-violent

events and initiatives. This commemoration and memorialization of only military events and battles in public space result in making violence seem like an unfortunate but inevitable result of conflict as if no other solutions to the conflict existed. Such insistence on remembering only violent events leaves little room for reflections about the possibility of non-violent initiatives but also normalizes violence and makes it acceptable. Johan Galtung (1996: 120), however, argued that violence was socially constructed and not a natural or inevitable characteristic of human interactions, but that it was only one of possible ways in which people interact in conflict situations. De-normalisation of violence in public space by remembering peaceful processes and initiatives would promote critical thinking about the inevitability of violence and would break the silence about peaceful alternatives to conflict resolution.

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CHRISTIAN COSTAMAGNA

Understanding the end of
the Kosovo War: *historical
insights, new archival sources
and lessons learned*

This study examines the end of the Kosovo conflict (1998-1999) and how Slobodan Milošević, the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), accepted the peace negotiators' requirements. The perspectives of United States (US) President Bill Clinton, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and several important Yugoslav politicians, as disclosed in their phone calls during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing of Yugoslavia, will be examined. Martti Ahtisaari, representing the EU, and Viktor Chernomyrdin, Boris Yeltsin's envoy, will also be considered. The picture emerging from primary sources, the books of memories of some of the main political actors, and scholarly literature show the key role of the leaders of the big powers in addressing the regional crisis in the Balkans, while there was an evident asymmetrical relation between the US and Russia, the subordination of the United Nations (UN) to those same powers, and Milošević's struggle to resist the external pressures and stay in power.

Historical background about the Kosovo War

In 1998, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Yugoslav and Serbian forces engaged in armed conflict, which resulted in the deaths of several hundred civilians and the displacement of hundreds of thousands more. Belgrade saw the conflict as a legitimate Yugoslav antiterrorism operation against the KLA. The KLA saw it as a struggle against the oppression of the Yugoslav state.

The UN Security Council (UNSC) and the Contact Group (made up of the US, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia) repeatedly warned Yugoslavia to find a political solution and resolve Kosovo's status within the Yugoslav federation.

In 1998, the US began a new negotiating process to end the Milošević regime's disproportionate acts of violence in Kosovo. In October, Richard Holbrooke, the architect of the Dayton peace agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, negotiated a deal with Milošević. After what became the controversial case of the Raçak massacre in January 1999, the pressure against Belgrade mounted. A peace conference talk in Rambouillet and then in Paris was held but without convincing the Serbian participants. NATO, without the endorsement of the UNSC, initiated a military operation against the FRY. The stated justification for this operation was the need to prevent more escalation and protect the human rights of Kosovo Albanians. The NATO raid lasted for 78 days. Just then, after challenging diplomatic efforts by EU representative Martti Ahtisaari and the Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin, the war ended. The Yugoslav security forces left Kosovo in

Interpretations on the end of the conflict

The termination of the NATO bombing campaign and the Kosovo War has received less scholarly attention than its origins. Since then, several hypotheses have been circulating (e.g., Hosmer and Ribnikar).

In the first instance, it is essential to understand why Milošević agreed to engage in the war with NATO, an utterly unbalanced conflict in terms of resources. Briefly, it is possible to say that he accepted the risk of a NATO bombing because he believed it would have been short (maybe a few days); because, most probably, he thought that it would have been politically more convenient than to accept the conditions of the Rambouillet's agreement (that required, according to its annex, the freedom of movement of NATO troops all over Yugoslavia); because he thought Yugoslavia may have obtained some support by Russia (maybe weapons); because Milošević hoped that due to the NATO bombing some NATO members would have abandoned the mission under pressure from their internal public opinion (like in Italy or Greece).

On the other hand, according to the scholarship, what may have influenced Milošević's decision to capitulate most probably was the risk of a prolonged bombing of his country and his political consensus falling. For example, Hosmer (2002: 60-62; 73-76) states that among the causes that finally led Belgrade to accept the terms for achieving peace are the pressures generated in the Serbian population by the prolonged bombing, as well as similar pressures within the regime itself. Furthermore, Hosmer asserts that Milošević embraced the peace plan out of concern for both intensified military actions, including continued NATO bombing, and the looming threat of a NATO ground invasion into Yugoslavia. Similar considerations can be found in Ribnikar's book (Ibid., 220).

Memoirs, while valuable, should be approached with caution. To this category undoubtedly belongs the book by Martti Ahtisaari, the primary mediator and architect, together with Viktor Chernomyrdin, of the diplomatic agreements that led to the technical-military agreements of Kumanovo on June 9, 1999, marking the end of the conflict. Ahtisaari, who manifests in his memoirs unconditional support for the NATO operation, does not hide that he received the proposal to play the role of mediator directly from Strobe Talbott (2001: 13-14), at the time deputy secretary of the State Department. For the US, there was a need to identify a neutral political figure (Finland was a member of the EU but was not part of NATO) before whom Milošević

should give in but save his dignity in front of his electorate and Yugoslav citizens. Ahtisaari and the Russian envoy Chernomyrdin represented an excellent solution to make it tolerable for Milošević to accept NATO's conditions during the difficult diplomatic talks, given Russia's harsh reaction to NATO's choice to bomb Yugoslavia and its efforts to protect Yugoslavia's interests to some extent. To persuade Milošević, the UN had to be officially involved, even though NATO soldiers would have dominated Kosovo's peacekeepers after the war. Given the substantial political disagreements between Russia, China, and the US, achieving this goal required their support, which was uncertain at the time.

In his book, Ahtisaari says he knew what the Americans wanted and why they chose him as a mediator. He believes that after six weeks of bombing, seeing that Milošević was not surrendering and the opposition in Serbia was weak, the new diplomatic attempt would have strengthened both support for the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia and even the unity of NATO itself (Ibid., 19). If Ahtisaari's attempt had failed, he would have shown the world that there was no alternative to NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia. However, the best option would have been a successful mediation. There were many doubts about its success until the very end. In addition, further interesting details emerge in the book, such as the fact that the Americans, when referring to the future of Yugoslavia, used the acronym "ABM" which is "Anybody but Milošević" (Ibid., 42), while Russian President Yeltsin, during a round of meetings in Moscow, had said that, once the crisis in Kosovo was resolved, to leave Milošević "in his place" (Ibid., 141), although he showed no sympathy towards him. Instead, the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Ahtisaari believed that the opposition to Milošević would only prevail once Kosovo stabilized.

Talbott, Ahtisaari writes in his book, believed that the negotiations should not be held with Milošević, but only between the US and Russia (Ibid., 121). Milošević should have been presented with only one choice: accept the conditions offered by the mediators or not receive them. But his refusal would lead to the continuation of the bombing and a possible ground invasion of Yugoslavia by NATO troops. However, Ahtisaari expresses skepticism that the latter option could have come true. However, Ahtisaari, in his book, argues that he did not doubt that NATO, in no way, could accept a defeat (Ibid., 55; 125).

In the books of memories consulted, it is possible to find various interesting details that somehow contribute to creating a clearer historical picture of the events around the end of the Kosovo War. For example, Vladislav Jovanović, at the time Yugoslav ambassador at the UN, wrote in his book (2008: 314) that he was bitter that he had not been informed by the Foreign

Ministry of Yugoslavia that Milošević had accepted Ahtisaari's proposal, and that he had to discover about it from journalists.

General Dragoljub Ojdanić, at the time the chief of staff of the Yugoslav army, wrote in his book that at the beginning of June 1999 what was offered by Ahtisaari was just another "ultimatum" (2019: 516), like the one in Rambouillet, but that in the end, while the Yugoslav army, until then, protected perfectly Yugoslavia and didn't give up a single inch of its territory, there was no alternative to accept the proposal of peace. Moreover, Ojdanić, who attended one of the meetings with Ahtisaari in those days (the second meeting, on June 3, 1999), claims, as eyewitness, that the Finnish President had explicitly threatened the Yugoslav leadership that if Milošević refused the offer, "Belgrade will be as flat as this table" (Ibid., 517). Ojdanić bitterly remarks in his book that Ahtisaari, in his memories, didn't mention that sentence (Ibid.). Nevertheless, Momir Bulatović, who at the time was the Prime Minister of the Yugoslav government, in his book states that Milošević told him, on June 2, 1999 (or immediately after), that, in case of refusal of the Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin's plan, "Belgrade will be razed to the ground" (2005: 318). Moreover, Milošević told Bulatović that it would not be appropriate to reject a Russian-backed plan anyway, because Yugoslavia needed an ally. A rejection of the Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin plan would have meant the loss of Russia's support for Belgrade (Ibid.).

The historians, just in recent years (e.g. Kieninger), thanks to new archival sources, started to delineate more clearly; the dynamics in the international processes that led to the end of the war. Furthermore, it should be added that, although at different stages and with different motivations, over the last twenty years, some primary sources fundamental for understanding both the Kosovo War and its conclusion more clearly have been published in books (Vlajković, 2004; Perry, 2023).

By consulting some of the online documents of the Clinton Presidential Library it is possible to see, for example, how President Boris Yeltsin thought that he could have controlled Milošević, and how him and President Clinton agreed to try to isolate, with *ad hoc* operations, Milošević from his inner circle. It is worth mentioning the transcript of a phone call between Clinton and Yeltsin, on April 25, 1999 (*Clinton Digital Library*, National Security Council and NSC Records Management System). On that occasion, the President of Russia said to Clinton: "Well, Bill, we are continuing and shall continue to work actively with Milosevic as if we were converting him to another faith [...] And finally, so that everyone gets the impression that it is you and me that stopped that war. This would influence the domestic political situation in your country and especially in this country [Russia], but what is most important is that it will help put an end to this conflict." Clinton answered with "Yes." Later, during the same phone call,

Yeltsin added: “Milosevic will not slip out from our influence – he will do everything we tell him to do. I hope your line of communication is a closed one like mine.” In this instance as well, the US President affirmatively responded with “Yes.”

On May 3 (*Clinton Digital Library*, National Security Council, NSC Emails, and NSC Records Management System), during a meeting in person between Vice President Al Gore, other key US officers (like Strobe Talbott) and Chernomyrdin, the latter said: “I told him [to Milošević]: you’ll have 3-4 months and Yugoslavia will be flattened like a disk. He [Milošević] said people would support their country and not give in. You see he’s a sick person and his nation doesn’t know what’s happening. Like Germany under Hitler.”

Indeed, among the contemporaneous sources, namely in two distinct newspaper articles published in the US in 1999, as Hosmer (2001: 103) clearly demonstrates in his study sponsored by the United States Air Force, there were indications that Chernomyrdin may have warned Milošević at that time. In the first case, in an article published by the *Washington Post* on May 27, 1999 (Chernomyrdin) containing an op-ed by Chernomyrdin himself, it is stated, in strongly critical tones towards NATO, that “Now that raids against military targets have evidently proven pointless, NATO’s armed force has moved to massive destruction of civilian infrastructure – in particular, electric transmission lines, water pipes and factories. Are thousands of innocent people to be killed because of one man’s blunders? Is an entire country to be razed?”

In the second case, in a *New York Times* article of July 16, 1999 (Hedges), it is quoted what Yugoslav General Nebojša Pavković said, namely that “We [Yugoslavs] approached the Russians, who were our friends, and made a plan. The Russians accepted the plan. [...] But the Russians then came back and said we had to accept the Western plan, that we had to take it or leave it [...] We were told that if we refused the plan, every city in Serbia would be razed to the ground. The bridges in Belgrade would be destroyed. The crops would all be burned. Everyone would die. Look at the Russians. They have not helped us.” Despite the partial plausibility of Pavković’s statement in July 1999, however, this information is not enough to determine with certainty when Chernomyrdin warned the Yugoslav leadership. Moreover, it is unlikely that Pavković knew about it before his superior, General Ojdanić, who claims to have known it only on June 3, 1999. As Milošević tended to withhold sensitive information even from his inner circle, as illustrated in Jovanović’s memoir where the Yugoslav ambassador to the UN learned about Milošević’s acceptance of the peace plan from journalists rather than his ministry, it is likely that General Pavković indirectly acquired this information from his superiors or senior politicians.

As we can see, from the archival primary sources, we discover that the role of the USA and Russia, in order to convince Milošević to accept the peace plan, was of overarching importance. The role of the UNSC was completely subordinated. Secondly, the primary sources inform us that at least one full month before Ahtisaari said to Milošević that Yugoslavia would risk being further bombed by NATO, the Yugoslav President had already received the same warning from Chernomyrdin. However, consulting the memoirs of Ahtisaari, Bulatović and Ojdanić, this element, of extreme importance, does not emerge. Even taking in consideration the open contemporary sources, like the newspaper articles mentioned above, it is not possible to prove that Ahtisaari and/or Chernomyrdin menaced Milošević of prolonged NATO bombing before June 2.

It is only thanks to archival sources, in this case American, that historical research has been able to progress. This new element opens up a new set of questions. Why did Milošević wait a whole month to accept the peace plan, despite being aware of the risks to his country? Why did Milošević want even his closest associates, such as General Ojdanić, to believe that the threat of prolonged and indefinite bombing by NATO, in the event of non-acceptance of the Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin plan, had only come at the beginning of June, even though it had already been warned by Chernomyrdin exactly one month earlier? In other words, why did Milošević, despite the massive intensification of bombing, delay for a month? To date there is no certain answer, only conjectures. The best conjecture found remains, to date, after more than twenty years, what Hosmer wrote, namely that “Milosevic had every reason to contemplate with trepidation the prospect of unconstrained bombing. He realized that the FRY was now essentially isolated both militarily and diplomatically, surrounded by neighbouring countries that had granted bases or overflight rights to NATO, and confronted by NATO settlement terms that had been endorsed by Moscow” (2001: 103).

Lessons learned from the end of the Kosovo conflict

The Kosovo War was shaped by post-Cold War dynamics in which the US was the sole superpower. Russia was weak, and NATO and Europe's security architecture were changing. The UN system has consequently lost some of its legitimacy. Concepts such as globalization, human rights, liberalism had become dominant and it seemed that an irreversible historical process had begun, notwithstanding the deep contradictions.

The territory of the former Yugoslavia, during the 1990s, had proved particularly vulnerable to a series of wars, originating mainly from Serbia's

political choices. The responses of the international community have not proved timely or efficient.

The vortex of violence, triggered in 1998 by clashes between the KLA and Serbian security forces, has contributed to a serious humanitarian crisis. Milošević and his collaborators have been politically responsible for having contributed to generating a situation of conflict, first latent and then open. The countries of the Contact Group, which had tried to facilitate a solution to the conflict, were divided internally, essentially because of Russia's divergent position. Russia's acceptance of US demands was the essential first important step to ending hostilities. NATO's attack against Yugoslavia and Moscow's pressure persuaded Milošević to accept the peace terms.

The political leaders of the major powers, despite their obvious asymmetry, used coercive military means and intense diplomacy in order to persuade the leader of a relatively small European state, ruled by an authoritarian regime, without effective allies, to accept the peace plan and give up factual sovereignty over part of its territory.

The end of the Kosovo War in June 1999 is the result of intense international diplomatic work and the use of military force by NATO. The objectives of this mediation were the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo, the return of refugees and the entry of KFOR into Kosovo. These objectives were, *de facto*, essentially the same as those of the Rambouillet talks (February-March 1999). NATO pursued these objectives with the use of force against Yugoslavia, while leaving a diplomatic channel open in parallel. Milošević's acceptance of these demands put an end to the NATO bombing and the conflict between Yugoslav forces and the KLA.

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LEDA SUTLOVIC

Temporalities, Inclusivity,

Affect – *notes on the latest*

feminist generation

Over the past decade, a new generation of feminist activists emerged across the post-Yugoslav space, spearheading the new wave of feminist protests, introducing innovative forms of organizing and intervening against patriarchal reality. Brought to wide recognition with their social media work, standout groups such as *Sve su to vještice* [It is all witches] from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the more recent Montenegrin collective *Vala, Ljeposava* [Yes indeed, Ljeposava], are distinctive for their skilful combining of meme format with humorous framing of political message. Creating an interplay between online and on-the-street engagements, in Croatia, feminist collective *fAktiv* organizes the largest feminist protest in the country, *Noćni marš* [the Night march]¹. Originating at Serbian art academies, the regional #metoo movement, *#nisamtrazila* [I didn't ask for it], ignited a wave of testimonies from performing arts students across the region, provoking widespread condemnation of sexual harassment cases, thereby resonating with global movements. The examples are numerous. Though the occurrence of this activism may seem provoked by the current cultural moment, it stems from a longstanding, rich tradition of feminist organizing in the region and persists against the current attempts to diminish women's rights and gender equality. For instance, here in Rijeka, the first initiatives to counteract anti-gender mobilizations emerged when resistance to a single protest, *Hod za slobodu* [Walk for Freedom], created a network of activists ready to respond to attacks on reproductive rights, or any sort of sexist behavior. And though the cases of activism created by the latest feminist generation continue to emerge across the region, they yet await to receive full academic attention². With the goal of creating a starting point for some future in-depth research, this text provides an exploratory overview of the recent examples of feminist activism in the post-Yugoslav space³. The idea is to identify the ways in

1 I wish to extend my heartfelt gratitude to the collectives *Sve su to vještice*, *Vala Ljeposava*, and *fAktiv* for generously granting permission to utilize their photos and materials in this publication.

2 Surprisingly, contemporary feminist activism in the post-Yugoslav space still represents an under-researched issue. The studies of feminist movements will cover the period until 2010, ending with the studies of the new cohort of feminist activists emerging on the scene in the early 2000s, the so-called 'millennials' (Siročić, 2019;2023). These groups endorsed a 'third wave' framing and repertoires of action, evident in the manifestation of queer and left-feminist politics at feminist festivals throughout the region. The most recent work represents a *Women's Studies International Forum* special issue on Post-Yugoslav feminist activism in the 21st century (2019). However, the timeline of this collection also ends in 2010.

3 The interpretation presented in this text was guided by the literature on new feminist activism, a long-term ethnographic observation of Facebook pages of these initiatives, participant observation in the Night March, and seminars organized at the CAS SEE.

which this generation perceives and ‘does’ feminism, as well as the innovative aspects of their interaction with the ever-interesting political reality of this region.

Surfing the Waves

Regardless of the global occurrence, visibility, vibrancy, and growing presence of contemporary feminist activism, the studies still remain predominantly limited to Western countries (e.g. Chamberlain, 2017; Crossley, 2017; Dean, 2010; Evans, 2015; Oren and Press, 2019; Reger, 2012). This literature sees the preconditions for proliferation of this activism in the development of new technologies, rise of social networks, or mainstreaming of feminism in popular culture. Employing the resilient and often criticized ‘wave metaphor’, used to denote a way of framing feminist practice, the literature systematizes this activism as the ‘fourth wave’, facilitated by the Internet and social media (Munro, 2019). However, defining this era in feminist organizing solely based on digital technology use and rapid communication represents a rather narrow perspective. In contrast, the preceding third wave was distinct for stressing the intersections of gender with ethnicity, class, sexuality, disability, and religion, manifested in new event formats and new tools, such as at festivals, blogs, websites, and zines (Dean and Aune, 2015: 5). The fourth wave continues to prioritize intersectional approach, with some scholars appending it by incorporating the struggle against rape culture, online feminism, humour, and inclusivity (Cochrane in Chamberlain, 2017: 2). This effort towards fostering a more inclusive feminism is evident in the introduction of new specialized vocabularies, including terms such as cis, WoC and TERF (Munro, 2019).

Yet, in its aim towards assessment and systematization this literature seems to overlook a broader focus on the movement and its pressing issues, such as reproductive rights, gender-based violence, and femicide, that in the recent years reinvigorated some of the worlds’ largest and most vibrant feminist movements in Argentina and Poland. The restrictions of reproductive rights and bodily autonomy, occurring in both countries, sparked massive waves of protests, creating a new generation of activists, interconnecting different struggles. In Argentina, the positioning of the feminist strike at the center of feminist politics – defining it as a process, rather than a singular event – brought forth a historical accumulation of existing struggles, marking new territories as feminist, forging alliances with other movements, and establishing transnational networks across Latin America and beyond (Gago, 2020). By broadening the strike to encompass various on-going struggles, it became “the key for understanding how the transversality

of social conflict is at play in the intersection of exploitation and sexist violence” (Ibid., 29). To garner broader public attention and resonance, the movement, more known as *Ni una menos* [Not one woman less], also employs different artistic actions and performances to disseminate their message⁴.

Contrary to the synergistic approach of Argentinian activism, some scholars identify a distinct absence of intergenerational dialogue within similarly inclusive massive mobilizations in Poland. Politicized through Black Protest, a new generation is committed to digital and grassroots organizing, navigating between online and street politics, accentuating and utilizing performativity, humor, and inclusivity. This departure from the elite,



A screenshot from ‘Dekna još nije umrla a ka će ne znamo’ (Dekna did not die yet, when will she we don’t know), Živko Nikolić, 1988 – our birth rate is falling – let it fall, we don’t have a place to park either (Vala, Ljeptosava)

institutionalized NGO-centric feminism that dominated previous decades created a more inclusive and open movement. However, despite this shift, the movement still draws certain threads from the decades of previous feminist work. According to Hall, the lack of knowledge transfer between feminist generations and the absence of intergenerational dialogue may risk perpetuating a flat, stereotypical image of the older generation of Polish feminists as ideologically homogeneous. Such oversight potentially leaves unquestioned the legacy of previ-

ous governments that eroded women’s rights. The outlined characteristics of new, vibrant, inclusive feminism greatly resonate with examples observed across the post-Yugoslav space. This text aims to demonstrate how this activism, when perceived in relation to previous feminist generations, is distinctively marked by inclusivity and the skilful use of affects, particularly humor, in online communication and other activities.

No Doors, no Knocking

Invoking of a generational paradigm is no coincidence and is here prioritized over a more common and contested ‘wave metaphor’, utilized to delineate feminist activism and create a historical narrative on the

4 Most notable is the song and performance *Un violator en tu camino*, created by a feminist collective from Valparaíso in Chile, that traveled the globe in feminist protests to be also performed at Zagreb’s Night March.

movement. The metaphor did not travel well to the (post)socialist East, and this represents just one of its critiques, illustrating how Western temporalities and parameters inscribed into the wave approach fall to address the varieties of women's activism in this part of the world (De Haan et al., 2013). For activists from post-socialist countries, the struggle to find their place within the newly consolidated transnational feminist discourse became particularly evident at the 1995 Beijing UN Conference for Women, where Eastern European women's rights issues were framed within 'catching up'



A screenshot from Quentin Tarantino's 2007 'Deathproof' – there is Lela; hi Lela what's up I'm super busy let's talk later meet for coffee (Sve su to vještice)

with the West paradigm (Grabowska, 2012). Further on, underlining a temporal dimension, the idea of a generation, or even a "political generation" (Reger, 2012), illustrates how certain historical and cultural experiences may shape an age cohort or a group, uniting them through a shared political awakening brought by societal changes. The latest feminist generation emerges amidst rising social polarisations, neoliberalization, anti-gender mobilizations, growing socio-economic inequalities, and authoritarianism. The widespread use of new technologies and specific alignment with similar discourses abroad facilitates it. Reconceptualizing 'wave metaphor' as

"affective temporality" instead of division inscribed into the metaphor, Chamberlain suggests a narrative of continuity in which the movement's past, present, and future may come together in the moment of contemporary activism. Aiming to shape the movement, the younger generation carefully chooses their sources of inspiration from the archive according to their identities and ideological preferences. As new generations mature and undergo political 'coming of age,' this further opens discussions about the recruitment mechanisms of the movement and how these may change over time.

Emerging roughly around 2010s, the new feminist activism can be seen as conditioned by the following factors: the effects of economic crisis, growth and synergy between (far)-right and anti-gender forces, the occurrence of similar initiatives in other contexts, and a notable decline of hegemony of professionalized organizations within the movement. Concurrently, the widespread adoption of digital technologies and social networks during this period greatly democratized 'entering' into feminist activism, a role previously performed by well-established, professionalized

organizations. This gate-keeping function can be seen as representing the core of ‘generational issue’ between the cohorts of activists. Its existence is apparent in several research works that, despite pursuing entirely different topics, inevitably encountered this central concern.

In professionalized organizations cases of disappointment, division, and disagreement between the generations are not an exception (Bias, 2019). Older generations often hold key positions in prominent NGOs, hesitating to give a new generation of activists a sense of ownership in the organization, often confining them in the role of “feminist learner” for too long, aiming to keep the control over the movement’s narrative and ideological position (Ibid.). Individual and group activist work are driven with the expectations of “the commitment imperative,” displayed through an all-consuming activity that depends on intrinsic motivation and self-sacrifice, as the only way to receive acknowledgment and become ‘one of us’ (Siročić, 2024: 113). Younger generations strive to overpower this emotional framing of feminist activism, overcome felt passivity, and become equal storytellers and shapers of the movement (Ibid., 53)⁵. Another point of ‘generational issue’ concerns ideology, as younger generations tend to embrace left-feminism and situate their response to the current backlash to women’s rights and gender issues within a wider anti-capitalist framework (Sutlović, 2019: 58). These findings further shape our understanding of a generation, emphasizing ideological leanings over mere belonging to the same age cohort⁶. The new generation perceives feminist organizing beyond the confines of NGOs that view activism as a full-time job. Instead, they seek alternative modes of organization and action, free from donor constraints and dominance of older activist generations. This new organizing can also be interpreted as the need for belonging, or a desire to create communities while acting collectively to counteract patriarchal regimes, thereby creating “affective networks” or the interpersonal bonds that underpin activism (Cvetkovich, 2003 in Siročić, 2019: 52). The latest feminist generation therefore enters the activist arena on their own, without looking for doors to knock on, aiming to create their own affective spaces of expression and playful resistance, free from expectations and informal rules.

5 In her research of the ‘millennial’ activist generation, Siročić identified various negative feelings in relation to the older generation of activists, such as “no development of feminism, no advancement, no inclusion of new people, but simple preservation of the status quo”.

6 Based on observations and protest participation, the assumption is that the latest feminist generation comprises people mostly born in the 1980s and 1990s.

The new feminist activism is primarily visible in the online 'boom' across the countries of the region sharing the same linguistic space. Their discourse is often profoundly marked by humor, evident in the usage of screenshots from popular 1980s TV series or photos of famous philosophers and historical figures in creation of memes. Anger and outrage over the examples of gender-based violence is exceptionally pronounced, as well as rapid reactions to these through sharing of personal experiences, as was most evident in #nisamtrazila movement⁷. Direct resistance and protest, such as the Night march, raising awareness and education, and general intervening into public space, can be identified as some of the goals of these initiatives. This article / essay argues that, in contrast to previous feminist generations, contemporary feminist activism to be most distinctive for its affective framing, endorsed primarily in online communication, but also in various other activities.

By utilizing visibility, humour, and blending common cultural tropes with affective framing of political messages, the progressive-feminist-experimental platform Sve su to vještice gained impressive social media following and widespread acclaim in the region. Emerging organically as an autoethnographic endeavour or a public diary, Vještice grew to gather a broad and diverse audience, witnessing the creation of a counter archive of Yugoslav feminist history. A conscious populist choice to use colloquial language, coupled with visual cultural references, humorously framed in a meme format, reached and engaged the people who might otherwise be disinterested in feminist legacy or negative towards everything civil society or NGO coded⁸. The temporal positioning of *Vještice's* work concerns the legacy established not only by the AFŽ [Antifascist Women's Front, *Antifašistički front žena*], but also the famous Croatian witches, a group of feminist journalists and intellectuals, publicly condemned and ostracized in

7 For more on #nisamtrazila, see: <https://www.dw.com/en/the-balkans-face-their-metoo-moment/a-56469884> (accessed 30/08/2023).

8 Existing on several social media, such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and different podcast platforms, *Vještice* gathers around 60k followers, among whom the most numerous are women, single mothers, unemployed, stay-at-home mums, young, older women, and a significant portion of men. Besides the social media page, *Vještice* is also an independent platform that conducts an experimental program composed of a series of workshops, exhibition productions, artists support, writing, and advocating and collaborates with artists, curators, academics, independent media production, and other actors operating in the domain of counterculture (CAS SEE Seminar with Hana Ćurak).

a political magazine for raising their anti-nationalist voices in the 1990s⁹. For the platform founder, Hana Ćurak, this unsigned article condemning and coding these women as ‘witches’, represents a breaking point that sets up the social context in which we have been operating since the 1990s. As the word ‘witch’ on a vernacular level in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other



Virginia Woolf, London, 1939, chromogenic print created by Gisèle Freund – and she also drags that poor child around... (Sve su tu vještice)

countries of the region carries derogatory connotations, appropriation of its’ meaning subverts the gaze, emphasizes playfulness, and signalizes the existence of a cohesive community, captured in the name It’s all witches. Understanding *Vještice* as a ‘counterinstitution’ or a fake institution, while also rejecting the term ‘activist’ and the NGO form, Ćurak sees as a collective identity encompassing herself, the network, and everyone contributing to the platform.¹⁰ Examining the interaction on the social media page, it is interesting

to observe how provoking a positive affect may serve as an emancipatory mechanism. Ascribing a humorous message into visual representation of a historical figure or a movement icon resignifies the feelings towards the person (that we never knew we had), while placing at the centre the message often documenting a vernacular female experience of patriarchal reality. By putting women’s experiences of everyday life in patriarchal regime in the spotlight and framing them within positive affect, the platform emphasizes their visibility and provokes collective reactions. The embodied experience

9 This concerns the (in)famous case of media ostracism, colloquially known as ‘Witches from Rio’ [*Vještice iz Ria*]. In the unsigned article of a weekly political magazine, titled “Croatia’s Feminists Rape Croatia,” the author calls out the “five witches” or five prominent feminist intellectuals, Dubravka Ugrešić, Jelena Lovrić, Rada Iveković, Slavenka Drakulić, and Vesna Kesić, as traitors and communists who work against the country. At the PEN congress in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 the listed women have allegedly lobbied against holding of the next congress in Dubrovnik. The article also included their biographies, underlining their lack of loyalty towards the new state and its sufferings (Miškovska Kajevska 2017). The media hate campaign that this one article provoked is paradigmatic for the public treatment of oppositional voices that questioned dominant nationalistic discourse and its effects on women. The media hunt relating to the ‘Witches of Rio’ case lasted almost a year (for more see Women Memory – Gender Dimension, ‘Witches of Rio’ at www.women-war-memory.org).

10 Certain donors, such as Kvinna Till Kvinna, Open Society and Heinrich Böell Stiftung office in BiH, self-initially approached Ćurak and supported her work (CAS SEE Seminar with Hana Ćurak).

of this positive affect, interactivity of social media platforms, and engagement with other people fosters a sense of belonging to the *Vještice* community. This may serve as a positive, motivating factor for people to endorse active involvement in political life. The creation of this content can therefore be signified in a variety of ways: as a method of intervening into public digital history, raising awareness, political mobilization, education, but also – and equally important, providing amusement and fun.

In the context of this region, the utilisation of positive affect in activist efforts can be seen as a novel approach to ‘getting the message out’. For instance, following the political regime change in Montenegro, *Vala*, *Ljeposava* arose in response to the exclusion of women from negotiations on the formation of a new government. Endorsing a framework that intersects humour with strong political message was a strategic decision, consciously recognizing it would propel the discussion of gender discrimination and reach out far beyond than the usual activist responses¹¹. The prevailing activist habitus commonly involves experiencing and diffusing negative affect, and this emotional strategy proved to be effective in mobilisation (Siročić, 2024: 7). However, long-term resorting to negative affect can be exceptionally draining, and when coupled with the inherent self-exploitation within activism, very detrimental. Engaging in “reparative politics” becomes a crucial survival strategy and a necessity for those committed to continuous activist work (Ibid.). It is unsurprising that the latest feminist generation – to their still enraged and furious activist repertoires, include the elements of playfulness and fun that emerge from the pure joy of coming together in glorious collective resistance to patriarchal, neoliberal, heteronormative regimes. This mixture of affects is particularly visible with the feminist collective *fAktiv*, organisers of the Night march, one of the region’s largest feminist protests held in Zagreb over the past seven years. This protest has successfully brought around ten thousand people to the streets, demonstrating a blend of classic protest techniques with a celebratory atmosphere of taking up the streets and marching for ‘all those that came before us’ and those ‘that will yet come’. Displaying anger and rage over the state of women’s rights and gender equality in the country and beyond, it also asserts the ownership of public space by (re)claiming the streets. Belonging to the community that intersects generations and movements, albeit in anti-capitalist, solidary key, and drawing attention to the various intersecting issues, such as climate change, migrations, and wars, sexual, reproductive and workers’

11 For more on *Vala*, *Ljeposava*, see <https://www.masina.rs/vala-ljeposava-de-god-se-odluke-donose-cuvaj-i-nama-stolicu/> (accessed 30/08/2023).

rights, represent some of the main traits that the latest feminist generation displays at this protest. Carried by the torrent of the most contradicting, yet powerful emotions, the Night march provides a platform for expressing piled-up anger while uniting in celebration of the International Women's



*The March – my place for emotions
(private archive, Night march 2023)*

Day. It also fosters a sense of belonging to a joyful and proud community, reclaiming justice in the space where they live, and showing solidarity with similar struggles worldwide¹². The event, therefore, succeeds to achieve at least two goals: the political aspect, by expressing anger and highlighting urgent issues, and the reparative aspect, by fostering a sense of community, playfulness, and celebration.

Conclusion

As numerous examples from this region show, past, present and future of feminist movement come together within the moment of contemporary activism. Aiming to shape the movement according to their identities and ideological preferences, the latest feminist generation looks for no doors or permissions to create its own spaces of expression and resistance, free from informal rules, expectations, and donor requirements. Perhaps it is the latter that particularly facilitates a playful and affective aspect of feminism created by the latest generation, that utilises local idioms and vernacular to create community and 'affective networks' through amusement and resistance. Threads of shared meanings spread beyond the region, as we observe in the performances travelling the globe, also to invoke strike as a process and contention tool. Continuities from the previous activist decades, such as dedication towards grassroots organising, DIY aesthetics, queer-left, anti-capitalist leanings, remain prominently visible. Going all the way back to 1942 to make connections with AFŽ, frequently addressed in initiatives across the region, arguably serves as a criticism both of post-socialist transformation processes and previous feminist generations, signaling a desire to connect with the legacy of this particular socialist women's organizing. The

¹² Participating in the Night march represents indeed a whirlwind of emotions, turning from smiles and hugs to shouts and tearing up in a matter of seconds. A friends' two-year old girl very well sensed this, and joined everyone else in expressing her dissatisfaction by shouting all the curse words she learned in the kindergarten the moment we stepped the Zagreb's mains square.

choice of *Vještice* to create connections with the feminist anti-war activism of the 1990s represents an interesting and important intervention that perhaps speaks more to the relevance of micro-local contexts in which these initiatives emerge. The interweaving of diverse feminist temporalities and a conscious choice of the latest feminist generation on their sources of inspiration forges affective networks, nurtures community, and reinvigorates feminist activism, infusing it with playfulness, passion, and fun.

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ENDI TUPJA

**All The Missing Caregivers or
Fascismo all'Acqua di Rose**

The present contribution is a reflection on the possible pathways of artistic research. It focuses extensively on engaging performative writing as an artistic element in biographic storytelling. Hence, the text remains an attempt to reflect on personal memory, the relations of the latter to micro biographies, and how violence guides and is embedded in the creation of a participatory performative work. Reference is made to the performance *All The Missing Caregivers* (Fascimo all'Acqua di Rose) I presented at the Festival for Performing Arts, Live Works Vol.10 Centrale Fies in Dro (Trento/Italy).

I want a word for beingness. Can we unlearn the language of objectification and throw off colonised thought? Can we make a new world with new words? (Kimmerer, 2017). In her article *Speaking of Nature*, Robin Kimmerer reflects on language and plant biology: on language as an act of separation and language as a signifier of being-ness, stressing the differences in English grammar and the Potawatomi language of her ancestors. I am caught in these words as in a spider's web. Can we unlearn the language of objectification? *Can we* implies a they but it also implies oneself.

The research and performative practice for *All the Missing Caregivers* attempts to achieve the goal of unlearning for the performer and to put the audience in the necessary discomfort zone, for a collective unlearning to possibly occur. I am constantly aware this process is limited since I am simultaneously a by-product of the elements I attempt to unlearn. The amount of consciousness supervising the size of being limited was in itself a tool which strongly determined the structure of the performance. I am reminiscent of the fact that I navigate and, at the same time, reinforce the structure to be unlearned. I was made to fit in it, confine myself to its architecture and expand it in the forms it dictates me to so that it can continue to remain profitable against me. This web is alive and is made of colonial thought, hierarchies, a language imposing itself and a timeless construct of unidirectional submissions. I still am entangled in the web of the experiences as a female Albanian migrant in Italy and the consequential misfitted combination of navigating this particular web.

Like a well-orchestrated trap, this web has had the advantage of a linear time of victories of many forms of Italian-ness over the Western Balkan Peninsula, from the Roman Empire to Mussolini's annexation of Albania in its imperial fascist project, from Italy's sudden (re) discovery of Albania in the early nineties to Silvio Berlusconi objectifying Albanian female bodies. Indelible remains his general misogyny, specifically the one concerning Albanian women. His words, referring to them as "very beautiful girls" and "the only type of migrants accepted in Italy from Albania," were uttered in

an official meeting with Albanian diplomats to prevent illegal immigration from Albania to Italy.

60

It was a joke!

And Italy's mediatic obsession filtered in Berlusconi's being laughed!

The joke and the reality of brutal sexual exploitation and forced prostitution of Albanian women in Italy, constitute to this day, one of the most solidified structures of the objectifying web I was (am) trapped in. My experience was always measured against this specific part of the web. Being the prostitute! This semantics of objectification was usually displayed without the usage of the word prostitute itself, in the best example of Montague's compositionality principle (Dowty, 2012). where, the meaning of the whole is a function of the meanings of its parts and their mode of syntactic combination. Therefore, often the whole was missing and the parts did the work on their own. Myself and Albania were the parts and the prostitute, the meaning of the whole. I came to Italy as a student for my first bachelor year in 2003, when the fight against the rubber-boat illegal migration from Albania to Italy had just started to be successful. Nevertheless, the reaction to the Albanian community's presence in Italy continued to be one of sheer horror. This horror was very eloquently readable in the faces of Italians just having found out the Albanian ethnicity of their interlocutor. Usually there was a gasp, a confused look slowly transforming in soft disgust, a pause, a sigh. All these reactions were followed by several ultimate gestures of Italians sanctioning their refusal to interact with any form of Albanianess, like abruptly leaving, turning their backs, imprecating etc. Strategies were developed to hide one's own origins, especially amongst the Albanian student community. Most commonly the ethnicity and nationality would be hidden and other nationalities of the Balkans would be stated instead. The winner for the purpose of elevating one's own ethnical status was Croatia. Still in the Balkans, same diet, the language and accent could be easily confused for the Italian untrained ears and also very similar in phenotypical terms. It is interesting to note that to that point, as far as my memory recalls, Croatians were in general very unkeen to interact with Albanians. Especially, since the latter were within Yugoslavia, perceived as mere inferiors and had de facto less rights, culminating in several forms of state sanctioned forms of apartheid (in Kosovo). The label of Albanians as savages and uneducated, were (continues to be) part of a political strategy of submission of Albanian subjectivities. Croatian students for example would not react to the suggestions of their Albanian counterparts of a shared Balkan culture. In the presence of Italian citizens, they would state the differences elevating Tito over Hoxha and going on to reclaim their proximity to Italianess. This resembled the proximity to certain types of whiteness aligned with Italian standards of ethnic acceptability. I was for instance more than often

reminded in university settings that my skin was »too white to be Albanian«. A phrase that carries in itself a clear form of anti-black racism. Albanians were (supposed to be) of darker skin, meaning they were further away from the northern Italian standards of whiteness and of course inferior. I was lucky to be the exception.

Amid this climate, the Albanian student community was developing growing fears of interacting and becoming too involved with other Albanian migrant communities for fear of encountering the criminality we were constantly told was part of our DNA. Lying on the nationality went as far as to stage half fake biographies (in the case of Albanian girlfriends) for the sake of the Italian boyfriend's family safety. This was done until the boyfriend deemed righteous to confess the truth, especially to their mothers. Inhabiting the city of Milan as a student transformed into a dance of becoming fearful of oneself. The forms of internalised self-hate making their way into the minds of Albanian women (and men) were very alive at the beginning of the 2000, and they were also very alive in me. Except that, I would live and at the same time refuse them in a cacophony of extremes that was detrimental to my mental health. I started to say I was from Tirana, not Albania. My Italian interlocutors would be surprised, slightly confused, and eager to know more. They would ask me to pronounce the name of the town again, and I would slowly, in an epic self-sufficient tone, spell:

T - I - R - A - N - A

I felt victorious and kept saying Tirana with the voiced alveolar approximant (Rescanses, 2013). Italians have such a hard time pronouncing. Unfortunately, I lived in the region of Lombardia where there was apparently a small village called Tirano. Consequently, my victory was very short lived.

Are you from Tirano?

I answered politely and passive aggressively:

No! Tirana as in the capital of Albania.

Ah!

The voiced alveolar approximant also known as soft rolling r. There was a laughter that carried the relief of not knowing the right capital of an insignificant neighbouring country, deemed unworthy and inferior. The rest of the conversation was easy to predict in its banality. The interlocutors didn't have any remarks filled with any type of intelligence to make about my country of origin, except prostitute and poor. Usually, dry compliments on how good my spoken Italian was, were followed by a slight clumsy physical move to talk to someone else. This graceful passage granted me alone time and the Italian interlocutor relief from fighting the cognitive dissonance between my image and the prostitute I should (have) be(en). I knew I had to make myself attractive and worthy through knowledge. I was good at it.

Well read, well spoken, straight shoulders, impeccable pronunciation. I was moving fast forward into Italianess, but there was always an intermezzo of syntactic combinations of the parts hinting into the whole meaning of being a prostitute. For example, war. I was more than often asked about the war. – *How are things now? Better after the war?*

The question was not referring to the ethnic cleansing on Kosovo Albanians, which might have been slightly plausible and justifiable given the general geographical confusion of Italians on the mapping of the Mediterranean. They however were referring to Bosnia.

Pardon! I confused it with Albania.

Not knowing where to locate geographically my ethnicity and background, Italians proceeded in giving reassurance to my new sense of belonging: the prostitute.

Being the prostitute became my map: *Ab wow, cool she does not look like the usual prostitutes they show on T.V!* – This is a sentence told to one of my Italian ex boyfriends by a friend. A rather wealthy, in his early 30s Milanese attorney that had graduated at the Bocconi University. What he really meant was I did not resemble Adelina Alma Sejdini.

Adelina Alma Sejdini.

Raped, kidnapped and sent to be a prostitute in Italy at the age of 16. She had 40 men arrested between the Albanian and Italian mafia and became an activist and advocate reminding the Italian state of the risks of sex work and the distinction with forced prostitution, especially focusing on the illegal status of women. If they kept having no rights (permits) there could never be a real fight against sex trafficking.

She wrote a book.

She sent a letter to the Italian senate.

Some Italian woman politician read it in a hearing.

Nothing was done.

She threw herself from a bridge.

Bones touching water.

She had third stage breast cancer.

Metastasis spreading,

in the soft November waters of the Tevere,

soured by middle class hyaluronic acid and urine.

Her citizenship denied.

Adelina participated in an Italian T.V Show, *Le Iene*, a show that mixes sensational tabloid strategies with investigative ones, moving between the spectacle and pseudo social or political injustice denouncements. However questionable its format it is where I encountered Adelina for the first time. We were in front of each other through a screen. The flesh and bone of my projection was on the other side, telling me that If I was supposed to be, she

had been. She, the prostitute, and I in the imaginary meant-to-be prostitute of my interlocutors. I kept her in silence within as she became part of my web. Part of constantly forced to self-defence. This physically created a bizarre combination of numbness and anger. I was constantly pending between the two poles of hushing and screaming. And the poles did not meet in the middle. No equation gave them balance or a clear structure to navigate. On the other hand, the situation did not improve with time. It improved only apparently since other racialized ethnicities became a mediatic target of racial hatred (as was especially the case for Romania and Morocco). The fear of the Albanians was slowly dissipating in the fervent of the public discourse. Students like me graduated. More Endis were out there proving their worth with their first jobs, thus appeasing Italian souls with the medicine of likeness. Underneath, the prostitute was still the prime signifier of the web, which now had grown to be fully a part of me.

In this premise, the work on *All the Missing Caregivers (Fascismo all'Acqua di Rose)* was born. The death of Adelina Alma Sejdini affected me profoundly. It made me aware of her painful and political journey and of the ways how, in spite of my privilege, it intertwined with mine. The death of Adelina exhumed, not only episodes of racism, but also many episodes where the political responsibility of Italian fascism in Italy was minimised in the most cowardly ways. It made me realise how long I myself had ignored the real implications of this denial, which persists strongly also on the Albanian side amongst institutions, intellectuals and historians.

In my first year at university I was given, by my very first Italian woman friend, a book as a gift. It was a best-of poetry volume by D'Annunzio. I had slightly heard of him in my high school years and after some research, all the fascist implications surfaced. How remarkable that a 19-year-old fresh from high school would give me this author to culturally approach Italy. Later, during my studies I would recall Gramsci having said of D'Annunzio's popularity that it was in part attributed to the fundamental apolitical character of the Italian people, especially of the lower middle class (Gramsci, 2022). My friend came from a lower middle class and would later on tell me, when applying for an Erasmus semester in Berlin, that I was already in Italy, in Milan, and should have been thankful enough for this opportunity. It made sense for her or other Italians to go to Germany, not for me. The friend who didn't necessarily connect D'Annunzio to fascism was so determined to lovingly reveal the inferior hierarchy, I should by "nature" of my ethnicity belong to.

Italian Fascism in Albania and its colonial project made me aware of the ways my own strategies of knowledge accumulation and production had been politicised and highjacked. When I discovered the story of Musine Kokalari, I felt I was too late. I had been too busy looking away for

foreign acceptance. She is the first published Albanian woman writer, both in Italian and Albanian, activist, founder of the Social Democratic Party with her brothers and a strong opponent to Hoxha's regime. A student of Albanian Literature in Rome from 1938 to 1942, she would upon her return to Albania, become very active culturally and politically and reveal unprecedented levels of intellect and courage. Musine was arrested by Hoxha and sentenced to 20 years of prison. Both her brothers were executed without trial. After serving her prison sentence she was sent to forced labour camps and became ill with breast cancer. Musine was denied treatment and died alone and destitute. The diary of her years in Rome were essential to develop the structure of the text for the performance. She exquisitely analyses her feelings and state of being as a migrant and as an Albanian woman in Rome, by capturing the fascist ideology of the time. An ideology still so obviously lingering in the post Berlusconi-era (after his funeral celebrations we were shown his era is deeply embedded in the structure of Italian society).

Weaving a story based on three biographies, of Musine, Adelina and my experience with the projection of the prostitute, transformed into the core process of the performative writing process. It mostly was a process of confrontation with anger, pain and many forms of violence, frustrated in the repressed memories and the fatigue of getting out of them. What does it mean to write about and encounter pain in a performative setting? How can pain and anger be staged? For the sake of whom? How can a performative act move through grief? These were the questions that guarded the creative journey and my sincerity in making a point for Adelina, Musine and performance as an act...of what?

This idea of performing, of the body surrounded by spectators, made me realise the performative setting itself was inevitably objectifying, it was like the web I was trying to deconstruct. The public is a voyeur and a devourer at the same time. I knew I was ready to be devoured. I could not be present in this work other than in the full blown, anger-filled version of my repressed-pain-self, because I speak as a privileged woman for two women who suffered excruciating pain and are both deceased. Be devoured and attempt to devour in return. Open and close ways through metaphors.

The text provided guidance through an architecture of movements and staging ideas of the anti-spectacle in being uncomfortable. Two large scale screens, reminiscent of the omni presence of reality shows and T.V culture in Italy from the nineties to the present, were projected in the space. They included edited material combining food images, family ideals in the far-right Casa Pound organisation, found footage of Italian fascist parades in the annexed Tirana's main square, nuns participating in reality shows etc.

The dialogue between myself as the performer, Adelina and Musine created a path, and the performer with the public a separate one.

Performative writing in this case represented a way to ride contemporarily two different time spaces thus inhabiting separate roles: one with the narration and one with the audience. Several strategies were developed in interaction with the audience, which was constantly challenged to participate. Challenged to the extent of having to follow/obey or leave the space. Creating a sense of discomfort and disorientation was very important to despectacularize the setting. The staged theatrical elements, movement, space, light, and sound in performing strategies are very challenging because I tend to embrace more disorienting political practices. These can, at the same time, be aesthetic but mostly displeasing. I achieved, to a certain extent, the creation of the anti-spectacle in the spectacle, trying to rub myself between the pleasurable and the ugliness and lure the audience into the discomfort of this specific space. It was rewarding to see the public in a state of confusion but, most importantly, disappointed in not being entertained. After the performance, I thought I would feel a void and discomfort, which I am usually overwhelmed with when thinking of Adelina and Musine—the discomfort of injustice and forgetfulness. But I didn't. I was lighter. It did me well. And now, some time has passed and I feel the web still strangling certain parts of my body. It will continue to.

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ACHILLE ZARLENGA

Frontiers and identity:

new approaches for old problems

My research is focused on two main topics: the problem of frontiers and the development of personal identity and how they overlap. Frontiers and borders raise the question of migrants, who are often forced to stay in free and neutral zones, surrounded by walls and guarded with cameras and other control devices, their identities being feared, forgotten, and often rejected. There are numerous works on this theme, but the starting point of my research is Franco Basaglia's analysis, whose theoretical-practical activity is crucial evidence of this correlation. When Basaglia started his work at Gorica's asylum in 1961, he was faced with a dramatic situation where pain, misery, and repression seemed to be the only possibilities for human relationships, as the patients were just mere husks of men without any will. The situation in Gorica's asylum was extremely delicate because the city was at a focal point at the border with Slovenia and was de facto a door to the Balkans. When he examined the situation of patients, the first consideration was purely linguistic: the hospital's mental guests were not without needs and desires, nor did they lack the wits to express them; they did not know the language. Indeed, at the time, two-thirds of patients were strangers, and half of them didn't speak Italian; their life was a history of hate and violence caused by the crimes that had inflamed the north-Adriatic zone's frontiers during the Nineteenth century. This border territory, in the heartland of Europe, showed him how the frontier's existence led to identity negation and the construction of de facto lagers, and he realized that hospital institutions could produce the same effect of ghettoization and denial of alterity out of fear for everything that is perceived as outside the norm. His theory project, although specifically envisioned for asylums, had the goal to be extended to other systems that could create walls and barriers between people. So it stands to reason to consider that his speculative proposal would encompass the actual institutional system of borders, where the negation of identity, be it cultural, political, religious, or more, is common practice and is upheld by the very constructs that Basaglia tried to bring down with his philosophy of praxis, where the notion of "*incontro*," which means meeting or confrontation, could help eliminating the bias of incomprehensibility that surround the other, be it migrant or patient. The comparison with the other, who comes from beyond our frontiers, can happen with the aid of therapeutical practices adopted by Basaglia, who saw in the notion of *incontro* the elements necessary to reconnect to the social life an individual that has been negated by it. With the concept of *incontro*, Basaglia meant to bring together the essential terms of his anthropophenomenological approach that he developed based on the analysis of authors such as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Karl

Jaspers, and Ludwig Biswanger. To quote Ernesto De Martino – whose link to Basaglia is also worthy of study, as some members of the Gorica team worked together with him in Apulia to analyse the tarantism – the views of those thinkers could help to grasp the crisis of existence that plagues the outcasted, whether they be psychologically ill or refugees. For Basaglia, it was only possible to conceive the patient's presence through the *incontro*, which assumes the primal values of recognizing their existence and eliminating the stigma of incomprehensibility surrounding them. Basaglia would delve deeper into his ideas in a paper of 1954 called *Su alcuni aspetti della moderna psicoterapia: analisi fenomenologica dell'incontro*, referring not only to Biswanger and his anthropophenomenological analysis but also to the work of psychiatrist Eugène Minkowski, whose teachings, according to Basaglia, summarized the phenomenological tendencies of modern psychiatry. For the Italian psychiatrist, the *incontro* allows to study the true essence of a closed off individual who often needs stimulus (or *provocatio*) from the doctor to open up and not perceive the other as hostile. As Basaglia pointed out, the *incontro* implies an existential knowledge of the individual that can only happen through an anthropological and phenomenological investigation to create a relationship of unity between patient and doctor that precedes their singular identities. Proceeding with his analysis, Basaglia focused on the double values in the dynamics of the *incontro*: on the one hand, it allows us to empirically understand the modality by which one person interacts with another; on the other, it can help us understand humanity as a whole. The primary means to achieve such a feat is language, which assumes great importance. As the paper stated, it is imperative to get access to another world, another language that allows recognizing the peculiarity of the patients without ascribing them to incommunicability. The phenomenological analysis of the *incontro* and the language are fundamental to explaining the *Weltanschauung* of a person and to add concreteness to the relationship that is built between doctor and patient, which allows Basaglia to anchor his theoretical assumptions to a precise political praxis, compatible with the ordinary functions inside the clinic. In the eyes of the Italian psychiatrist, language study should not aim to find the perfect grammatical rule but instead to study the formal existence and help create a common ground. This *incontro* is accomplished through a dialogue of words, gestures, expressions, and silences. The intimate relationship thus established brings to the blurring between subjective and objective, between "I" and "you." According to Basaglia, through the *incontro*, *it is possible to replace the canonical dynamic doctor/patient with a relationship between two individuals that, by tacit agreement, work together to overcome the patient's traumatic experience to open up to the world and society.*

Across deserts, seas, and hospitals: a look at the current state of migrations

A look at the current global situation shows how the stasis of thousands of people inside refugee camps throughout the world (be it in Greece, Turkey, Liban, or elsewhere) has torn the identities of these stateless persons stuck along the world's frontiers. Nowadays, it is impossible not to notice how frontiers are one of the most pressing issues in our society. It involves different actors, both national and extra-national. The current socio-economic crisis across the globe has destroyed the States' frontiers, pushing an increasing number of people to abandon their hometowns in the hope of finding more acceptable and dignified life conditions elsewhere. The current economic system, essentially based on neoliberal capitalism and vicious globalization, has eroded with alarming speed the frontiers and has created a world virtually without barriers. However, this process did not involve an equal redistribution of richness. Instead, it has widened the differences between men, encouraging all these migratory flows, further amplified and exacerbated by wars, persecutions, and hunger. In a very short time, this crisis has sparked a copious movement of bodies, particularly from Third World countries where the inhabitants, despite their poverty, were forced to pay a lot of money to move towards the States that, in their opinion, could improve the quality of life and give them better chances. A poignant example is the massive migration towards Europe from Africa, as men, women, and children venture daily on a dangerous trip across the deserts, suffering degrading and inhuman conditions. It is hard to believe that these human masses could arrive unharmed in Libyan ports, as it is a fact that many of those who depart often die during the journey in African deserts. Moreover, if by chance they get to Libya – and aren't arrested and detained in State prisons – the luckiest survivors board on fragile inflatables across the tumultuous waters of the Mediterranean Sea, often with tragic outcomes – in the last eight years, according to many NGO's reports, the dark waters of the sea swallowed up twenty thousand bodies. Those who can reach Europe's coast start a long ordeal into the facilities for welcoming immigrants and are treated with the stigma of incomprehensible and relegated to the role of deadweight by the State in which they arrive. It is also significant to highlight how there is often prejudice applied to the migrant, born from a strong ideological heritage that impoverishes their existential peculiarity. This process regards various levels of Western society and, despite appearances, also affects the members of those social classes devoted to protecting humans. Allow me to report a very emblematic episode that I witnessed long ago about a few months pregnant migrant from the Sahara who lamented severe bowel pain with chronic retching. She was taken to the hospital, and the

first medical report was a neurotic crisis and recommended hospitalization in the psychiatry department, which was strongly supported by paramedical and nursing staff; linguistic mediators tried but could do nothing against the blind obstinacy of medical operators, and were forced to turn to doctors in the private sector to reverse what would have been an unnecessary, and perhaps even scandalous, hospitalization. This anecdote is paradigmatic and allows us to point out how certain migrants' physiological conditions are often misjudged and hurriedly categorized as mental illness or psychological distress, a much more convenient and inexpensive way than understanding their problems and needs. Suppose the only answer made by institutions in front of a serious health problem is forced medicalization, its reduction to more corporeity. In that case, this shows the serious social-ideological hypothecation on the migrant's shoulders. Consequentially, this leads to a serious identity crisis because the migrant is aware of the unequal treatment to the point where he/she starts to question his/her humanity. This situation shows how stateless people, after all the difficulties during the travel, have to deal with the prejudices present in the State they arrive in, where instead of being accepted and re-inserted into a different social fabric, they become the prime target of a new form of ghettoization that relegates them to the role of burden for the host society. The same reception arrangements, at least in Italy, don't point at progressive migrants' emancipation but are weighted down by cloudy social assistance that prevents them from cutting out a minimal space of autonomy and self-determination. In the present situation, the frontiers aren't configured only as physical spaces in which to relegate certain human categories but appear to constitute themselves as mental borders that make migrants a sort of sub-human destined to all possible and imaginable atrocities. In addition to what has just been said, it should bring the function of refugee camps, which, in the last years, have increased in number around the world; these shadow zones have become indeed autonomous microcosmos that perpetually enforce certain exclusion mechanisms and where new types of legislation and socialites are born. Segregated within these heavily guarded and fenced territories, the migrants are relegated to a new jurisdiction's typology and are subjected to the panoptic structure par excellence.

New strategies for inclusion

If we keep in mind these elements, the main question to ask is how it is possible to counteract and invalidate these ideological legacies that prompt us to the negation of migrant's identity and alterity. As previously mentioned, globalization has imposed a redefinition of geographical maps, thus

making frontiers and borders of modern nation-states almost ethereal; however, despite this process of homologation and leveling, it is necessary to reaffirm frontiers and borders's importance that are secular artifacts elaborated by men to delimitate their territory and also, and maybe more importantly, to defend their existence against the threat of hostility. The contemporary movements pushing in favor of frontier suppression reveal an inherent immaturity, aiming to avoid the problem instead of facing it directly. While it is not feasible to find definitive and ready-made solutions, maybe it is possible to list some necessary measures that may allow us to mitigate some of the negative effects we have described. Firstly, the illegal migration that nowadays is one of the most urgent problems and the cause of numerous deaths, especially in the journey through the African deserts and the Mediterranean Sea, should be monitored and reduced. This measure is to safeguard the lives of many who are endangered not only by the natural perils of the journey but also by the stratified criminal organizations, possibly covered by some State authorities, that act mostly unpunished in their human traffic. This observation brings out the necessity of bilateral agreements between different governments to help not only regulate the migratory fluxes – at the current state, impossible to control wholly – but also to stop thousands and thousands of people from trying their luck across the sea in inflatables and improper boats. Plus, it is necessary to deeply rethink welcoming strategies to eliminate those forms of sick social assistance that often make the migrants a weight for society. To pursue this goal, it is fundamental to encourage the integration process through some preliminary steps that allow them to master the language and have the possibility to choose a work with regular contract and retribution; too often, especially in Italy, there have been cases of irregular migrants used in agricultural work, without protection and adequate insurance cover or any of those rights that should be reserved for any worker. One of the main challenges related to migrants' inclusion is understanding how best to prepare them for a new country, making sure that the human capital they bring from their countries becomes an integral and productive part of the communities hosting them. Achieving this objective is a desirable result not only for the migrant's wellness but also for the economies and societies in which they live, which could benefit from all the different skills with which migrants can contribute to socioeconomic development and the potential to mitigate the impact of aging and population decline. According to some sector studies, the migrant's inclusion can be obstructed by the lack of linguistic abilities, education, or working experience in the destination country and the non-recognition of job qualifications acquired in their home country. To nullify these elements, the job market should be more open towards the migrants, encouraging measures favoring citizens of Third-world countries, ethnic minorities,

asylum claimants, and refugees to promote social inclusion and full participation in the community's life. A great part of public opinion should understand that the migrant's arrival in depopulated and economically marginalized territories has often represented an occasion of true rebirth, not only in economic terms – for example, through the revitalization of abandoned activities like craftsmanship, considered unprofitable – but also demographic, which is a very delicate theme that polarizes the political discourse when debating the rights to citizenship for immigrants and their children. But why do some communities reject the migrants, viewing them as another cost to shoulder, while others want to grasp the opportunities of a younger population and are eager to integrate them? What factors can promote the start of those virtuous processes of migrant integration and local economic development that seem so important for the state organizations? The answers to these questions could help in facing the continuous challenges that the process of immigration poses to Western countries, increasingly focused on positions of closure. Beyond the pessimistic or enthusiastic positions that emerge from the analysis of individual experience, it is, in fact, necessary to identify possible integration scenarios starting from elements that, at the local level, can indicate not only the socioeconomic inclusion trajectories of migrants but also the social interaction with the population and life's overall quality. Plus, in my opinion, a further problem is the prejudice promoted by media establishments and some political parties that, indifferent to the daily difficulties of these human groups, promote certain stereotypes that see in the “nigga” a career criminal, a serial rapist and, in short, a human being doomed to illegality. This narration fosters the distrust with which we observe the others, who come outside our frontiers and are always seen as a constant threat in Western society. It is almost superfluous to note that how we see the other, the migrant that invades our borders, is weighted by a strong social heritage rooted in a sense of superiority, sometimes unconscious, that is always common to the wealthy parts of the globe. To undo all this, it is necessary to start with the technicians of medical knowledge and the workers inside the public health structures, those who first come in contact with migrants and should be more receptive towards their needs, helping in their integration law process with host societies, to see a resource and opportunity in immigration and an important growth medium and improvement for society, now poisoned by timidity, in an identity different from ours.

NIKOLINA ŽIDEK

Fitting like a glove:

the (ab)use of the European

memory framework in

contemporary Croatia's memory

politics

Since 1945 three “memory regimes” have been in place in Europe: the first, lasting until the 1970s, was framed as the exclusive Nazi German guilt for the atrocities during World War Two, and the myth of resistance and the uncontested ‘victim’ status of Nazi-occupied countries (Littotz-Monnet, 2012: 1182-1202). The second emerged in the 1970s, when the memory of the Holocaust became an epitome of barbarity in European memory. In the third period, after the end of the Cold War, the East European countries faced themselves and the West European memory with the legacy of Communism (1945 to 1989) and delayed the (re)turn to democracy, creating a new memory culture and starting to deal with the legacy of both Nazi and Stalinist crimes (Neumayer, 2015: 344-363), the latter not considered in Western Europe. Consequently, since the 2004 and 2007 European Union enlargement, East European memory entrepreneurs¹ managed to upload their memory to the European memory framework (Neumayer, 2017: 992-1012).

As a result, the European Parliament adopted several resolutions acknowledging Communist crimes and their victims. The most salient is the Resolution on European Day of Remembrance for the Victims of all Authoritarian and Totalitarian Regimes (2008) and the Resolution on European Conscience and Totalitarianism (2009), introducing the equivalence of two “totalitarianisms” (Neumayer, 2015: 345-346), Nazism and Stalinism. However, their effect was regionally limited, because of the lack of ownership in Western and Southern Europe (*Ibid.*). This is also a divisive issue along the ideological lines within the European Parliament (Neumayer, 2017). So far, many authors analysed these memory struggles in Eastern Europe, giving an overview of the whole region Mink and Neumayer, 2013; Sierp and Wüstenberg, 2015) or in individual or comparative case studies (Mälksoo, 2009: 653-680; Mälksoo, 2014: 82-99; Hogeia, 2012; Littez-Monet, 2012; Neumayer, 2015.).

When it comes to the Western Balkans, Milošević (Milošević, 2017: 893-909) analysed the Croatian MEPs initiatives to upload Croatian narrative regarding the 1990s war in Croatia into the European memory framework. Milošević and Touquet (Milošević and Touquet, 2018: 381-399) analysed the “unintended consequences” of downloading European memory practices in the memory frameworks in Croatia and Serbia. McConnell also studied Croatia, with the conclusion that not only “the European project of

1 “Those who seek social recognition and political legitimacy of one [their own] interpretation or narrative of the past, engaged and concerned with maintaining and promoting active and visible social and political attention on their enterprise” (Jelin, 2003: 33-34).

memory miserably failed in Croatia, but it provoked a counter-effect that pushed nationalist sentiments forward” (McConnell, 2020).

This study argues that, rather than provoking a counter-effect, the European memory project fell on a fertile ground of a decades-long process of reconfiguring Croatian memory of World War Two and, consequently, the 1990s war. The rehabilitation of the Ustaša WW2 regime by Croatian memory entrepreneurs was an indigenous process which later instrumentalized the European memory framework for domestic purposes.

The roots of nationalist ideas that emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Croatia can be found among the Croatian political émigré community (1945 – 1990), that preserved its narrative on the WW2 Independent State of Croatia (*Nezavisna Država Hrvatska – NDH*) as the fulfillment of a thousand years of yearning for Croatian independence. In the Cold War context, they managed to reconfigure themselves as victims of Yugoslav communism, and eventually as democrats. They pushed for the destruction of Yugoslavia and the recreation of an independent Croatian state. When Croatian independence was achieved, they found resonance with their political ideas in the homeland.

The leader of the Croatian Democratic Union (*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica – HDZ*) and the first President of Croatia Franjo Tuđman (1991-1999), that headed the Croatian nationalist movement in the 1990s, founded his political project on the reconciliation between the descendants of Ustaše/fascists and Partisans/anti-fascists, and the unity between the Homeland and Émigré Croatia by “forgetting the past.” This project backfired and implicitly tolerated the rehabilitation of the Ustaša (Đurašković, 2016: 772-788), resulting in a spillover of the political émigré memory into the mainstream memory of the Republic of Croatia, parallelly with the process of rejecting and reframing of the common Yugoslav history and Communist legacy.

After Tuđman died (1999), the subsequent Croatian governments did not deal with this narrative spillover and the persistent ideological cleavage regarding World War Two memory and focused instead on the European Union integration process. When Croatia joined the EU in 2013, a regression occurred. HDZ, which during the EU accession negotiations portrayed itself as a mainstream party in line with European liberal values, turned more to the right, even accepting some radical nationalists among its ranks. Also, several radical right parties appeared, interpreting “any kind of liberal attitude as a specific communist one” (Cipek, 2017: 150-169, 150). The Ustaša revival gained impetus again, finding its legitimization in the European memory framework.

This study will analyse World War Two memory in Croatia during the period overlapping with the emergence of East European memory in

the common European memory framework, the Croatian accession to the EU (2013), and the downloading of EU soft laws into Croatian memory practices. It will observe the use of the EP resolutions related to competing narratives around Jasenovac and Bleiburg, two sites that epitomize the two totalitarianisms in Croatia in the public discourse regarding the two events and the speeches at the annual commemorations. Due to the word limit, it will only present the most indicative officials' statements by way of example.

The Bleiburg commemoration marks the events of the immediate post-WW2 when, after the defeat, the army of the Nazi-aligned quisling Independent State of Croatia (NDH), accompanied by thousands of civilians, fled the country, and surrendered to the British Army and Yugoslav Partisans in Bleiburg, Austria, on 15 May 1945. However, they were repatriated to Yugoslavia by the Partisans and either executed *en masse* or transferred to labour camps. The event, commonly labeled as "Bleiburg," was initially commemorated by the political émigré community abroad that preserved its memory, while it was a taboo in the communist Yugoslavia. Although they commemorated the event in their communities in the countries where they found refuge (USA, Canada, Australia, Argentina, West Germany), the first organized commemoration at the site took place in 1952 when three émigrés laid wreaths at the Unter-Loibach cemetery at the graves of Croatian soldiers. In 1953 the Bleiburg Honorary Guard (PBV – *Počasni bleiburški vod*) was founded to organize formal commemorations, and in 1965, after collecting money from Croatian diaspora, PBV bought the parcel on the Bleiburg Field and renovated the graves at the nearby cemetery. Until 1990s it was almost exclusively an émigré gathering. After 1990, official delegations from the Republic of Croatia began attending the event. In 1995 Croatian Parliament started sponsoring the commemoration. In 1996 it was officially established as a Remembrance Day for Croatian Victims in the Struggle for Freedom and Independence, framing the Ustasha regime and followers as fallen freedom and independence fighters, and it is commemorated on the closest Sunday to 15 May.² The sponsorship was ended in 2012 when Social Democratic Party-led coalition was in power, but it was restored in 2016 when HDZ came back into power. The event has never been attended by the highest state figures, prime minister or president.

The commemoration has its rituality: it begins at the church and the cemetery in Unter-Loibach where NDH soldiers were buried and then the procession goes to the Bleiburg Field where the PBV built a chapel and a stage for the commemorative mass and speeches. There was also an adjacent area with tents where drinks, food, and souvenirs (usually overtly

2 In Croatian: Dan spomena na hrvatske žrtve u borbi za slobodu i nezavisnost.

NDH-praising or allusive) were sold, but it was banned by Austrian authorities in 2019. Also, in 2018 the Austrian government added the Ustaša symbols to their prohibited symbols list. In 2021, due to Covid-19 travel restrictions, the central commemoration was held in Udbina, Croatia, site of the Church of Croatian Martyrs, but the latest decision by the Austrian government to allow only an indoor religious ceremony indicates that the Bleiburg commemoration will permanently be moved to Croatia.³

In 2014 Željko Reiner (HDZ), Vice-President of Croatian Parliament, attended the event, although it was not officially sponsored, and asked "... who is bothered with the commemoration of such an unprecedented crime, where women, children, disarmed people were killed, with no trial... Who can be bothered with that, those who swear by the European values? The European values are also a condemnation of communist crimes, and Europe clearly stated that. Those crimes were condemned by Europe, and we also must condemn them, not only because of the past, but also for the young generations. We have gathered here for love towards all those innocents who were killed here, just because they thought differently than their killers, just because they loved Croatia. We have gathered here for those who died with the name of Croatia on their lips and with Croatia in their heart..."⁴ Here the European values are introduced as the legitimacy card for condemning communist crimes against victims (both soldiers and civilians) portrayed as Croats, killed just because they loved their country, implying that communists were not Croats, thus not representing national interests.

In 2016 again Željko Reiner (HDZ), but now in the official role of the President of Croatian Parliament, sponsor of the event, stated: "The fascists, the Nazis and the Ustaše that committed crimes during WW2 were mostly punished for them in numerous just or unjust judicial processes and these totalitarian ideologies have long been clearly and unambiguously condemned by History. The Communist crimes against Croats committed after the end of the war have never been tried nor punished... This is hurtful, and it distinguishes us from many other European countries and European civilization legacies that are clearly stated in the Resolution of the Assembly of the Council of Europe ten years ago and stress the need to condemn the crimes committed by the totalitarian communist regimes. This European

3 For a more in-depth and expanded information on both Bleiburg and Jasenovac commemorations see: Pavlaković, V., D. Pauković and N. Židek (2022), especially the Introduction (Pavlaković, V. and Pauković, D.) and the Chapter on Jasenovac commemoration (authored by Pavlaković, V.). The description of the events is based on that source.

4 Framing the Nation and Collective Identity in Croatia: Political Rituals and the Cultural Memory of Twentieth Century Traumas (FRAM-NAT) project website: <http://framnat.eu/bleiburg-transkripti/#tab-id-19>

resolution precisely states that the problem is that the crimes of communism have not been solved and the perpetrators have not been punished... today we have not gathered here to express any regret for NDH, and let alone celebrate or justify the Ustaša crimes, but exclusively express a deep piety for innocent victims of communist crimes and this is the only truth..." (FRAMNAT). First of all, he states that the Ustaša regime has been unambiguously condemned (by History, with capital H), which is not the case in the context of the increasing historical revisionism in the country. Again, he insists on the dichotomy of criminal communists vs. innocent Croats. Finally, he does not quote the European Parliament resolutions condemning both totalitarianisms, but the Council of Europe Resolution from 2006 that condemns communist totalitarian regime.

In 2017 Gordan Jandroković (HDZ), new President of Croatian Parliament stated that "Bleiburg is a symbol and a metaphor of all the Croatian suffering... a reminder of all the crimes committed during all of the years of Yugoslav communist totalitarian regime... Here we also pay homage to all the generations of Croats who waited far away from the Homeland the day when Croatia would become a sovereign nation anchored in the European space of peace and democracy... Our responsibility is to condemn any undemocratic, authoritarian and totalitarian regime... The victims of the tragedy at Bleiburg and all the Ways of the Cross, the victims of the Homeland war that brought us freedom and independence, as well as all the victims of totalitarian rule must always be mentioned so that their story and their tragedy would never happen again..." (FRAMNAT). Although he does mention "any totalitarian crime," he only explicitly mentions communism, without overtly condemning the NDH regime, but by precisely presenting Bleiburg as a metaphor of *all* Croatian suffering, he whitewashes the Ustaša and frames their struggle as the precursor of the 1990s War of Croatian Independence.

Jasenovac functioned as the largest NDH- Ustaša labour and death camp from 1941 to 1945, where mostly Jews, Serbs, Roma, and enemies of the state were imprisoned and killed. The annual commemoration is organized at the Jasenovac Memorial site on Sunday closest to 22 April to honor the victims and the final breakout attempt of prisoners on 22 April 1945, when Ustaša regime in an attempt to cover up the crimes, destroyed the camp buildings and started killing all the prisoners left in the camp on the eve of the end of the war. Out of 600 prisoners, only around one hundred survived. The Memorial Site was founded in 1969, with the Stone Flower monument made by Bogdan Bogdanović. During the 1990s war, it was occupied, damaged and pillaged by rebel Serb forces, and the site was restored with the assistance of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in 2001. In 2003, the Croatian government restored the Flower Monument and a new

permanent exhibition at the museum opened in 2006. Commemorations resumed in 1996, and they were intermittently attended by high state officials on the day of the commemorations, depending on the side of the political spectrum in power: in 2002 (social democratic) Prime Minister Ivica Račan participated, and since 2003 until 2015, Presidents Stjepan Mesić and Ivo Josipović attended the commemoration. This tradition ended when Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović (HDZ) became president, and started laying a wreath in the days before official commemoration.

The commemoration starts at the museum, followed by a procession to the crypt under the Flower monument, where the speeches were/are held by politicians, followed by the singing of a choir, the reading of prisoner testimonies, and short memorial services delivered by representatives of the Catholic Church, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Muslim and the Jewish community. In 2016, due to the turn of the HDZ government towards right that tolerated or turned a blind eye to the historical revisionism, the victims' and survivors' associations (Croatian Serb associations, antifascists, and the Jewish community) started boycotting the official commemoration and organized additional ones. Therefore, since 2016 we have separate commemorative events, and the (HDZ) government representatives at the official commemorations decided to stop delivering speeches, but they always give statements to the press.

In 2017 Prime Minister Andrej Plenković stated to the press that he came to the Jasenovac commemoration to express piety and condemn crimes, not only here but also in other places of suffering and to repeat that the goal of modern Croatia is that such crimes are never again committed (Al Jazeera Balkans, 23 Apr 2017). We can already observe the pattern that is going to be repeated in the subsequent years. In 2019 after the official commemoration – under the auspices of the Croatian Parliament (Tportal, 14 Apr 2019) where a big number of government officials attended,⁵ Plenković stated that: “We have come here to pay respect to the victims of the Ustaša camp Jasenovac to all the camp prisoners, those who 74 years ago in April carried out a break-out attempt, when, unfortunately, a lot of them died. We are here again to condemn the crimes and the regime where such camps existed, and to say that we have to work on the inclusion in the society, on the reduction of divisions, tolerance and dialogue, as well as the education of the youth on the important moments of Croatian history, especially

⁵ Prime Minister Plenković, President of the Parliament Gordan Jandroković, Minister of the Interior Davor Božinović, Minister of Culture Nina Obuljen, Minister of Public Administration Lovro Kušević, Minister of Science and Education Nina Obuljen Koržinek, Minister of War Veterans Tomo Medved, envoy of the President of Croatia, Anamarija Kirinić.

from World War Two.” We can observe that the victims are devoid of their ethnicity, or any distinctive identity (Serb, Jew, or Roma) and no label of totalitarianism is used or a specific identification of the (NDH) regime that perpetrated those crimes, but only vague reference to a regime “where such crimes existed” or “are committed.”

On the same occasion in 2019 the education minister Blaženka Divjak said: “It is important that the marking and paying respect to the victims of all the totalitarian regimes is done together, and that the victims are in focus, and that we have to pay attention so that history does not repeat itself.” Regarding the education curriculum “We have especially emphasized the totalitarian regimes, especially in Croatia. On the other hand, we have clearly included concentration and death camps where Jasenovac is something that should find its place in the regular education program.” Here we can again notice a vague reference to totalitarian regimes, without specifying what kind of totalitarian regime NDH was, and labeling the biggest Ustaša camp as “something” that should be taught at schools.

In 2021 Gordan Jandroković (HDZ), President of the Croatian Parliament stated: “Paying respect to the victims and killed due to their religion, ethnicity, political positions and values that they were advocating for. A horrible crime has been committed here and we should remind young generations that there is evil and people who are ready to commit horrible things.” Again, we can observe that there is no clear reference to who were the victims, and who were the perpetrators. He continued by saying “Consistency will be important in this because under the ‘red star’ horrible crimes were also committed: Bleiburg, Goli otok, and from the recent past, Vukovar and Škabrnja.” (*Croatian Parliament* website 22 Apr 2021). While Bleiburg was the site of postwar killings by the Yugoslav partisans, Goli otok was a communist political prison for communist dissidents, while Vukovar and Škabrnja are two towns that suffered mass killings and expulsion of Croatian population in 1991 by the Yugoslav People’s Army, Croatian Serb rebels, and Serbian paramilitary forces. Jasenovac death camp victims have no relation to these sites or events, or the regime that followed the end of World War Two. But this theory of the two evils or two totalitarianisms attempts at implying that although the Ustaša regime was the perpetrator in the case of Jasenovac, its members were victims in the case of Bleiburg, so both crimes should be equally condemned.

Conclusion

The contested narratives of World War Two and the legacy of communism are still very present in Croatian public discourse and everyday life.

When it comes to commemorating World War Two events, epitomized in the Bleiburg and Jasenovac commemorations, we can observe different frames. The Bleiburg post-war killing victims are portrayed as Croatia-loving, patriots, poor and innocent victims of communist totalitarian regime. Their struggle is portrayed as the precursor of the Croatian War of Independence (1991-1995) although Antifascism is set as the basis of continuity of Croatian Statehood in the Preamble of the Constitution. Also, they are presented as Croats killed by communists, thus implying that they were the real representatives of the Croatian national interests. On another hand, when it comes to the Jasenovac victims, they are vaguely mentioned without reference to their ethnicity or any other identification, and even more importantly, the perpetrators, the NDH- Ustasha regime, are not openly named. Also, immediately after a reference to the Jasenovac victims, there is usually a relativizing frame that there were also communist crimes, although Jasenovac victims are not related with communism, but were only and exclusively victims of the Ustaša regime. Thus, the purpose of mentioning the communist crimes at Jasenovac commemorations is another attempt at leveling and whitewashing what happened during the NDH regime with the crimes committed during the communist one that followed.

In all the speeches at Bleiburg we can observe the reference to Europe, or European Parliament condemnation of totalitarian regimes as a tool of legitimization of (exclusive) victimhood of those who are killed at the Bleiburg Field and in the immediate post-WW2. The European Parliament Resolution on Conscience of Totalitarianism helped reinforce the narrative of presenting Ustaša as victims of communism by Croatian nationalist memory entrepreneurs, contrary to the EU memory politics aims, which (also) condemns Nazism. Thus, it derives that in Croatia the European memory framework was hijacked, twisted and instrumentalized to reframe the memory of the Ustaša and NDH in World War Two and the later communist period in Yugoslavia to fit the present Croatian nationalists' needs.

The relativization and revisionism carried by the center right HDZ government can be explained by the rise of the radical right in the country, where the party, even when led by moderate fraction, as is the case of the current government, in order not to lose votes, has to flirt with the revisionist ideas, or at least not challenge them. Also, we can observe that while the Prime Minister Plenković is moderate in his statements, and goes regularly to Jasenovac, but not to Bleiburg commemorations, it is usually the (HDZ) President of the Parliament that gives more explicit and controversial statements in the case of both commemorations.

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
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PART II

Reimagining Power and
Possibility: *Essays on
Political and Critical Thought*



ALENKA AMBROŽ

Gender and the (Bio)politics of Translation

The question of intercultural translation is increasingly being raised in academic and activist fields related to feminist and gender studies, as evidenced by numerous publications on the subject in recent years (Castro, Ergun, 2017; Flotow, 2017; Flotow, Farahzad, 2016; Mohanty, 2003; Abu-Lughod, Lutz, 1990). With the words of Olga Castro and Emek Ergun, the editors of one of the important collections on feminist translation studies, *Feminist Translation Studies. Local and Transnational Perspectives* (2017), the future of feminism is transnational, and the 'transnational' happens precisely through translation. Such an observation raises several questions: What is the bond that unites gendered beings with diverse experiences in international solidarity? What kind of translation can take into account the disparity of these experiences within a common struggle? And more fundamentally, how to translate theories concerning subjects whose very existence is not defined in the same way in different languages? For instance, how can we translate feminist theories if we admit that they concern "people we call 'women'", who, as Catherine Malabou writes, are "defined partly by their anatomy, partly by culture, according to a delimitation that is never clear and final"? (2009: 19)

The second wave of feminism was accompanied by the idea that gender is a social construction. This idea is crucial for a trans-cultural perspective, as it implies accepting alternative but equally real conceptions of what it means to be "a man" or "a woman." If we admit that gender is constructed, it becomes a historical and cultural phenomenon. An opposition is thus created between social constructivism and biological determinism, as mutually exclusive. As no cultural organization is universal, the concept of gender therefore raises a particular demand for translation. In other words, as the *Dictionary of Untranslatables* describes this common understanding of gender: "If 'gender' is a term considered untranslatable, this is because it does not have the same extension as sexuality, sexualité" (Cassin, 2014:2249) Yet, such a position can obscure the deeper intertwining of what is considered "biological" and the social, Nigerian historian Oyeroke Oyewumi explains in *The Invention of Women. Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses* (1997) Indeed, the debate about which aspects are constructed and which are "natural" only makes sense in a culture where we assume that social categories have no independent logic, which is not the case in all cultures, as Oyewumi shows. The real issue of gender from a cross-cultural perspective, the author points out, is not the realisation that gender is socially constructed, but rather the realisation that biology itself is socially constructed and therefore inseparable from the social (Ibid., 9). Indeed, there is a problem with the sex/gender distinction by the fact the nature, and with it sex, has a history of its own. As Butler puts it: "If 'sex' has

a history, and a conflicted one at that, then how do we understand ‘gender?’” (Cassin, 2014: 2249).

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What is at stake, then, is a certain discursivity that shapes how we understand and perceive our biological nature. Catherine Malabou summarises this point as follows: “With the question of gender, ontology and biology intersect in language” (2009: 19). As a consequence, gender allows us to observe to what extent translation generates biopolitical effects and carries its consequences on life itself. We are not only performing our gender in our everyday interactions: through widespread hormone treatments and birth policies, the social definition of gender is literally inscribed in our bodies. This is why Paul Preciado asserts that “political subjectivity is made of language and biomolecules” (Malabou, 2020: 94).

The work of translation starts at birth

Gender is one of the words that constitute the *Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon* (Cassin, 2014: 2251) an ever-growing assembly of words that, as Barbara Cassin stresses, don’t stand for what we *cannot* translate but that which we *never cease to* translate, an ongoing task. As Judith Butler explains in a note accompanying the “gender” entry in the dictionary, translation not only further complicates the already complicated relationship between the terms sex and gender and the political implications of their uses, but is tied with the advent of gender in the most intimate way. In being gendered, Butler writes, the infant is put in a situation of having to make a translation: “(...) Gender is a problem of translating the drive of the other into one’s own bodily schema” (Ibid.). With other words, gender, as an expression of the intimate and fundamental sense we give to our bodies, is the result of an infant’s way of translating incomprehensible adult demands and social norms onto its own body. It is a negotiation with ‘enigmatic and overwhelming signifiers’ coming from the adult world. How to understand the process of translation at work here?

One of the great theoreticians of translation, Willard V. O. Quine, often stressed that translation starts *at home*. Pointing to the radical indeterminacy of any translation, he argued that not only can we never be sure what people of other cultures mean by what they say, but that this is true also of our most intimate circles and finally, for our relationship with ourselves. Do we really know what exactly do we mean by what we say, or by calling ourselves “man,” “woman,” “nonbinary”...? Commenting on Quine, Sandra Laugier summarizes this point in the following terms:

The projection of our goals, of our world, into the discourse of another speaker of our language is, philosophically speaking, no less arbitrary than that which takes place in translation. Even we, who grew up together and learned English on the same, or adjacent laps, only speak similarly because society has similarly trained us. (...). When I 'translate' the speech of a co-speaker from my own language, I overlook the inscrutability, that is, unfathomable differences.
(Laugier, 2002: 31-60; 52-53).

Gender, as other forms of our social existence, is thus a constant work of translation: a negotiation between social demands and the idiosyncrasies of our own desires. Sexual difference is the site where biology and culture converge, but without an explicit causal link. As Butler explains, while we are not born “women,” for example, we are born as “something else,” and sex is the name of that something else we are before we become what we become.

Translating the struggle

Keeping this in mind, let's now move to the question of political movements that place the question of gender in their core and the way they mobilize translation. For some years now, the public sphere around the world has been marked by an increased call for a revision of gendered relations. From Chile to Poland, we witness a great solidarity of global feminist movements. *El violador eres tu*, an international anthem of the struggles against violence against women, supporting the Chilean struggle to recognize femicide as a legal category in its own right is just one of the recent examples of such solidarity. Any such fight, that demands a redefinition of what is or isn't acceptable in a certain society, implies translations made at the inter- and intra-linguistic levels, with legal, moral, cultural and societal repercussions.

Without generalizing the diversity of movements fighting for gender equality, we can assert that the objective of these movements is to change the collective imagination of sexual relations in order to liberate *everyone* from relations tainted by domination. Feminists keep repeating it, feminism is a universal emancipation movement because, with the words of bell hooks, “patriarchy has no gender.” We are all victims of the rigid relationships caused by the sclerotic imaginary of male domination, even those who find themselves on the domineering side of this social division. The object of feminist movements are therefore not social units, called ‘men’ or ‘women’, but gendered relations. It is for this reason that the question of translation

within feminism is particularly interesting as translation is the primary operator of any relation.¹ With gender and translation, we are thus dealing with two relations that overlap and intertwine, often with unpredictable consequences for emancipatory struggles. Indeed, it is in feminist studies that the articulation and superposition of different power relations have been studied with the most attention during the last decades. The concept of intersectionality, proposed by the American jurist Kimberlé Crenshaw, has made it possible to think about the combinations of social relations that define an individual in relation to the discriminations or privileges that determine him or her in society. In particular, the concept allows us to understand that the liberation of a part of the female population is not necessarily significant for all women; on the contrary, historically it has often been at the expense of less privileged women. The notorious and often cited example is the access to work of middle-class women in the United States, made possible by the delegation of domestic tasks to immigrant women, employed with sometimes very low wages.

On one hand, with the example of international solidarity in common political goals, feminist movements are exemplary of a cosmopolitan political struggle and serve as an example for many other movements. On the other hand, global feminist movements also present many confrontations, misunderstandings and exploits. Indeed, the female condition is often used as a pretext for “Western” insurgencies in the rest of the world. The goal of women’s liberation is thus caught up in the most violent military and economic exploits. In *Do Muslim Women Need Saving?*, Lila Abu-Lughod analyses the discourse around the US insurgency in the Middle East that justifies the “fight against terrorism” as a “fight for women’s rights and dignity.” During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the issue of women in Islam was constantly in the media. This curious cultural recourse, which was not present in other contexts of war (Guatemala, Ireland, Palestine, Bosnia...) leads the author to ask the question:

(...) Why was knowledge of the region’s culture – and particularly its religious beliefs and treatment of women – more urgent than exploring the history of the development of repressive regimes in the region and the role of the United States in that history?
(Abu-Lughod, 2013: 31).

1 This point has often been stressed by Édouard Glissant, among others.

The common emphasis on the need for women's liberation through military intervention exposed by Abu-Lughod goes back to the presence of the women's issue in colonial politics. A significant example of such "colonial feminism" was the British governor Lord Cromer, famous for denouncing the wearing of the veil in Egypt as a sign of oppression, while opposing the right to vote for women in his own country (Ibid., 33).

In a similar vein, Hourya Bentouhami warns against the perils of international feminist strategies in *Race, cultures, identités. Une approche féministe et post coloniale* (*Race, Cultures, Identities. A Feminist and Post-Colonial Approach*) (Bentouhami, 2015). The author exposes the risk of asserting a universal sisterhood too quickly at the expense of the particular situations of women and sexual minorities. As many historical examples show, emancipation struggles easily become a source of repression in their turn, as soon as they claim to be universal:

(...) There is in the too quickly proclaimed sorority an obscuration due precisely to an enthusiasm that does not sufficiently make the part of ideology in the use of universal signifiers. Concretely, we aim at the idea of solidarity in the struggles that take for object a universal name to defend ("woman," "class," "race," "minority") by forgetting to question the social and political coordinates of the names thus summoned (Ibid., 65).

Just as postcolonial and decolonial theories pose a challenge to previous theories of translation, forcing their development, so it is for feminist and gender studies. In both cases, a crisis of the universal, in other words, a "crisis of reason" is evoked, suggesting that the concept of reason as employed thus far could not embrace the differences of those whose voices are traditionally excluded. Moreover, the two major differences largely obscured in the philosophical canon, cultural difference and sexual difference, together form intersections that further complicate the issues of translation. Women and representatives of sexual minorities belonging to dominated cultures and social strata often find themselves in a double bind. Dominant narratives of female and LGBTQIA+ emancipation thus deserve to be complicated by those from other socio-historical and cultural contexts.

The examples evoked in the previous chapter, though brief, show that gender equality doesn't easily translate from one social context to the other and can be often used as an empty political slogan causing more violence. The question thus remains: if the work of translation is inherent to our gendered social existence, is there a way to mobilize it in our political struggles in a productive and meaningful way? In an intervention in 2016, Hourya Bentouhami asserts that in order to decolonize feminism, it is necessary to start from the lived experience of women, especially from the perspective of minority women. At the foundation of any feminist project is the conviction that there is indeed an objective truth of subjective experience: the only way to get there is to ascend to generality through a pooling of narratives of experience, a fundamental journey according to the philosopher.

It is not by accident that one of the particularities of feminist thought is linked precisely to the conception of shared experience as essential to the formation of theory. The first wave of American feminism, which is at the origin of the international feminism we know today, was born from such sharing. Indeed, the movement began with the spread of listening groups where women met in each other's homes to share their experiences. For many of them, this was the first experience of sharing their testimonies in a non-judgmental environment and being taken seriously.

Feminism was thus born through the struggle against hermeneutical injustice, as defined by Miranda Fricker (2007). Hermeneutic injustice has to do with the way we interpret our experiences. As Fricker writes, "Feminism has been interested since its inception in how power relations can limit women's ability to understand their own experience" (Ibid., 147). If, for example, we have never heard of postpartum depression, sexual harassment, or marital rape, we would have difficulty putting our experience into words and sometimes even identifying that it is an act of violence we are experiencing. The victims of hermeneutical injustice are usually those who have, like women, historically had less institutional power to shape the categories by which we understand the world. Here is how Fricker describes this phenomenon:

One way to consider the epistemological suggestion that social power unfairly impacts collective forms of social understanding is to think of our shared understandings as reflecting the perspectives of different social groups, and to consider the idea that unequal power relations can distort shared hermeneutical resources, so

that the powerful tend to have appropriate understandings of their experiences, ready to be used to make sense of their social experiences, while the powerless are more likely to see certain social experiences through a glass darkly, with at best maladaptive meanings to make them intelligible. If we look at the history of the feminist movement, we see that the method of raising consciousness through “speaking out” and sharing barely understood, barely articulated experiences was a direct response to the fact that much of women’s experience was obscure, even unspeakable, to the isolated individual, while the process of sharing these half-formed understandings awakened previously dormant resources for social meaning, bringing clarity, cognitive confidence, and increased ease of communication (Ibid., 148).

This grounding of feminism in shared experience is reflected in the way theory itself is constituted and justified. Chandra Talpade Mohanty, an Indian sociologist and one of the most visible representatives of what is sometimes called “transnational” or postcolonial feminism, begins her book *Feminism Without Borders* (2023) by explaining that the ideas in the book belong to the collective of feminist, anti-racist, and anti-imperialist communities to which she belongs; the writing was thus born out of conversation with her co-combatants.

As we have seen, one of the main questions of “transnational” feminism is the relation between the “Woman”: a composite of biological, cultural and ideological elements, constructed through different “representational discourses,” as Mohanty calls them (scientific, literary, juridical, linguistic discourses etc.), and “women” – material subjects with their collective histories. Through creating a dialogue between different experiences, translation can be mobilized to respond to the internal impasses of feminisms which, while aspiring to make sense of the situation of all women, actually leave some of them out. Applying the procedures of translation equally allows us concepts mobilized in traditional socialist feminist thought are thus questioned: those of “family” and “home” in particular, criticized for their Eurocentric foundations. It would be important to further explore the “standpoint epistemology” approach, to discern the link between social position, gendered experiences and their epistemic perspectives.

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PAUL BLAMIRE

The Political Theology
concealed within Political Theory

There is a political theology underlying much political theory, and that political theology must be reconfigured.

(Lloyd, 2011: 2)

What was political theologian Vincent W. Lloyd referring to when he wrote that much political theory rests upon a political theology in need of reconfiguration? This is a question that asks us to excavate already difficult concepts. The sometimes murky and unclear waters of the conceptual relationship between politics and theology can be navigated with surprising clarity when approached with the help of political theologians who, at certain moments, have brought their theological training to bear upon intractable political processes, ideologies, and injustices. These moments of righteous rage—in which an otherwise sleepy, overly-technical, and sometimes impenetrable field of thought (which nonetheless deeply undergirds many features of modern secular political thought) is suddenly brought to bear upon, and forced to reckon with, very worldly and present political issues—can provide moments of simple, blissful clarity. One of these thinkers will help us to understand one unseen theological peculiarity which stands as a cornerstone of much contemporary political thought.

The theologian most famously associated with the early wave of Black Liberation Theology is James H. Cone. With a central focus on the liberatory message of Christianity, Cone erupted into a flurry of publication in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the United States, producing a body of work which squarely addresses a central tension in Christian theology, which also stands as a very well-hidden problem for secular political thought. To cut right to the chase, Cone insists that because Jesus was a Jew, he must be understood, for contemporary Christians living in the US and wondering about the meaning of Christ for their world, as black. The insistence on understanding Christ through the ethno-cultural or religious particularity of Jesus is, for Cone, the basis for understanding Christianity as a message of liberation:

“Jesus was a Jew!” The particularity of Jesus’ person as disclosed in his Jewishness is indispensable for Christological¹ analysis. On the one hand, Jesus’ Jewishness pinpoints the importance of his humanity for faith, and on the other, it connects God’s salvation drama in Jesus with the Exodus-Sinai event... Jesus’ Jewishness therefore was essential to his person. He was not a

1 Christology is the area of systematic theology which deals with Jesus Christ and questions like the relationship between his divinity and his humanity (mixed within one body like water and wine, or together but separate like water and oil, etc.)

“universal” man but a particular Jew who came to fulfil God’s will to liberate the oppressed.” (Cone, 1975: 109) 100

Cone rails against an abstracted vision of Christ and Christianity which made possible its attachment to empire and allowed it to become a malleable tool for various projects of political expansion and dominion, such as in the form of fervent missionary activity, as well as various articulations of, in the last few centuries, European superiority, as caretakers of the universal word of God. In this form, Christianity provided indispensable justification for various political mega-projects which have brought untold misery into the world. A particular problem for Cone is the universality of Jesus’ teaching. He reclaims the political meaning of a liberatory Christianity through insisting on the particularity of the actions and revelations of the Christian God:

As long as [conservative white theologians]² can be sure that the gospel is for everybody, ignoring that God liberated a particular people from Egypt, came in a particular man called Jesus, and for the particular purpose of liberating the oppressed, then they can continue to talk in theological abstractions, failing to recognize that such talk is not the gospel unless it is related to the concrete freedom of the little ones (Ibid.,126).

Most expressions of Christian faith have at their centre a story of moving beyond particularity and a particular community to bring ‘the Good News’ to humanity regardless of worldly distinction. This (at least nominally) challenges worldly distinctions between peoples, and universally promises final consummation (perfection, transcendence of material life/sin) and redemption for original sin, symbolically washed away in baptismal waters (for those that maintain this sacrament, as most Christian denominations do) and in continual declarations of faith.

Cone’s insistence on Jesus’ Jewishness and his critique of a very universalist reading of Christianity asserts Christianity’s particularity (historical, cultural, as well as political) as fundamental to its rehabilitation as a message of liberation. As a political theologian, then, Cone sees Christianity as something more than a universal promise of salvation that is confined to the private realm. This is distinctly unlike many ‘political rehabilitations’ of Christianity which assert its universality *as* the vehicle for ‘overcoming all

2 Who were, by and large, the target of Cone’s polemics as he worked in an academic field of Protestant theology overwhelmingly dominated by white theologians who had a conservative reading of Christianity.

our differences', as in Karl Barth (Barth, 1994), or even overcoming capitalism, as in Alain Badiou, although admittedly not a theologian (Badiou, A.). The extent to which Christianity is mobilised as a message of divine liberation for a particular, circumscribed community, or a universal message for all humanity without distinction, is a pendulum that appears, between different places and different times, to swing back and forth. At the heart of this theological constellation is a deep site of tension within Christian theology, pertaining to the originary and ongoing relationship between Christianity and Judaism. The dominant Christian understanding of this relationship, in which Christianity supersedes Judaism, is known as Christian supersessionism.

Supersessionism pertains to the theological understanding of the relationship between Christianity and Judaism. The sites of this tension include both Jesus' person as well as interpretations of the practice and thought of the earliest Christian communities. As a regular feature of Christianity's self-understanding, it became consolidated in the writings of the early Church Fathers (the early and subsequently hugely influential interpreters of Christianity, and who remain particularly important in Orthodox Christianity) and is visible in its broad brushstrokes in most Christian theology thereafter.

Supersessionism names the overwhelmingly dominant narrative of Christianity that Christian churches still for the most part teach. The spiritual covenant of faith in Christ replaced and superseded the earlier, fleshly covenant (best symbolised by circumcision) of the Jews. The Jews used to be the Chosen people, but since Christ had to come and be sacrificed for us, those who see this revelation for what it is (Christians) are the 'new Israel', the new Chosen people. This summarises a protracted interpretive power struggle in the early Jesus movement, and in current scholarship there is an agreement that in the earliest years this Jesus movement was very much a Jewish sect, comparable in many ways with other radical Jewish sects at the time (Rey, J-S.). But beginning with the Apostle Paul (or perhaps with the way he was interpreted), and consolidated with the Church Fathers, the narrative through which Christianity becomes understood as a completely new faith that supersedes and replaces the Jewish covenant with God, emerged. This is also the result of a power struggle in the mid First Century between a 'Pauline-Lukan' faction who wanted to evangelise to Gentiles (many of Paul's letters attest to this struggle and their place as utterly crucial for Christianity becomes solidified therein), and a Jerusalem faction under James who considered Jesus' teachings to be for Jews who should also continue to practice Jewish Law (feasts, circumcision, etc.). The 'de-Judaification' of Christianity in the success of the Pauline faction is evidenced in multiple shifts of practice and worship: faith in Christ replaced adherence

to Law, baptism replaced circumcision (although baptism was not in itself a new practice), the Pentecost replaced Shavuot (the feast of weeks), and so on. The refusal of many Jews to convert to Christianity was seized upon as evidence of their refusal of God, and by the Second Century the Jews were already considered by many Christian writers collectively guilty for having killed Jesus, which gave just one theological justification (amongst several) for the very long history of Christian persecution of Jews.

Why does all this matter? These are indeed somewhat abstract and intricate questions of theology and the early Church, and supersessionism's implications, beyond Christian anti-Judaism, are not always immediately obvious. After the Holocaust, supersessionism became a key issue in Christian theology, and key features of it have been publicly rejected by most churches (including at the Second Vatican Council), despite their continued adherence to a basically supersessionist narrative of what Christianity actually is. But is it a question those outside the churches should be worried about? Is a theological root of Christian anti-Judaism significant beyond trying to understand the persecution of Jews specifically?

Much of what is interesting to political theologians concerns the theological roots of contemporary, secular, political thought. Secular political philosophies are often revealed as depending upon theological concepts or mirroring theological structures (Milbank, 1990). Has Christian supersessionism been inherited by secular thought? Have its features been adopted, and then concealed, in the secular age? Would the apparent decline of religion mean, for the part of Christianity, the decline of supersessionism and its map of particularity being superseded by a claimed universality?

The most direct discussion of supersessionism as a theological phenomenon is that of R. Kendall Soulen, in *The God of Israel and Christian Theology* (Soulen, 1996). Soulen establishes the 'Standard Canonical Narrative' that undergirds basically all Christian thought as a familiar four-step schema:

Creation of the first humans for perfection and eternal life.

The fall, original human disobedience, cast out of the garden, etc.

The redemption of lost humanity in Christ (we are redeemed for our sins if we have faith in Christ, he was sacrificed on the cross for our sins, etc.).

Final consummation, perfection, transcendence from this world, Kingdom of Heaven, etc. (this hasn't happened yet, at least according to Christianity).

Why is this Standard Canonical Narrative supersessionist? Firstly, with the exception of a few passages from Genesis, it disregards the entire Old Testament history of the relationship between the Jews and God, with all its twists and turns, prophecies, betrayals, nuance, and texture. The

entire Hebrew Scriptures are reduced to: God created humans, humans betrayed God and became in sin, this prepares the ground for Christ. The scriptural relationship between the Jews and God is more or less unimportant other than providing the background reasoning (and prophecies) for God to come in Christ for the purposes of redemption. The Standard Canonical Narrative inaugurates an understanding of the human drama in which what matters is an inward and spiritual relationship with Christ as saviour, rather than a worldly relationship with a particular community as having a unique relationship with God. However, *faith alone* (as Luther insisted) was crucial and would become re-asserted at different pivotal moments in the Christian tradition (Augustine, Luther, Barth). Despite the Hebrew Scriptures being included in the Christian Bible as the Old Testament, they are, according to Soulen, structurally unimportant in the overwhelmingly dominant Standard Canonical Narrative.

Soulen establishes the Standard Canonical Narrative as providing a problematic vehicle for moving beyond supersessionism because by its very nature it authorises a triumphalist stance towards Jews and Judaism, as well as rendering Hebrew Scriptures and the whole history of Israel's covenant with God basically unimportant other than a little bit of Genesis. After the Holocaust, Christian churches have rushed to reject supersessionism, which has been thinly rendered as the active persecution of Jews, because understanding it more deeply throws into question the dominant understanding of the Christian story in its entirety. This is a deep problem for contemporary theology.

Political theologians in the US have argued that a supersessionist *logic* transitioned, during the period of the enlightenment and the growth of a secular understanding of the world, into secular political thought, and is thus not just a problem for deep theological tinkering. To return to our opening quote:

Supersessionism within Christian theology has been forcefully criticized and largely abandoned in academic theology after the Second World War. But supersessionist logic, in many guises, remains regnant in political thought. The time to question its supremacy, and to offer an alternative, is long overdue. There is a political theology underlying much political theory, and that political theology must be reconfigured
(Lloyd, 2011: 2).

Where are the sites of this underlying political theology? Amongst others, Soulen discusses supersessionism in Kant, addressing Kant's sketch of the

‘religion of reason’ in *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, written towards the end of his life. Here Kant uses ‘reason alone’ to postulate ‘the transcendent conditions of a morally coherent world’, undergirding morality with *rational* support in the absence of confirmation (via reason) of a God. In his construction of morality ‘within the limits of reason alone’, familiar to all students of European philosophy, Kant reproduces the crucial features of the standard canonical narrative of Christianity and is explicitly critical of any remaining Hebraic elements. Kant argues that any elevation of ‘statutory (Jewish) law’ above ‘moral law’ “cripples the moral enterprise of the human race.” (Soulen, 1996: 62) Kant clearly bases the capacity for universal morality drawn from reason alone upon the unique capacity of Christians to stand above their particular worldly conditions, a feat unachievable for those followers of a faith which remains entrenched in a limited particularity. For some reason, philosophy schemes still teach Kant as a secular thinker, as though he was not explicitly building his moral philosophy on a sense of Christian superiority over Judaism, and so writing that sense of superiority into his thought. Kant, or perhaps our mis-categorization of Kant, secularises the features of a supersessionist Christianity into a universal moral enterprise that is purported to be the product of ‘reason alone’. All that is Jewish about Christianity, in Kant’s schema, is jettisoned, and Christianity’s most universalising, abstracted, and disembodied elements become written into an enlightenment understanding of the possibility of a universal human moral enterprise.

The supersessionist tradition plays Judaism off against Christianity as its constitutive other, and has it stand in for all the bad things that Christianity overcomes: Judaism becomes rendered as limited, particular, worldly, and unable to engage in abstract reasoning (because of the absence of a universal frame). Christianity, by contrast, is universal, transcendent (of fleshly existence), moral, spiritual. The supersessionism of Judaism is a key moment in the ‘maturation’ of humanity and the possibility of establishing universal reason *and* becoming the masters of history. Hegel, for his part, is also very clear about this: universal knowledge is only available to those who have transcended such ‘particular ends’ as the mere survival of the Jewish people (aka, Christians) (Hegel, 1975: 41).

One contemporary thinker who makes a very clear argument about the impact of supersessionism and its secularisation, in particular through Kant, is J. Kameron Carter. In his 2010 *Race: A Theological Account*, Carter charts the inheritance of supersessionism into secular thought which undergirded the early-modern racialisation of Jews. This racialisation in turn provided the groundwork for the racialisation of other groups. Carter argues that the production of the Jews as a distinct race-group who, by definition, could not escape their Jewishness, made possible and intelligible the production of

black Africans (alongside others) as a distinct race who were understood as merely particular, as tethered to and limited by their particularity, in opposition to the European, Christian, rational, universal self: the master of history. This is also evidenced in the establishment of the idea and elevation of 'pure Christians' in the Iberian world around the time of the expulsion of the Sephardim in 1492. *Conversos* (formerly Jewish converts to Christianity), of whom there were many, came under suspicion and were seen as lesser Christians on account of their inescapably Jewish blood. Racialisation is deeply tethered to religion. Amongst others, Kant was a key point in establishing the idea of a European self that was predicated on a myth of reason and universality that was only enabled, or even defined, by the pre-existing structures of Christian supersessionism which claimed a moral universality *against* the 'mere particularity' of the Jews. For Carter, this rational, universal, moral European self underlies a pervasive sense of European exceptionalism.

Much contemporary political thought is unknowingly undergirded by Christian theological concepts. Christianity as a universal message of salvation and moral law, and the Christians as the new Chosen people, provided a framework that has become, at least in parts, secularised and disguised within contemporary secular political thinking. Various claims to chosen-ness have been operative in multiple personal and political projects of European empire, domination, and settlement of the last few centuries (Arendt, 1979: 71–75, 197, 233). There remains, however, much excavation to be done to ascertain the extent of the influence of theological ideas and concepts that were inherited into, and concealed within, secular thought. Theologians addressing doctrinal problems within the halls of systematic theology may be a case of closing the barn door after the proverbial horse has bolted into the long grass of modern secular political thought.

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GIUSTINO DE MICHELE

Negotiating with Violence.

**From the Economy of Violence
to the Violence of Calculation,
Following Deconstruction**

J. Derrida

A thought of deconstruction states that there is no end to violence but only an infinite and ever-risky negotiation among singular, historical positions: an “economy of violence.” In this element, a quasi-categorical imperative impels to save the possibility of the best possible negotiation. The current essay intends to expose the main elements of the framework that this philosophical perspective supplies to carry out such a task: to negotiate with violence.

Deconstruction's Violence and Its Economy

Deconstruction is a term that can designate both Jacques Derrida's philosophical thought, and the conception of reality that this thought deploys. Deconstruction aims at describing and at highlighting a structure of reality based on a postulate of non-conservation of every principle: be it energy, value, life, or meaning. According to this conception, it is impossible to identify, in a given set of instances, one that would be privileged as compared to the others (we can call it a transcendental signifier) and that would organise their order, thus constituting their centre or apex. At the same time, and by reason of this first assumption, it is also impossible to identify a principle (a ground or a reason: we can call it a transcendental signified) that would motivate or justify the existence and the order of the said set of instances. As a corollary to these assumptions, one must also recognise that, in this realm, no method or technique (not even philosophy, or deconstruction itself) can be the privileged way of accessing or exposing any ground or key to describing reality, be it on the physical, semiotic, or intellectual level.

This is not to say that everything (every instance, every principle, or every value) is worthless, or at least as worthy of consideration or as promising as any other: deconstruction is neither a nihilism, nor a relativism. This rather means that, if on the one hand one cannot but give one's preference or rely on some objects and values in an absolutely singular and necessary way, for the time being, on the other hand this preference and reliance are impossible to justify and legitimate in a universal and absolutely binding fashion. As already said, no principle, be it energy, value, life, or meaning, can and can be said to be an unconditional principle of legitimacy. This is why, while analysing other thinkers' ways of legitimizing their conceptions, Derrida is foremost attentive to put into question “the signification of truth” (1997: 10) and the binary “hierarchical opposition[s]” (1981: 4) that such signification orients (such as: voice/writing, spirit/matter, human/animal, or good/evil).

On these premises, Derrida comes to define the trademark of his oeuvre, “*différance*,” as an “economic concept” (*Grammatology* 23), and he ties this definition to the issue of violence. How do deconstruction, economy, and violence come to be articulated? If deconstruction states that no principle of justification precedes what exists, and notably that no stable presence precedes the laws of becoming (*différance*), it then entails a radical criticism of every law (*nomos*) of propriety and proximity (*oikos*). More precisely, since the deferral “precedes” or allows all presence whatsoever to precariously emerge from it. Deconstruction tries to recognize a “most general structure of economy” (Positions 8) where becoming is not made possible by the existence of a recognizable and stable value, of a substance, of something stable that changes, but rather by the dynamic of deferral itself. Whereas a “restricted” conception of the economy of becoming implies that the latter is conceivable or calculable, a general one implies pure expenditure and pure loss of value as its necessary conditions; it therefore accounts, so to speak, for the incalculable.

In turn, this notion of economy is based on conflict: the lack of all foundation gives way to a field of differential forces, better still, “of differences of forces” (Différance 18), without stable referents, origin, or end. All aspects of reality are contingent hypostases emerging from the negotiation (exchange, appearance, disappearance) among singular, conflicting positions. Derrida can speak of a “transcendental violence,” and of a fabric of reality as governed by an ever-becoming “economy of violence” (1978: 113n.21). If violence is transcendental, there is no end to it. Thus, all imperative, be it ethical, theoretical, or political, imposes to negotiate *with* violence: which means, *against* it; but also *using* it. Since transcendental violence has no opposite, and since no opposition to it is legitimated by any principle, one can only opt for a better hypostasis of conflict: hence an economy of violence. Yet, all evaluation remains motivated by singular, arbitrary preferences, the axiological and quantitative calculation of its effects remaining in principle impossible: hence a general economy of violence.

Does this entail that deconstruction is a violent philosophy? Does it state that, since violence is irredeemable, one should yield, indulge, or may-be even exceed into it, in order to redeem evil through its excess? Quite the opposite is true, in fact, which can be shown by pointing the characteristics and the consequences of deconstruction’s violence.

How are we to characterise this violence? A good synonym to it would be “abuse.” In turn, this abuse is to be intended as a lack of legitimacy or fundament. But such arbitrariness is not to be intended as the trait of a moral position: all morality is a consequence of a violence which is pre-moral, pre-political, and even pre-epistemic, thus imperceptible, so to speak. “This transcendental violence, which does not spring from an ethical

resolution or freedom, or from a certain *way* of encountering or exceeding the other, – says Derrida – originally institutes the relationship between two finite ipseities.” (1978: 160). A good way to read the previous sentence is to interpret it as a transposition of a much earlier one: “Whence things originated, there they must also return and according to necessity; for they must pay penalty and be judged for their injustice, according to the ordinance of time.” (Nietzsche, 1962: 45). Thus, if violence is pre-institutional and yet is a necessary condition for funding any institution, it cannot become a post-*quem* principle of legitimacy. Violence names an originary lack of origin. Commenting on Heidegger’s reading of the Anaximander Fragment (the above version is Nietzsche’s), Derrida will thus translate the Pre-Socratic into Shakespeare: the Fragment’s *adikia* (Nietzsche’s *Ungerechtigkeit*, Heidegger’s *Un-fug*), the necessary injustice expressed by the texture of space and time, would be akin to the disjointedness of the epoch that haunts the Prince of Denmark: “The time is out of joint,” says Hamlet (1.5.188).

Are we to deduce that no moral imperative comes from such violence? On the contrary, this transcendental violence is paradoxically the condition for deconstruction’s justice. Or for deconstruction itself *as* justice, if we are to read (one of) its definition(s): “Deconstruction is justice.” (Derrida, 1990: 945).

The necessary disjointure, the de-totalizing condition of justice, is indeed here that of the present – and by the same token the very condition of the present and of the presence of the present. This is where deconstruction would always begin to take shape as the thinking of the gift and of undeconstructible justice, the undeconstructible condition of any deconstruction, to be sure, but a condition that is itself in deconstruction and remains, and must remain (that is the injunction) in the disjointure of the Un-Fug. Otherwise, it rests on the good conscience of having done one’s duty; it loses the chance of the future
(Derrida, 1994: 33).

This situation thus implies some categorical or quasi-categorical imperative. “[W]ithin history – but is it meaningful elsewhere? – every philosophy of nonviolence can only choose the lesser violence within an *economy of violence*.” (Derrida, 1978: 113n.21). This negative formulation (one cannot but negotiate with and within violence) also takes a positive form (the lesser violence is the one that best respects the dignity of alterity): “The, shall we say, categorical imperative, the unconditional duty of all negotiation, would

be to let the future have a future, to let or make it come, or, in any case, to leave the possibility of the future open. And to this end, to negotiate the rhythms so that, at least, this opening will not be saturated.” (Derrida and Stiegler, 2002: 85). “[T]his is the axiom of deconstruction,” one that binds it “to the priceless *dignity* of alterity, that is to say, to justice” (Ibid., 21). As a corollary to this axiom, the will to saturate the disjuncture of transcendental violence would not only be unrealistic: in a Kantian sense, it might even prove radically evil.

And yet, how do we negotiate with violence? How, in sum, to recognize, esteem, or calculate the negotiation that gives way to an opening to alterity – or even alterity itself, since it cannot be recognized, let alone esteemed and calculated? This is as necessary as it is impossible. Deconstruction’s conception of reality thus implies a conception of responsibility which is at the same time infinite and null: I am absolutely and infinitely responsible since my decisions are not to rely on any external principle of legitimacy; yet, since I am not to rely on any external principle of legitimacy, and more, since my own decisions are, necessarily, not well informed or even conscious, I am exempted from any reasonable responsibility. Being responsible means enduring this aporia. This has a corollary: one cannot not choose. The choice is made, even passively and always arbitrarily (hence abusively, violently). Again, the structure of this necessity is ethical and ontological at the same time. It can be made relying on the notion of preference: since I am a finite being, and I cannot prefer, consciously or/and not, some things rather than others, then I am at the same time infinitely responsible and irresponsible. Derrida’s exemplification of this formal structure is as vivid as it is personal:

I can respond only to the one [...] that is, to the other, by sacrificing that one to the other. I am responsible to any one (that is to say to any other) only by failing in my responsibilities to all the others, to the ethical or political generality. And I can never justify this sacrifice [...]. Whether I want to or not, I can never justify the fact that I prefer or sacrifice anyone (any other) to the other. [...] These singularities represent others, a wholly other form of alterity: one other or some other persons, but also places, animals, languages. How would you ever justify the fact that you sacrifice all the cats in the world to the cat that you feed at home every morning for years, whereas other cats die of hunger at every instant? Not to mention other people? How would you justify your presence here speaking one particular

language, rather than there speaking to others in another language? And yet we also do our duty by behaving thus. There is no language, no reason, no generality or mediation to justify this ultimate responsibility which leads me to absolute sacrifice
(Derrida, 1995: 70-71).

The Violence of Calculation

It is possible to propose a formalisation of Derrida's conception based on a Kantian scheme. As we have seen, Derrida does not shy from exposing his position based on an aporetic articulation of hypothetic and categorical imperatives, between the conditional and the unconditional, and as between the calculable and the incalculable, or as between a restricted and a general economy or violence and of responsibility. Moreover, as concerns the possibility to apply the exigencies of the unconditional, Derrida never shies away from the Kantian refrain that consists in affirming the necessity not only of a law, of finite and conditional institutions, but even of some kind of force (which sometimes needs to be phenomenal, physical, and even military) in order precisely to *enforce* laws and institution which must, if not manifest, at least not efface the promise – of unconditional peace, hospitality, justice, etc.

Deconstruction's axiom or imperative consists in affirming the structure of reality as disjuncture. We have seen why this affirmation is necessary, why it affirms a necessity, why this necessity coincides with some justice, and why this justice cannot be a principle of legitimacy. And yet, this affirmation must be affirmed, or *re-affirmed*. It is always better, as Derrida says, to affirm than to negate or deny (that which would amount to lean to radical evil) the structure of reality that permits for something to arrive, and that he designates as *living-on (sur-vie)* (*Spectres* xx). This affirmation must then be the object and the vehicle of a preference: as necessary as it is, it must still be preferred. If this axiom can be defined as a categorical imperative, it is yet one that is unconditional but not sovereign (Derrida, 2005: 84): absolutely obliging, here and now, and yet not autonomous, but determined by some passivity. Whence a responsibility comes which is inextinguishable because its conditions of possibility and of possibility coincide. This imperative is void of all *a priori* content, but it is every time *a priori* bound to a content which is singular and whose occurrence is determined heteronomically (hence Levinas's voice shows a decisive correction to our Kantian start). The law of injunction is general, but every time it comes from, it precipitates on, and is relaunched by a singular and arbitrary (abusive) occurrence (Derrida, 1999: 115).

This logic of preference and of substitution is a tragic and sacrificial one, as shown by the passage quoted above. The deconstructive imperative thus comports the necessity to negotiate, but *the* good negotiation is nowhere to be found. How, then, to negotiate well, or for the better? Such negotiation must avoid two formal consequences. In their exposition, the motif of economy and of calculation comes to the foreground. On the one hand, the axiom demands to not reduce the incalculable to what is calculable; not to reduce rationality to calculation. On the other, it demands to not appropriate the incalculable, to not found one's reason on the possibility to sublimate calculation, which would amount, again, to measure the immeasurable. These would be two complementary manifestations of *hybris*.

The first case, the overt reduction of all economy to its restricted realm, might be akin to the scope of neo-classical economics considered in their philosophical tenor. For deconstruction, which refuses teleology together with oppositional conceptuality, economy cannot be a continuation of war with other means, permitting a slipping toward peaceful and hospital negotiations. The middle-ground of economy and economics is characteristically ambivalent. If the practice of exchange can offer a milieu for differing armed violence, concurrently the material and symbolic arrangements permitting production can set the ground for the worst oppression (down to industrialised extermination). If the practice of calculating quotas or monetary equivalents for hospitality represents the condition of possibility for the empirical effectuation of a categorical imperative (Derrida, *Hospitalité*), concurrently the ideal of calculation most effectively effaces the *ratio cognoscendi* of unconditional morality. On this ground, Derrida even distinguishes violence from "brutality [which] homogenises and effaces singularity" (Derrida and Ferraris, 2001: 92). The violence of economics, the reduction of reason to calculate the optimum of a function of interest, might even be the worst.

The second case is exemplified by Derrida's treatment of the death penalty. When exposing the said axiom of deconstruction, Derrida evokes Kant's formulation according to which some "unconditional dignity (*Würdigkeit*) [is to] be placed higher, precisely, than any economy, any compared or comparable value, any market price (*Marktpreis*)" (Derrida, 1994). But this evocation is critical: Kant does give a singular content to his supposedly universal imperative. Since the distinction between unconditional dignity and calculable economy reflects that between ends and means, Kant's categorical imperative becomes *de facto* conditional in considering human rational essence as the paradigm of an end, and by collecting all such ends in a set of noumenal entities, this gesture corresponds to appropriating the purportedly immeasurable principle of moral negotiation: to measuring justice. Yet the *metron* for this operation remains arbitrary (one can always ask, with Derrida: why man?, why reason?, or even, why "life"?). (Ibid.). Moreover, its determination – that of human essence,

and of its relation to all kind of means, be them animal or inanimate objects – determines justice on the basis of a whole philosophy of right. Shifting from the realm of pure morality to right itself, the consequences of this calculation of the incalculable prove vivid: on its basis, Kant poses that “the categorical imperative of penal law is the talionic law, the equivalence of the crime and the punishment, thus of murder and the death penalty” (Derrida, 2014: 125). The death penalty would thus proof human dignity to be priceless and not negotiable, beyond all interest, be this the interest of empirical life or of animal spirits. The sublime talionic economy thus proof the manifestation of a sacrificial logic whose formal brutality is not mitigated by the means of its execution.

Apostille

If the necessity of violence (maybe even of brutality: but *how* to distinguish once and for all? – this presentation might prove the most abusive) calls for the necessity of insisting relentlessly on an emancipatory promise – pacifist, hospital, abolitionist –, the aporetic responsibility it entails calls for the sharpest vigilance. Deconstruction, which does not dismiss the belief in writing and reading, in ciphering and deciphering, as means to suspend worse forms of abuse (see Lèbre, 2015), hence consigns this promise to such formulations as “death of death” (Derrida, 2014: 202) “sacrifice of sacrifice, [or] the end of sacrifice” (Derrida, 2001: 70), together with the warning to never stop calculating their ruse: as if the inversion of a genitive, or the equivocality of homonymy, could shelter the stormiest consequences.

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VALERIO FABBRIZI

**The Populist Upsurge in
Contemporary Liberal
Societies. Implications for
Constitutional Democracy**

Populism is a complex phenomenon that can be addressed from a multi-lateral perspective. My research investigates populism both from a purely political stance, by considering it as a “strategy” or a form of a hegemonic power in the sense of Chantal Mouffe’s narrative and from a constitutional perspective, to define it as a form of illiberal constitutional democracy that clashes – for its true nature – with classic liberal legal constitutionalism. Here, it can be shown that populist constitutionalism manifests an evident prejudice against non-political and unelected institutions – such as constitutional courts and judicial bodies – by demonstrating a so-called “judicial resentment” or “legal skepticism.” For populist, independent, unelected institutions undermine the truly democratic character of political order by delegitimizing and trivializing popular sovereignty and popular will and depriving the “real” People of their constituent power.

As a political issue, populism stimulates an analysis of four aspects:

1. An intrinsic and irreducible conflict between *the elite* and *the people*, with the former seen as the most radical foe of the latter;
2. An illiberal and anti-pluralist definition of democracy, that rejects cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism, and liberal-democratic values;
3. The celebration of leadership and authoritarian decision-making;
4. A nationalistic and conservative impulse, especially within right-wing approaches.

Nevertheless, from the perspective of a non-liberal constitutional theory, three different versions can be detected: a populist, a popular, and a political approach to constitutionalism. These are similar but different: populism proposes the most radical critique of liberal constitutionalism, by rejecting judicial review and the legal guardianship of democracy, so as it contests any normative and universal conception of rights by privileging an ethnic, strongly majoritarian, and exclusivist claim; popular constitutionalists do not reject judicial review and legal democracy *tout court* but endorse a *weak-form* judicial review as the only way to legitimize and save such an institution, warning against judicial supremacy and arguing in favor of judicial elections as popular constitutionalism.¹

1 Judicial supremacy is, according to Larry Kramer, the primary foe of popular constitutionalism. It implies, he states, “the notion that judges have the last word when it comes to constitutional interpretation and that their decisions determine the meaning of the Constitution or everyone” (2004: 125). Post and Siegel consider this definition too naïve since judicial supremacy does not mean giving courts the last word or authority about the Constitution’s meaning. In their comment on Kramer’s work, the two scholars point out that some possible accounts of judicial supremacy should be excluded as fallacious. Firstly, we tend to exclude that a constitutional or supreme court

Political and populist approaches to constitutionalism have much in common: the primacy of parliamentary supremacy over other forms of democratic decision-making the idea that democratic legitimacy is attributed only to popularly elected institutions, such as the parliament, parties, and the government. It follows that the vote holds major importance. Other central issues for political and populist constitutionalists are disagreement over constitutional matters and fundamental moral values and a strong focus on social rights that are seen as a direct product of the political will of elected majorities (see Goldoni, 2010: 734).

Nevertheless, political and populist constitutionalists also share a clear distrust or scepticism towards constitutional and supreme courts and towards any non-political guardianship; as Richard Bellamy has underlined, for political constitutionalism “the democratic process is the constitution. It is both constitutional, offering a due process, and constitutive, able to reform itself” (Bellamy: 2007: 5). What radically separates political constitutionalism from populist one is the role and meaning of the constitution in the democratic system: for political constitutionalists constitution – albeit from a political and not normative perspective – is a necessary component of democratic decision-making. Moreover, political constitutionalists devote great attention and a strong commitment to the defence of fundamental rights, especially minority rights. By contrast, populists see the constitution as a mere instrument for preserving power, an instrument that might be influenced, modified, and often subverted to strengthen a

might determine what a constitution says or should say, nor that it might prohibit interpretations that contradict justices’ views. Post and Siegel argue that “the concept of judicial supremacy does not mean that courts are empowered to determine citizens’ beliefs about the Constitution” (2004: 1030). This argument can reasonably interact with the Rawlsian definition of the Court as the “exemplar of public reason,” according to which “the Constitution is not what the Court says it is. Rather, it is what the people acting constitutionally through the other branches eventually allow the Court to say it is” (Rawls, 2005: 237). By rejecting both parliamentary and judicial supremacy, Rawls wants to defend the role of the Supreme Court in the process of validating constitutional amendments, that can never be aimed at replacing a fundamental principle with its opposite; it would contradict, Rawls poses, “a long historical practice” that prevents constitutional principles from being reversed or repealed. See Rawls 2005: 238-239. Besides, Post and Siegel maintain that *the People* can permanently overturn judicial decisions through legitimate amendments to correct the contested interpretation given by the Court. No form of judicial supremacy might deny this opportunity; at the same time, “no plausible version of judicial supremacy would prevent citizens from voting for a President because they believe he will appoint Supreme Court Justices who will express the citizens’ view of the Constitution, even if that view differs from the decided opinions of the Court” (Post-Siegel, 2004: 1030).

leader's power and its majority. Political constitutionalism stems from a republican conception of constitutional democracy – especially in Bellamy's version – and takes the constitution as a defence of representative democracy and parliamentary authority, rather than as a way to merely impose authoritarian leadership

Popular constitutionalism, in turn, addresses its critique of the (un) accountability of constitutional justices by contending that justices should reflect the popular will to give it constitutional legitimacy, rather than interpreting the constitution as a normative text in a paternalistic tone. Although it shares with populist and political constitutionalism an undoubted suspect towards judicial supremacy and legal constitutional democracy, popular constitutionalism does not manifest a radical rejection of judicial review by courts; to the contrary, it proposes a weak-form review that might transform courts into a popular institution by allowing them to symbolize the principle of “constitutional representation.”

Current State of the Populist Phenomenon

In current times, the general interest and the philosophical-political literature about populism is getting wider and wider. Over the last thirty years, the scholarship has produced countless number books, essays, and articles about populism, by investigating it from various perspectives and angles. Within the huge literature about populism, we cannot fail to mention Margaret Canovan's *Populism* (1981), Ernesto Laclau's *On Populist Reason* (2005), and Jan-Werner Müller's *What is Populism?* (2016) and the most recent Chantal Mouffe's *For a Left Populism* (2018).

Populism is a complicated and multifaceted phenomenon; it is very difficult to be defined, and nearly impossible to be systematized.² For instance, Camil Ungureanu and Alexandra Popartan have defined populism as a “catch-all concept” that identifies political forces that appeal to the “popular” voice to legitimize themselves. Nevertheless, some guidelines to depict the profile of the “populist model” can be traced. A first typical character of “the populist guy” is suggested by Cas Mudde, according to which we should not ban populism as a merely anti-democratic style; conversely, an

2 Nadia Urbinati has persuasively underlined the complexity of the populist phenomenon. She defined it as both a rhetorical style and a strategy to exercise political power and manipulate the democratic system; this second aspect goes hand in hand with the rejection of liberal constitutionalism and representative-parliamentary politics. I have certainly been influenced by this argument, and I am indebted with her work.

alternative thesis considers populism for its anti-liberal claims that lead to rejecting the peculiar assets of liberal-democratic regimes: judicial independence and the legal interpretation of the constitution; minority rights; pluralism and any limits to popular sovereignty and general will. Moreover, populism has been also identified as a form of radical and militant democracy, based on agonistic grounds which oppose the “real People” and the “corrupted elites.”

Contemporary populism emerges as a form of post-ideological and post-party politics that assumes the defence of “the People,” in its national and ethnic identity, as a primary goal; at the same time, populist leaders look for an enemy, mainly economic or financial elites; minority groups or international institutions. Moreover, the populist upsurge is often associated with deep social and economic crises that contribute to nourishing a tense and potentially conflictual atmosphere that populists are able to interpret and manipulate (Marchettoni, 2018: 110).

Populist exponents, so as their supporters and voters, tend to polarize good and bad arguments, by offering a simplistic view of facts and events, without any critical analysis of society, by often conforming to a common-sense narrative, sometimes conspiracy theorist and negationist (see the no-vax and no-mask movements during the Covid-19 pandemic) and delegating a leader to represent the “real” or “counter-truth.” Populism also entails the idea that part of the public opinion is constantly deceived by the elites – economic, political, cultural, scientific – that want to control the gullible people. Populists are inclined to accuse these people of being servants of such elites while defending the true and free people that are not to be deceived.

Contestation of the scientific knowledge and the protest against “the professors,” “the experts” or also “the technicians” to give value and importance to the common sense of the common people, so as the idea that competence is no longer a value but only a form of elitist power is a populist standpoint. This idea of truth and public opinion is open and antiscientific by blaming science and research to be prone to political and economic powers; these arguments cannot be accepted as properly democratic. Accordingly, to follow Urbinati we might define populism as a form of anti-intellectualism (see Urbinati, 2014: 131-132, 150).

Contemporary theories of populism tend to distinguish between two forms of populist politics, a left-wing and a right-wing approach. Right-wing populism pursues purely nationalistic issues; it aims at defending “the People” from an ethnic, conservative, and traditional postulation; the recall of the “pure People” is a recurring topic in the right-wing populist claim.³

3 This distinctive feature of populism is well exemplified by the

Michael Sandel has observed that the rise of right-wing populism follows the failure of the left-wing parties and the progressive forces: the more the Left – with its values and principles – loses credibility and support, the more the nationalist, conservative, and somewhat xenophobic right-wing populism gains (Sandel, 2018: 353-359).

Right-wing populism repudiates multiculturalism and pluralism, by promoting differentiation, discrimination, and exclusion and by accusing minorities, migrants, or “special” categories (LGBT groups; political opponents; non-political and international institutions) of being the worst threat to the “People”; at the same time, the State, its leader and the “People” are considered as one, as the Nation with its traditions and laws to be respected and protected.

Right-wing populism often coincides with a charismatic and fascinating conception of leadership that identifies a man or a woman as the only spokesman and defender of the real will of the people. This leader is often considered the most honest, sincere, and trustworthy leader on the political scene; he/she claims a wide political consent that is considered to be misinterpreted or ignored by the political elite and the government.

By contrast, left-wing populism does not entail nationalistic or ethnocentric, much less racial, premises. Left populists prefer a social and political, rather than ethnic, definition of “the People,” by founding the battle against financial and economic elites in terms of denouncing social inequalities and redistribution of resources and wealth. Left-wing populism does not find its enemy in the weaker or minoritarian groups; conversely, leftist populists aim at defending such groups against big concentrations of power and wealth, elites, and privileged castes. Contemporary populism, especially the left-wing one, seems to arise from two main circumstances:

1. The financial and economic crisis has impoverished the middle class and significantly widened the social inequalities;
2. The failure of the left-wing parties throughout Europe and the USA and their gradual slipping towards neoliberal positions.

slogans promoted by right-wing parties and leaders in Europe and United States, such as “Make American Great Again” launched by Donald Trump for his victorious presidential campaign in 2016, or – again in 2016 – “Britain First” used by former UKIP leader Nigel Farage during the equally victorious Brexit campaign. In the same vein we consider “Italy First” promoted by right-wing leaders Matteo Salvini and Giorgia Meloni, and “Choisir la France” that is the motto chosen by Marine Le Pen in 2017 to replace the previous one, “Remettre la France in ordre,” as the landmark of her new movement Rassemblement National, risen from the ashes of her father’s far right party Front National.

This essay is intended to become part of a larger project about democracy and constitutionalism in current times (probably a book project on political liberalism and its critiques), but in my mind, it will be also prepared to be a large article, or two specific articles, on populism and its implications for liberal democracy to be worked on in the next months.

The first part is to be intended to be general, because it will primarily focus on the political and theoretical backgrounds of populism, to recall many important theories about the populist phenomenon, and its distinction into leftist and rightist sides. By being general, the first section will be more analytical and comparative, but, in any case, it is partial and incomplete at the moment because it is work still totally in itinere and “under construction.”

The second section will try to put together political and constitutional features of populism to contextualize this topic into a distinction between political, popular, and, namely, populist ways of interpreting constitutional theory and opposing the liberal-democratic paradigm. The idea here is to compare these three models to highlight similarities and differences by posing the starting point according to which both are anti-legal and not-liberal models of constitutionalism (although in different senses).

Against this background, this work will go deep into the populist phenomenon by investigating it both under political and constitutional frameworks. In particular, the scope will be to compare populist constitutionalism with its two most similar competitors in the battle against liberal-democratic constitutionalism: a popular and political one. Populist, popular, and political constitutional approaches are similar but different: populism proposes the most radical critique of liberal constitutionalism by rejecting judicial review and the legal guardianship of democracy so as it contests any normative and universal conception of rights by privileging an ethnic, strong majoritarian and exclusivist claim; popular constitutionalists do not reject judicial review and legal democracy *tout court* but often endorse a *weak-form* judicial review as the only way to legitimize and save such an institution, particularly warning against judicial supremacy.

What is to be done in the future is to complete the first section about the political and theoretical fundamentals of populism, also in the light of the most recent contributions on such a matter, and to compose and conclude the second section by reconstructing the characteristics and the specific differences among political, popular and populist constitutionalism to clarify the final thesis that the differences among these varieties are certainly more nuanced than they are with liberal constitutionalism.

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**Building Bridges vs. Building
Walls: *Politics as the End of
Violence***

Violence means destroying the nature of something, i.e., treating something against its conformation (Sartre, 1992: 171). This straightforward claim certainly grasps the everyday meaning of the word “violence” and the moral contempt that it implies.

As Sartre’s definition seems anodyne, what it denotes is problematic. Not only is defining something’s nature a tricky task, but it is uncertain whether human beings have a nature at all (Arendt, 1961: 9-10) or whether the obscure ground of nature is what defines them (Arendt, 1979: 455). The very polysemy of the term nature in the previous sentence – swinging from the traditional notion of essence/form to the biological structure of a living being, up to a negative definition that emerges only by naming violence – reveals the fluctuations of the term’s nature and violence, that are therefore problematic or, in Schmitt’s words, polemic. The slippery meaning of violence and its content of moral deprecation allows for a varied use of the word. Indeed, the identification of violence intertwines with a normative definition of human beings, hiding the political and philosophical choice of what constitutes their realisation and dignity.

However, destroying something’s or someone’s nature is not the only feature of violence. Using this word, common sense also addresses instrumentality: violence employs force to realize its scope (Arendt, 1972: 143). Even further, violence treats everything like a tool to reach its scope: “violence is not one means among others for attaining an end, but the deliberate choice of attaining the end by any means whatsoever” (Sartre, 1992: 172).

Putting Sartre’s definition of violence at work in Arendt’s thought, nature paradoxically appears as what is violated and what is violent. Indeed, nature captures human beings with the coercive force of bodily needs, while, for Arendt, they enact their dignity when they set free from violent ways of dealing with each other to act freely in the political realm. Thereby, this is her normative definition of mankind.

Therefore, for Arendt, violence and politics are mutually exclusive (1972: 143): politics is the end of violence. Indeed, according to her, politics begins when citizens give up on violence as a means for solving disputes among themselves, using instead the persuasive force of great speeches and deeds. For Arendt, politics is the enacting of plurality, i.e., “the fact that men, not Man, live on the Earth and inhabit the World” (1998:7; 1993: 9): the uniqueness of every human being reveals itself on the political stage (1961:154), where actors meet each other and discuss public matters. Politics is, for Arendt, the participative action on the public stage.

This introduction shows how Arendt’s deployment of the term violence reveals that she excludes constriction and instrumentality from the public

realm. There, citizens discuss rough topics without violence: in the political sphere violence takes the mild form of agonism among citizens, struggling to show their virtues.

Arendt's thesis about the reciprocal exclusion of politics and violence emerges by contrast if we examine the reflections of another thinker who worked in the same years as Arendt, Carl Schmitt, who involves war and violent deeds in his definition of politics, thus including them in his normative definition of human beings¹. This confrontation will be carried out through an inquiry into Arendt's and Schmitt's study of the spatial rooting of politics, and their discussion of the meaning of the term *nomos*.

Nomos: building walls

One of the insights that Arendt and Schmitt share is the idea that politics and law ground into a spatial disposition (1993: 122; 1995: 52, 73; 2007: 13): how a political entity lives expresses itself in how it organizes spaces, dwells and signifies them.

According to Arendt, human beings are at home when they build a world around them, i.e., when they transform nature, where they happen to be born, through lasting objects, institutions, cultural products, and works of art. All these "things" reflect and determine how communities perceive the world, their relationship with others and nature. Vice-versa, this world modifies and conditions human existence (1993: 9, 137) that takes place within a meaningful space, bearing the traces of the past. Some examples of this spatial dimension of human existence are the partage of the public and private realms, which has changed widely across history. For example, women's space was identified with the home for centuries, where they had to hide from public sight and activities. Further, the shape of what is revealed

1 These two authors come from very different backgrounds: Arendt (1906-1975) was a Jewish phenomenologist who fled Germany when the Nazi regime took power. Schmitt (1888-1985) identified himself as a jurist, and he was one of the intellectual advocates of the Nazi regime. However, Arendt's and Schmitt's theoretical pathways meet on several domains: each one's library contains, with notations, the other's book – see Schmitt's library in the online catalogue of the Schmitt Stiftung and Arendt's library, that is partially available on the website of the Hannah Arendt Center, Bard College. Also, the two authors meet in the fields of political theory, geopolitics, and philosophy of law, to the point that they often analyse the same concepts, even if from very different perspectives. While Arendt quotes Schmitt several times, Schmitt quotes her only seldom (Schmitt *Nomos – Nahme – Name* 573). Lastly, the bibliography on this point is vast: see the bibliography below. For this introduction, I thank Andreas Wilmes, and his research on "New Violence."

in the public sphere changed: the Greeks chose the glory of great deeds and speeches. During the modern age, the public realm became the space for exposing artifacts, i.e., the exchange market. Lastly, from the 19th century onward, activities that one does for a living, i.e., labour, have conquered the public realm as everyone tends to identify with its profession.

Hegel analysed the influence of the natural and artificial environment on cultures and human beings. For example, he described how the relations of various peoples to water determined their spirit and vice-versa. According to Hegel, the proximity to the sea enhanced bravery, stimulating entrepreneurial attitude and taste for risk-taking, thereby pushing adventurers and sailors to great adventures and the discovery of new worlds (1991: 106-108).²

Schmitt employed these reflections of Hegel's to describe the human spatial rooting and underline his preference for the telluric way of dwelling (1997:1-13;2006: 42). Indeed, Schmitt's work *The Nomos of the Earth* (1950) opens with the claim that the political body grounds on the Earth and its justice, and that the very foundation of law is the opening of the earthly space where the juridical order is valid – *justissima tellus* (Ibid., 42). Earth binds the political community and their spatial disposition, as the Greek word *nomos* shows.

Influenced by Heidegger, Schmitt grounds his search on *nomos* on a philosophy of language. Indeed, phenomenology deploys the idea that philosophical inquiry grasps the fundamental meaning of things. This philosophy of language develops along the spectrum of Nietzsche's claim – that Arendt embraces – that words are faded metaphors, hiding fundamental human experiences (Nietzsche, 1999: 143-144), up to Heidegger's idea that language is the "house of being," whose essence an "aboriginal language" reveal.

Following Heidegger's insights, Schmitt searches in the aboriginal meaning of the word *nomos* the spatial essence of the political and juridical entities (Sferrazza Papa), based on the assumption that the aboriginal language neutralizes the "polemic" use of words. Schmitt counters the most common translations of *nomos* as law and the German translation "*Gesetz*." This latter word, for him, reduces *nomos* to the whole of the positive norms established by a particular community (Schmitt, 2006: 70). Contrarily, *nomos* means, according to Schmitt, the coupling of spatial orientation and political-juridical order, as is clear by its denotation of walls, *limes*, fences (Ibid., 52). For a deeper understanding of *nomos* as the intertwining order

2 Hegel's and Schmitt's readings of the history mainly focuses on the European Civilization, whose history they turn into a Universal History. Certainly, this reading obliterates the history of the rest of the world and is highly Eurocentric, besides from being incorrect. For this clarification I thank Javier Toscano.

and orientation, Schmitt analyses the Greek verb *nemein*, of which *nomos* is the *nomen actionis*. *Nemein* relates – for him – to the German verb *nehmen* (to take or grab), revealing that *nemein* firstly means to occupy land, secondly to distribute, and lastly to produce and make use of the soil. From the etymology of *nomos* and *nemein*, and from the privileged relation of *nemein* to *nehmen*, Schmitt deduces the priority of the occupation of land over any other spatial activity: land occupation is, in the jurist’s thought, the “radical title” grounding the legitimacy of the political body.

In Schmitt’s perspective, the opening of the space for the political body is the authentic meaning of the Greek syntagm *nomos basileus* (sovereign law, despotism of law): “*nomos* is precisely the full immediacy of a legal power not mediated by laws. It is a constitutive historical event – an act of legitimacy, whereby the legality of a mere law first is made meaningful” (Ibid., 575-577).³

From this justice of the Earth, Schmitt deduces the prominence of the *jus publicum Euorpeaum*, i.e., the European balance’s order and orientation of sovereign states that started in 1648 (the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the religious wars in Europe) and ended in 1885 (the Congo Conference, which accepted a non-European state into the hall of sovereign states⁴). The *jus publicum Europeaum* grounded on the limited war among equal states (i.e., among equal sovereign enemies, the *justi hostes*, against what Schmitt describes as the “moralizing” war conducted for the *justa causa*), with limited territorial scopes and fought only among armies. This spatial order-orientation also relies on the heterogeneity between the European soil and the rest of the world, that Europe intended as free space for its imperialism. Lastly, the *jus publicum Europeaum* reflects the heterogeneity between Land and Sea, i.e., between the territorial law’s limitation and the lack of measure of the sea, whose “law” – or lawlessness – is correspondently unlimited. In

3 The institution of the space where the law is valid is indeed one of the essential functions of the sovereign, as he who decides on the exception (*Political Theology* 5). Indeed, “The exception appears in its absolute form when a situation in which legal prescriptions can be valid must first be brought about” (13). Thus, Schmitt counters the contemporary readings of the despotism of law, which attribute sovereignty to the law itself (21): these readings deny sovereignty by the very constitutional limitations they impose to it, thereby reducing the political body to a barely juridical entity.

4 Curiously enough, for Arendt precisely the inequality of the European system caused its crumbling: indeed, this system grounded – from the French Revolution onward – on the universal equality of human beings and sovereignty of the peoples. The actual inequality among Europe and the rest of the world endangered the very ground of this system, causing its decline (Arendt, 1979: 185-221, 298-299).

the modern age, the sea forged the uprootedness of England, that based its global empire on its monopoly over the oceans.

Remarkably, Schmitt does not use the word “violence” to describe war, especially when addressing modern European conflicts. He does not do so even when he describes war as the extreme possibility of killing the enemy. His neglect of the word violence reflects his intent of subtracting war from moral contempt. Indeed, for him, the possibility of war boils down to the fundamental political antithesis, i.e., to the opposition between friend (*Freund*) and foe (*Feind*) (Schmitt 2007: 26-27), where the latter is the foreigner himself (*Fremd*), since war with him is always possible. In Schmitt’s view, the political antithesis – friend vs. foe – should not blur with ethics – good vs. bad –, aesthetics – beautiful vs. ugly –, or economy – advantageous vs. disadvantageous. The purely political notion of enemy excludes any moralization: Schmitt accepts the event of war as an ineluctable fact that no one should put into doubt, as abolishing the word “war” leads only to labelling the event with different formulas.

As for Arendt, she also inquires phenomenologically about the fundamental political words, including the word *nomos*. However, philological inquiry into the origins of *nomos* does not simply bring together Arendt and Schmitt: Arendt read⁵ several books by Schmitt. Arendt’s accounts to Schmitt’s theses are three. Firstly, Arendt counters Schmitt’s hierarchization of the etymology of *nomos*. The second remark underlines Schmitt’s obliteration of human plurality. The last consists in her claim that, besides the Greek *nomos*, there is the Roman *lex*.

Arendt’s inversion of Schmitt’s list of *nomos*’ translations is precise: according to Arendt, *nomos* means “to distribute, to possess (what has been distributed), and to dwell” (Arendt, 1998: 63; Jurkevics, 2015: 13). Thus, in her view, spatial displacement generates the possession and limitation of land and later how people dwell there.⁶

This first remark grounds the second one, i.e., Arendt’s methodological criticism of Schmitt. While the German jurist aims at grasping the original meaning of the word *nomos* phenomenologically, in her *marginalia* Arendt describes Schmitt’s deduction of the telluric grounding of the order-orientation as “pseudo-ontological” (Jurkevics, 2015: 4). Not by chance, Schmitt

5 Arendt *Denktagebuch* 216-217, 243, Jurkevics 17.

6 Remarkably enough, the French philologist Laroche elaborates a similar hierarchization of the meanings of the word *nomos* (Deleuze – Guattari 472), in his work from 1949, *Histoire de la racine NEM- en grec ancien* (Marzocca 96-100; Sferrazza Papa 252-253). In a later work, *Nomos – Nahme – Name* (1959) Schmitt faces Laroche’s study, claiming that it does not counter the fundamental thesis of the spatiality of *nomos*.

counters the late Greek dichotomy between law and nature, *nomos* and *physis* (1996: 578). For Arendt, Schmitt grounds politics on the essence of the soil, thereby obliterating the human plurality from which politics and law spring. Significantly, Schmitt claims that the meaning of the fundamental political concepts does not spring from the human experiences and practices, as for Arendt, but that it was there even when nobody talked about it (Schmitt, 1995: 494).⁷ Indeed, according to Arendt, although it is undoubtedly true that *nomos* has a fundamental spatial meaning, i.e., it opens the space for the validity of law (1993: 122; 2015: 18), that means exactly that human beings arrange spatially their political organization, the parting of realms for their different activities, and the several meanings attached to each of them. Vice-versa, this spatial structure determines human existence and experience of things. To summarize, communities set up the world around them through their plural activities, including public discussion and the establishing of pacts. Therefore, Arendt's prominent criticism of Schmitt lies in her claim that he obliterates human plurality.

Lex: building bridges

Arendt's last account to Schmitt sheds light on his exclusive attention to the Greek exegesis of law while forgetting the Roman *lex*: Schmitt recognizes the different meanings of *lex* and *nomos* only to state the former's inauthenticity (1995: 578-579). Contrarily, Arendt underlines that the spatial dimension of a political community happens within the confines of its space, which justifies the analogy between laws and walls. Clearly, this notion of law implies the exclusion of the outside, the protection of the community from the stranger that tends to identify with the enemy, as Schmitt's remark on the proximity between *Feind* and *Fremd* reveals.

Nevertheless, Arendt underlines that this idea of law as a wall is also risky on the inner side. In correspondence to conflictual outer politics, inner relations among citizens are poisoned by individualism and agonism (1990: 82).

Indeed, the Romans grasped another fundamental meaning of the law and spatial disposition of the political community through the word *lex*. According to the Romans, politics meant binding individuals and peoples, connecting them as through the building of bridges (Arendt, 1993: 113; Jurkevics, 2015: 11-16). While individuals and peoples are equal and different (Arendt, 1998: 175), politics means recognizing the stranger not as an enemy but as a possible friend, with which intercourse is possible through political

7 In that text, Schmitt digs into the phonetics of the German word *Raum*.

pacts, and a discursive solution of conflicts (*foedera*). On this point, Arendt clarifies that this political virtue of binding peoples peacefully guarantees the expansion of political relations, thus sanctioning the end of violence. Nevertheless, in Arendt's view, while *lex* rectifies the violence hidden in *nomos* (Esposito, 2017: 30-31), the limitation implied in *nomos* contains the unbridled tendency of *lex* to connect individuals and peoples, thereby generalizing risks (Arendt, 1993: 118; 1998: 230-236; Jurkevics, 2015: 15; Lindahl, 2006: 900-901): "because of its concreteness as a territory or a jurisdiction, *nomos* acts as a counteragent to the boundlessness of *lex*" (Jurkevics, 2015: 13).

Lastly, in Arendt's perspective, the pluralism of internal politics mirrors outer political plurality: federalism, i.e., pacts connecting political entities to common rules, allows to avoid the massive deploy of violence for solving inter-state litigations. Contrarily, Schmitt's pluralism enacts only among states while excluding domestic plurality (2007: 53). Nevertheless, his exclusion of politics from the domestic political sphere mirrors the lack of "political," i.e., non-violent relations among states, for war is the extreme possibility shaping these relations – as the labeling of the foreigner as enemy implies. This is precisely the reason why Schmitt did not recognize the value of international pacts: in his view, the strength of the emerging spatial order-orientation counters any attempt at imposing norms on interstate and international relations.

In conclusion, this contribution echoes Arendt's longing for the end of violence through the global expansion of federal relations, starting from participatory local institutions, i.e., from councils of direct democracy, up to international relations among states (Taraborelli, 2002; Arendt, 1990:167-171). Indeed, abandoning Schmitt's friend-enemy antithesis and, especially, his labeling of the stranger as a potential enemy, is the cornerstone for a global path towards the end of violence, where the power of reciprocal promises to connect peoples counters the destructiveness of war: against the violence of pursuing political aims through war, stands the political neutralization of violence through the enacting of the human plurality and dignity.

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TOMÁŠ KORDA

**Is a World at War Still
Constituted for a Moral Being?**

A world needs our attention. It disturbs our solipsism and prevents us from becoming absorbed. After all attractions have failed, war intervenes as a last resort. We often begin to take it seriously when the world teeters on the brink of war. Usually, we realize that we are the inhabitants of this world too late (see Kissinger, 1969: 14).

Perhaps only a perfectly cynical or barbaric individual would remain indifferent to war and human suffering. This is because they may not empathize with the idea that a dying Man is an end in himself, and that mankind as a species is dying within him. Consequently, violence tends to appal those with moral conscience. This is especially true when acts of violence are committed by civilized states, rather than by insane individuals or primitive tribes.

“[Nevertheless – T. K.] the easiest thing of all is to pass judgment on what is substantial and meaningful. It is much more difficult to get a real grip on it, and what is the most difficult of all is both to grasp what unites each of them and to give a full exposition of what that is” (Hegel, 2018: 5).

Following Hegel’s call, this essay will argue that Kenneth N. Waltz’s three primary theories of war, as outlined in his canonical work on international relations, *Man, the State, and War*, fail to effectively reconcile a moral judgment on war and a theoretical understanding of it. None of these theories satisfy a moral being that conceives itself as “an absolutely free being” (Schelling, 1994: 3). Consider briefly why these accounts of conflict fail to do so.

Spinoza, Kant, Rousseau

The natural philosopher and theological writer Pierre Bayle, a contemporary of Spinoza, ironically uses the phenomenon of war to highlight a fundamental flaw in the philosophy of his Dutch counterpart. “Thus, in Spinoza’s system, all those who say, ‘The Germans have killed ten thousand Turks’, speak incorrectly and falsely unless they mean, ‘God modified into Germans has killed God modified into ten thousand Turks’, and the same with all the phrases by which what men do to one another are expressed” (1991: 312). War is not a matter grave enough to concern *Deus, sive Natura*, but rather a type of game that God plays with himself, as though it were behind the backs of men, or even nations that are thereby deprived of agency.

This sort of “cunning of God” treats human beings as if they were cogs in God (Schelling, 1994: 65). Their actions are “affections of a substance”

(Spinoza, 1994: 8). Humans are not an end in themselves, but mere expressions of substantial processes of the divine nature. Its all-powerful influence silences morality within humans and significantly impairs their sense of freedom.

Ultimately, worldwide conflicts do not challenge Spinoza's amoral view of God, much like how a solar flare does not harm the sun. Spinoza intentionally refrains from understanding human suffering in Christian language, meaning it is not viewed as God's suffering. Thus, the poles of subjectivity, objectivity, freedom, and necessity remain unreconciled.

The second philosopher featured in Kenneth's book is Immanuel Kant. Surely, Kant pleases a moral principle when he refers to the "moral-practical reason in us [which – TK] pronounces its irresistible veto" in *Metaphysics of Morals*: "There shall be no war, neither between you and me in the state of nature nor between us as states" (2006: 148).

But our focus is on the purpose of war for Kant rather than whether or not it should occur. Kant co-opts war, incorporating it into his conception of world history. Instrumentalized, wars, conflicts, and antagonisms played a crucial role in human history and have acted as a driving force for progress. Without war, progress would be impossible, even unthinkable. War has compelled humanity to transition from a state of nature to a state of law, with the prospect that all nations will ultimately reform and embrace a republican constitution, which Kant considers to be the most appropriate form of government for achieving perpetual peace (Ibid., 148).

But when war breaks out, as it should not, morality is naturally at a low ebb. Mankind regresses to a time when war was the means of progress. The realisation that war is not just a part of history, but also a current reality, is unsettling. War should belong in a museum, not in our present world. War is a deeply disappointing experience for a moral individual who finds no theoretical comfort in Kant's philosophy during times of conflict.

Kenneth Waltz presents Jean-Jacques Rousseau as the final and supreme war theorist, positioning him as the precursor to neorealism or structural realism. According to Rousseau, the anarchic structure of international relationships cannot be altered or improved. (cf. Buchan, 2002: 414). There is no higher authority capable of preventing states from going to war and there never will be. A Kantian federation of friendly countries with a republican constitution cannot substitute for this absence. War will always remain an *ultima ratio*, a very real possibility implied by the concept of anarchy or state sovereignty. Just as earthquakes or other natural disasters appear as contingent events predetermined by the concept of nature, so does war resurface as a contingency allowed by the "second nature" called anarchy. However, it is intolerable for morality to dwell in a state of nature, even

if only nations and not individuals are directly present in such a state. This is why Kant cannot resist proposing the idea of perpetual peace (Ibid., 148).

The Meaning of German Idealism for a Moral Being

Given these failures to reconcile morality with war, the relevance of post-Kantian philosophy stands out. *The Oldest Systematic Program of German Idealism* asks a question that endures after more than two centuries. “The question is this: How should a world be constituted for a moral being?” (Schelling, 1996: 3) In our context, that raises the question: How ought a world of international relations be constituted for a moral being? To emphasize the epistemological aspect of this inquiry (see Hegel, 1991: 21), a more appropriate question would be: How is a world of international relations to be *recognized as* constituted for a moral being?

German Idealist philosophy clearly aims to develop a worldview appropriate to moral agents. As an agent that considers itself completely free, studying German Idealism helps it acquire knowledge of the world by seeing it reflect its freedom, thereby substantiating it. It is important for morality to recognize that the world is *hers* and that it objectifies and supports her freedom.

If morality fails to recognize itself in the world, there is a risk of becoming ossified into a “beautiful soul” who is afraid to act because of the belief that the world would taint her through her action. Becoming beautiful, on the other hand, numbs the world. By reifying the world, the soul tries to purify itself from it. For instance, she may fall prey to conspiratorial thinking, attributing world events to celestial powers or supernatural phenomena occurring behind her back. Once petrified, the world can no longer tarnish his soul. However, the ossified world also entombs her as she remains a component of it.

Beyond Contingency and Necessity

We can anticipate a significant challenge in achieving liberation from aesthetically pleasing imprisonment, especially in times of war when the threat of petrification of a world engulfs humanity. Upholders of morality confront the formidable task of renouncing the deception that a supreme force intentionally instigates conflict. There is a natural inclination to suspect a secret puppeteer covertly protecting their interests. One of the usual suspects is the military-industrial complex. Other common explanations attribute the

cause to random chance, often pointing at belligerent leaders who unwisely drag entire countries into conflict.

But the question is this: How can we analyse wars without attributing them to some higher and hidden necessity or mere arbitrary chance, but rather to our quest for freedom? This understanding is needed for moral individuals to reconcile themselves with the reality of war and to avoid feelings of betrayal. Even in war, a world in conflict still represents our freedom.

The only approach is to presume that a moral being is not nearly as innocent as she believes. Although she may disapprove of warfare personally, her worldview must be implicated in it. In contrast, after reading the works of Spinoza, Rousseau, and even Kant, she can feel at ease believing herself innocent and removed from “the tragedy of great power politics” (Mearsheimer, 2001). She is allowed to place blame on factors such as human nature, the anarchical structure of international relations, or the immorality of rulers. “A society which regards peace as the normal condition tends to ascribe tension not to structural causes but to wicked or shortsighted individuals” (Kissinger, 1969: 85). This dilemma between contingency and structural necessity still need to be overcome.

The French Revolution and the Misrecognition of Non-Western States

Since the French and American Revolutions, morality has become an increasingly significant factor in international politics. According to Article XVI of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen*, “Any society in which the guarantee of rights is not assured, nor the separation of powers determined, has no Constitution” (Bellamy, 2020). As a result, it can be argued that any society that does not ensure constitutional rights for individual citizens or acknowledge Man as an end in himself is unconstitutional. Its nationhood, when compared to that of France, lacks morality and is inferior. These incomplete nations cannot be fully respected or acknowledged by a society that has already implemented a constitution and lives according to moral principles.

Raymond Aron wrote that “the French Revolution [...] introduced a fundamental heterogeneity” into international relations (2017: 148). It split states into two categories: constitutional and non-constitutional. The first category of states upholds moral principles by officially recognizing the right of individuals to be treated as absolutely free beings. In contrast, the second category lacks this principle of subjective freedom (Hegel, 1991: 338). At the very least, individual freedom is not adequately respected or rigorously upheld from the viewpoint of the first group. For simplicity’s

sake, the former is commonly referred to as the West, while the latter is comprised of non-Western nations.

This split, which has the potential to escalate into open conflict, is rooted in morality rather than geography or Eurocentrism. It is equally essential to recognize that this moral division in international relations is irreparable. To illustrate these claims, I will draw on Hegel's theory of the state's struggle for recognition (*Anerkennung*).

According to Hegel, the state is a person, an individual, and a sovereign entity. It cannot be diminished to a mere soulless or lifeless apparatus endowed with the sole mission of administering society. Its overarching objective cannot be solely centered on "the security of the life and property of individuals" (Ibid., 361), for the life and property of individuals cannot be secured by sacrificing them in war for the protection of the state. "For security [of the state] cannot be achieved by sacrificing what is to be secured—on the contrary" (Ibid.). In order to protect its sovereignty, the state must be self-aware. Self-preservation and self-awareness are inseparable. One cannot choose self-preservation, be it oneself or a state, without being conscious of one's existence.

The state is aware of its sovereignty over a given territory, but its satisfaction remains complete once other states recognize it. With external recognition, state sovereignty is satisfied (Epstein et al., 2020) and obsessed with a relentless struggle for recognition. Nonetheless, the state must first recognize itself as a sovereign entity before it can seek recognition from others.

Understanding why the quest for recognition between states does not lead to global success is important. Inter-state recognition becomes possible only when states recognize that their domestic structures are fundamentally similar despite mutual differences. Only then are they willing and able to wholly or substantially trust one another? Hegel asserts that a shared identity is a prerequisite for inter-state recognition rather than an arbitrary one (1991: 367). Although the demand by a state to be recognized is indeed reasonable and logical, Hegel contends that it is purely "abstract" or "formal" (Ibid.). Notably, in concrete historical instances, this abstract demand remains unfulfilled.

Former nomadic tribes even pose a challenge to being categorized as states since they lack identity with nations that consider themselves civilized and have a constitution, as noted by Hegel (Ibid.). Achieving mere diplomatic recognition may prove unattainable for these tribes. The extreme level of otherness they embody, to the point where mutual identity is no longer discernible, cannot be recognized even if states desire to do so. The more alike states are to each other, the more significant and dependable the recognition can be established between them. A state can only anticipate its

accurate recognition if it is bold and willing to adjust or reform politically in contrast to another state. Mutual trust and recognition become more delicate as the internal political differences that separate states increase. Interstate recognition necessitates what could be referred to as a cognitive intervention in the internal affairs of other states. The level of respect granted to a state depends on the extent to which it is perceived as being similar. Substantive recognition is conferred based on this evaluation.

The French Revolution was significant because it initiated a new dynamic in international relations by establishing clear criteria for interstate recognition, which newly required a republican form of government. Even before 1789, it was inadequate for a state to be marginally more organized than a nomadic tribe. However, the substantive interstate recognition now requires that a state meet certain conditions, including being constitutional and civil and treating human beings as moral or free beings, as outlined in the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen*.

Conclusion: A Hegelian Accommodation of the French Revolution

Finally, we will examine three possible ways the French Revolution could inform the international relations theory. Firstly, one may dismiss the Revolution and reject the significance of human rights by contending that morality has no place in international relations. This stance is consistent with the structural realist approach to international relations. From this perspective, the human rights agenda functions as an ideology that Western nations, particularly the United States, utilize to exert their global power while concealing their true interests. As conceived under this ideological framework, morality represents an arbitrary and artificial component of international politics. Therefore, it can and should be subtracted, like any detrimental habit, in order to achieve a more accurate understanding of how international relations operate.

Secondly, Kantian response towards the Revolution exists. The year 1789 is valued for its significant influence on global politics, ultimately motivating Kant to envision a future where nations would emulate the French Republic and adopt a republican form of governance. Through transitioning into constitutional states that protect the rights of citizens, nations can substantially recognize and respect each other's territorial integrity. This will ultimately culminate in perpetual peace across the world.

The third perspective argues that the French Revolution caused an ineradicable schism in international relations, leading to ever-lasting effects. The significant repercussions of this event will endure in the

future. As a result, only some states will always adhere to universal human rights values, rather than all. This argument discourages both a nostalgic longing for the pre-revolutionary past and an exaggerated hope for the post-revolutionary future.

The incapacity to move beyond the present, into the past or future, indicates the end of history. Consequently, universalism is plagued by particularism, rendering it untrustworthy and doubtful. One can legitimately question whether the citizen, as an end in themselves, genuinely typifies the universal genus of humanity and whether the citizen's freedom represents both the *telos* or meaning of all human history and the essence of all human beings worldwide. Objecting that human rights are merely a Western, French, or American ideology is possible and legitimate. Presenting specific values as universally applicable permits scrutiny and challenge from outside, even though considering particular values universal is the only way to uphold them. This is where the West is vulnerable to hypocrisy. Failure to be immune to a policy of double standards will ultimately lead to revanchism, which may resurface occasionally.

This interpretation acknowledges the French Revolution's pivotal significance, while avoiding any partiality towards Kantian perspectives. It aligns with Hegel's idea of concrete universality, which asserts that true universalism must be concrete, determinate, and particular. "The paradox of the proper Hegelian notion of the Universal is that it is not the neutral frame of the multitude of particular contents, but inherently divisive, splitting up its particular content: the Universal always asserts itself in the guise of some particular content which claims to embody it directly, excluding all other content as merely particular" (Žižek, 1999: 101). Furthermore, this stance posits that universal human history acts as the "world court of judgment" (Hegel, 1991: 372) and assumes the ultimate authority and power over individual sovereign states. If no revisionist nations were challenging the West, universal history would lack a subject for judgment.

Understanding the French Revolution from a Hegelian perspective can aid a morally conscious person comprehend the occurrence of wars in today's world. This perspective clarifies the phenomenon by using language that is understandable to morality, based on universal human and civil rights principles. Therefore, even in times of war, a moral individual is confronted with a world that still reflects him or herself, not an alienated or reified one.

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EMILIA MARRA

Token Crushing Token:

Cryptocurrencies to

Capabilities

Alternative monetary systems have always existed, but only after the 2008 financial crisis did the number of new currencies start growing exponentially (Arjaliès, 2021: 95). A far throw from the post-war gold standard, new economic creatures called cryptocurrencies made their “meteoric rise,” dismissing merchants’ skepticism and nation-states’ suspect (Hütten, 2017: 26). Research has shown that Their success is undeniable in terms of interest (worldwide Google queries) and daily exchanged-traded dollar volume (Chowdhry, 2021: 26). It seemed that a brand-new phase for finance was starting and that the protagonist would be cryptography. In fact, just under 15 years ago, financial investors and the tech-savvy community looked upon its use in finance with sympathy. This highly technological and conceptually new tool was hailed as a deadly challenge for banks and mints. The logical consequence would have been the liberation of transactions from any third-party control, cost and privacy wise. More importantly, this new playing field was opened in the name of transparency and accessibility, almost contradicting the etymology of “crypto.”

Over the course of centuries, coins and banknotes have become the standard monetary objects worldwide, called “cash” or “currency” (Geva, 2019: 11-38). At first, coins were valued on the base of the weight of the precious metal involved in casting them, but banknotes established “nominal value, notwithstanding the (relatively) worthless intrinsic value of the material of which they are made” (Ibid.). Non-cash payment systems find their premises in the use of “scriptural money,” the architecture of which is centralized (Ibid., 23). Digital coins such as bitcoins have the potential to bypass mints and centralized settlement, thus avoiding limits faced by regular e-money. Bitcoin, the first and still most successful cryptocurrency, “began life as a techno-anarchist project to create an online version of cash, a way for people to transact without the possibility of interference from malicious governments or banks”.¹ As such, the subversive aspect of bitcoins against banking appears. Benjamin Bratton expanded this point:

There is much to explore with Bitcoin, blockchains and related initiatives, such as Ethereum, but it is also the monetary platform of choice of secessionist projects for which the metaphysical expulsion of externalities is the paramount program, as important if not more than the disintermediation of central banks.

(Bratton, 2015: 336).

1 Cfr. *The Economist*, August 30, 2018.

Some have spoken of utopia in this regard, but what is clear is that novelty in economics is never only a technological implementation, but a proper social-political-theoretical revolution. As Željko Ivanković points out, economics belongs to the domain of practical knowledge. This not only means that no economic theory is formulated without a social and historical perspective behind it, but also that a new theoretical frame generates tangible effects in the market.

Despite the potentiality to found an alternative economy, Satoshi Nakamoto's project to avoid the need of a central authority for digital transactions partially shipwrecked. Over time many doubts have been raised, especially by interdisciplinary approaches, about the actual possibility of a completely automatized economic system, together with various concerns on the use of technologies, such as big data, for this purpose. Benjamin Geva acutely noticed that cryptographic tools were originally used "to enhance payment intermediation through safeguarding interbank as well as customer-to-bank and bank-to-customer communication" (Geva, 2019: 37). Therefore, it is through the implementation of a process already existing in banking, that banks as payment intermediaries could be demised. This contradiction makes it unlikely that cryptocurrencies will replace national currencies any time soon.

Finally, these new financial instruments imply a significant degree of technical knowledge in finance, I. T. and economics. As a result, they end up being impenetrable to the average investor and, in practice, become a source of new inequalities. Researchers from different fields insist on the latter aspect, stressing the strong correlation between limited access to information and decisional power and raising privacy concerns.² On the other hand, cryptocurrency enthusiasts state that new forms of finance "may provide a route out of poverty, increased female empowerment and enhanced support for the SME sectors that may, in turn, lead to more robust economic growth in depressed areas and states" (Chambers, Rasheed, McMahon, 2021: 34). Practical examples can help to understand the coexistence of these two, opposite positions.

² "To start, algorithms are often either proprietary to the platform or lender, or licensed through third parties, making monitoring the appropriateness and legal compliance of such algorithms challenging. For example, will regulators be able to ensure that lenders are not using protected information such as gender, age, and race in making credit decisions?" (Brown, 2021: 7-8).

Current state of the social phenomena: Four practical examples

(1) In September 2021, president Bukele announced an epoch-making change in El Salvador, known as “The Bitcoin Experiment.” With the adoption of bitcoin as legal tender alongside the national currency, the dollar, Salvadorans are supposed to save hundreds of millions a year on commissions for remittances, gaining their independence from the USA’s banks. Moreover, according to Bukele’s declarations, every citizen gets access to financial services, whether he or she has a bank account or not. However, a few months after the introduction of bitcoin, leaks in the system have made themselves noticed, not only in terms of equality – nearly half the population has no internet access and many more poor connectivity, but also financially: most bitcoins are stocked in a small number of digital wallets and not in use in El Salvador. This is not an isolated case. Empirical surveys show that cryptocurrencies around the world are mostly held by investors, rather than used for transactions,³ hence taking a very different direction to what Satoshi Nakamoto had defined as a “peer-to-peer electronic cash system.” Moreover, players in this new money game are mostly younger males with college education, who consider investing in bitcoins as a store of money, safer than a safe deposit box, less exposed to inflation and very difficult to track.

At first glance, it might seem that thinking about cryptocurrencies as regular, albeit digital, money can offer a key to understanding this new mysterious economic tool. (2) This makes it at least slightly easier to grasp certain news such as the decision by Konzum, Croatia’s largest supermarket chain, to accept online payments in cryptocurrencies from private buyers (December 2021). The PayCek system guarantees the transaction price until the end of the payment process, protecting buyers from volatility. The attempt is to bring cryptos into everyday life, moving away from the idea that they are a financial instrument for the chosen few. (3) In the same spirit,

³ Lee J. et al., “An Introduction to Cryptocurrencies.” In: *The Palgrave Handbook*, cit., p. 91: “A natural empirical question is how cryptocurrencies are actually used. Athey S. et al. (2016) find that most buyers of Bitcoin are buy-and hold investors rather than consumers who use Bitcoin for transactions. This makes it difficult to tie fundamentals (i.e., the value as a payment instrument) to cryptocurrency prices. [...] To get a sense for how “ordinary” investors use and think about Bitcoin, the Bank of Canada commissioned a usage survey. At the end of 2016, even though most Canadians knew what Bitcoin was, only 2.9% of the population actually owned any. These owners were predominantly younger males with college education. [...] Scott Schuh and Oz Shy (2016) find similar results from an earlier survey of the US population.”

Media Markt recently announced (April 2022) that it would be launching Bitcoin ATMs in Austria to enable a secure and simple purchase of crypto assets. The publicly announced target is to attract newcomers, cutting down on transaction costs and providing an intuitive tool for payments (the smallest unit of Bitcoin, Satoshis, can be withdrawn by scanning a wallet address); the implicit objective is to give investors psychological security by providing them with an instrument they know and are accustomed to. Trust, the issue discarded by Nakamoto, is not only reintroduced, but needs to be built to contrast the extreme volatility of cryptocurrencies.

The association between cryptocurrencies and paper money seems vital in order to build trust and to broaden their pool of users. However, the absence of a third central party and the risk of cryptobubbles prevent financial experts from considering them as proper currencies. In fact, they are inclined to compare cryptocurrencies to a store of value, more akin to a nation's gold reserve rather than to cash, but without the same stability. Many companies are monetizing by purporting themselves as a third party in the crypto world, as CeFi (centralized, therefore more similar to a bank) or DeFi (decentralized) financial institutions. This strategy helps clients trust crypto by proposing a familiar model to investors, but it is not surprise-free. The most recent example concerns the unexpected bankruptcy of Celsius Network, the American CeFi cryptocurrency lending company known for offering its customers significantly higher returns than a bank on their deposits. After the stable-coin Terra-Luna was cracked, the chain effect also involved the firm's market capitalization, which has decreased by 85% since 2021.⁴ As a result, withdrawals have been suspended, as well as swaps and transfers. On July 13th, Celsius filed for bankruptcy protection (Chapter 11), thus freezing their obligation to compensate its investors. In fact, as it has been noticed, deposit insurance only covers certain forms of money, such as savings and current accounts. It is not always possible to classify crypto assets within these taxonomic categories, nor is it always possible to understand how to regulate a particular digital asset or product, since such an investigation presupposes an in-depth look into how a particular crypto asset was created, sold and used.⁵ This lack of an effective regulatory framework makes it difficult to legislate in favour of users.

To compare cryptocurrencies with paper money and use them as medium of exchange, may mislead on the theoretical level and does not reflect the

4 Cfr. <https://www.cryptoworldjournal.com/how-the-failure-of-the-celsius-network-has-affected-its-customers/>

5 Cfr. <https://www.agendadigitale.eu/cittadinanza-digitale/pagamenti-digitali/le-cryptovalute-gettano-le-famiglie-sullastrico-il-caso-celsius-e-la-necessita-di-un-intervento-legislativo/>

real use of cryptocurrencies. When compared to a gold reserve, and consequently used as a store of value, crypto assets can be extremely hazardous, offering the potential for a high level of returns, but also the possibility of significant price volatility as well as losses, all of which may in turn lead to legislative inconsistencies. Nevertheless, cryptocurrencies continue their takeover on the market and on the collective imagination, especially in times of crisis, confirming themselves as a new economic tool whose concept and potential have not yet been completely comprehended.

Whether it is smoke and mirrors or an unmissable opportunity to narrow the gap between strong monetary players and emerging economies, what is at stake in the crypto-bet is not only the financial success of a new technology such as the blockchain, but a radical rethinking of the whole concept of money and, consequently, of value.

Recommendations

Although the use of crypto as current money still remains a remote possibility, it is interesting to note that by appropriating the technology and vocabulary of banking and finance, the introduction of crypto has radically changed their contours. Ivanković specifies that cryptocurrencies are a normative concept, their principles and features being intentionally distinct from the features of other money systems (bank money, commodity money). However, cryptocurrencies are actually restructuring money related vocabulary. One example among all concerns the concept of liquidity: ranking of volume, one of the most used parameters to describe transactions in a certain currency, and liquidity, are not the same. Bratton wrote that Bitcoin “has made money into a general design problem, as it should be, and not just the design of financial products or the look of paper bills, but of vessel abstractions of time, debt, work, and prestige” (Bratton, 2015: 337). Jurisdiction has to be added to this list. Private law has to be considered when it comes to investing, as it is still the most effective guarantee for traders. The Celsius Network case showed that crypto-assets are not traceable to known and unambiguous financial creatures to which traditional consumer protection rules apply. The case was brought to the attention of courts, which, however, cannot legislate unless it is first decided what strategy to adopt, i.e. whether to redefine the contours of existing financial regulation or to establish a new ad hoc regime for the crypto world.

Katarina Pistor expands on the issue by arguing that turning an object or an idea into capital requires an authority capable of deciding if and how given assets shall be coded as capital upstream (Pistor, 2019). Moreover, such a choice must later be corroborated by a community, different agents

ready to accept the established conditions. From the perspectives of both Ivanković and Pistor, not only does the risk of new inequalities in financial terms arise quite clearly, but some forms of mediation seem irreplaceable too, in contrast with the idea of a trust free system. In his most recent contribution on cryptocurrencies and NFTs, Slavoj Žižek emphasises further the possibility for these new technologies to bypass institutions and establish direct communication between individual traders. Additionally, he implicitly encourages his readers to tune into the concept of sovereignty and its structural need to guarantee the appearance of freedom (Žižek, 2022). David C. Brown and Mingfeng Lin stress the intimate link between finance and technological innovation. Their exploration of “FinTech,” namely the use of new technologies to create financial services or to improve existing services, shows how profoundly the concept of economic transactions has evolved from the simple exchange of paper money. In fact, FinTech does not exclusively involve cryptocurrencies. Well-known examples of FinTech are microlending, peer-to-peer lending, (rewards-based and/or securities-based) crowdfunding, initial coin offerings, financial planning and even insurances.

It is philosophically interesting to notice that money falls under the broader concept of value, which is also involved in this transformation. Firstly, the difference between value in use and value in exchange is questioned by cryptocurrencies, whose introduction into the market has resulted in a multiverse of values. Every and each cryptocurrency defines an environment, with its specific rules. This aspect becomes immediately clear thanks to Heiner Ganssmann’s intuition, built on Wittgenstein: “The pawn in chess neither has meaning in the sense of representing something, of being a sign of something, nor is it just the piece carved out of wood. What the pawn is, is determined by the rules of chess” (Wittgenstein, 1984a: 150 in Ganssmann, 2012a: 20). In other words, we are currently witnessing an incredibly diverse transvaluation of values, whose dominant logic can be described by using just one word: extractivism. From this point of view, the introduction in the financial market of cryptocurrencies is consistent with the emergence of the extractivist model. Once again, the example of El Salvador is very instructive: the introduction of digital government securities is supposed to solve the problem of bitcoin supply by financing the birth of Bitcoin City. Strategically located in the volcanic East of the country, in Bitcoin City the activity of mining (the extraction of cryptocurrencies) can be displaced thanks to geothermal energy, rather than relying on foreign countries. Hence, it should not come as a surprise that Benjamin Bratton asks “what price is this to pay, even for a better currency?” (Bratton, 2015: 104).

Moreover, and as finance has already shown, when it comes to e-money the concept of value is closer to people’s beliefs and expectations than it used to be. As a consequence, it is a relevant topic not only for investors and

curious onlookers, but also for democratic theory. Capital itself cannot be analysed as a mere fact, but has to be considered as a social relation. Marxist tradition identified the heart of this relation as labour, but the growing financialization of the market has forced contemporary theorists to move on from this definition and include, for instance, the crucial role of new technologies.

Once the intimate connection between social order and new technologies is established, a useful way to frame this new gold rush would be Sheila Jasanoff's approach. In her research on technology and the future of humanity, she warns against three preconceptions that may affect our understanding of the relation between society and *téchne*: 1. The idea of the unstoppable momentum of technology (the determinist fallacy); 2. Unquestionable consent has to be lent to specialists from closed ranks on technological issues (the myth of technocracy); 3. The structural impossibility to foresee and avoid potentially dangerous consequences in the use of technologies (the unintended consequences). These fundamental indications of method are a profitable addition to criticisms against cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology, outlining the opportunity to ask what practical and conceptual tools "we deploy to hold our proliferating inanimate creations in check." (Janasoff, 2016). Once the most common misconceptions on crypto-assets are highlighted, cryptocurrencies and blockchain can be philosophically investigated as a dynamic relation between society, economics, history and technology.

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JAVIER TOSCANO

**Thesis on violence—and a plea
for multicultural democracy**

Byung-Chul Han

§1. While it is incredibly difficult to define violence—or to provide a definition that fits every violent incident—it is rather easy to sense it or intuit it. Consider the available definitions¹: they all state that violence is something that hurts somebody, or something that prevents a person from reaching his or her potential. But going to the dentist may hurt and being sick is a form of limiting a healthy body. Yet we would not include these incidents in the category, without risk of losing its gravity.

§1.1. We think we can provide a definition of violence out of extreme occurrences, as with the example of a war, by focusing on the activities of a terrorist group, or evoking the killing of a person.

§1.1.1. And yet, beyond the concrete spot where fighting takes place, a war is an event of radical abstraction. A war describes mostly a framing, i.e. a set of conditions in the international political arena, but as a phenomenon it lacks a symbolic unity: it is not a representable event. And as Flusser writes: “Non-symbolic or non-representational phenomena are meaningless” (2017: 202). Consider the following lines that describe the battle of Borodino (1812), during Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, which Lev Tolstoy so sharply renders:

From the battlefield the adjutants he had sent and his marshals’ orderlies constantly came galloping to Napoleon with reports on the course of events; but all these reports were false: both because in the heat of battle it is impossible to tell what is going on at a given moment, and because many of the adjutants did not reach the actual place of battle, but told what they had heard from others; and also because, while an adjutant was riding the mile or so that separated him from Napoleon, the circumstances changed, and the news he was bringing became incorrect (2007: 800).

Tolstoy was echoing Clausewitz—a witness to Borodino—who in his work *On War* writes: “no prescriptive formulation universal enough to deserve the name of law can be applied to the constant change and diversity of the phenomena of war” (1976: 11.152). Modern warfare, with all its complex planning and informational systems, has not changed this in any respect, as

1 The task of discussing a definition, its possibilities and shortcomings, is undertaken by Andreas Wilmes in this same publication.

the reports from the frontline in the war between Russia and Ukraine have already proved (Meek, 2023).²

§1.1.2. The case of terrorism implies a category of its own too.

Speaking of terrorism is a way of escalating language and referring to a security urgency. Therefore, the term tends to be politically charged and, as such, frequently fails to serve the purpose of describing a specific phenomenon. For in a strict sense, terrorism is a very specific category of violence: not better or worse, not more or less serious in itself, yet different from other forms. A terrorist attack—such as certain hostage kidnappings or planned assassinations—can cause much less material and human damage than certain massacres or mass shootings that produce dozens of deaths and which fall under less severe categories. At its peak in 2015, terrorism produced 13 times fewer deaths than other kinds of homicides (IEP), let alone deaths produced by health-related diseases or even transit hit-and-runs. And yet, it was the greatest concern for Western countries, even though terrorist activities affect mostly countries from the Global South (a handful of countries in the South tend to concentrate almost 80% of terrorist events worldwide).

§1.1.2.1. Perhaps the main concern from governments regarding terrorism lies in the challenge this last poses to their own structural narratives. After all, terrorism is a form of violence that has adapted to the mass media communication environment provided by contemporary networked technologies (Meschoulam, 2023).

§1.1.2.2. This fact determines its continuous presence in society. We could ask: is every effort on combating terrorism by a State directed at eliminating the risk of that form of violence? Looking at historical responses, this is not necessarily the case. When States claim to mobilize resources to counter terrorism, they are usually gearing up security frameworks and procedures to tighten the control and surveillance of the riskless population, or designing strategies to prevent and mitigate the psychosocial effects that premeditated violence causes to those who had no contact with the violent acts, but did encounter the narrative (videos, images, texts, etc.) embedded in them. Moreover, some States are deeply involved with the political use of “narrative-making,” and they have been complicit in funding, fueling or spawning “terrorist” activities themselves, when it serves their purposes.³

2 Of course, this does not imply that there are no consequences derived from war. But these are mostly set at a political level in an international framing, and do not necessarily reflect the level of violence involved.

3 Just as the Reagan administration in the US during the 80s financing of the Muhaideen, future Taliban, against the Soviets (Operation Cyclone 1979); the Israeli support of the *Mujama el-Islami*

In short, terrorism is a category of violence that is not extreme and evident in and of itself, since it cannot be analysed without the precise sociopolitical context that frames it.

§ 1.1.3. Alternatively, we can focus on another form of violence that could be incontestably set as a liminal event in the catalogue of human destruction: homicide. After all, we tend to think that every major religion and every legal system sanctions the killing of another. But this is just not the case *eo ipso*. The Judeo-Christian Bible surely presents as one of its main commandments the prohibition to kill (Exodus 20:13), but this is later relativised and set into context in that same work, to explain that there are different effects and classifications of killing, which consider whether this action was done according to an intention or emotion (Deuteronomy 19: 4-6). This same distinction has been introduced in some languages, and in English the legal terminology differentiates, for instance, “murder” from “manslaughter” on the same grounds. In this sense, a rift is introduced that inevitably separates the inner world (intentions, emotions) of ethics, and the outer world (interpretations, perceptions) of politics.

§ 2. One of the reasons why it is so difficult to provide a straightforward definition of violence is because it is something that surrounds us, overwhelmingly. This has been both acknowledged and instrumentalised. For the Romantics it was part of the tragic condition of existence. Modern political theory was born out of stoking fear from the uncontrolled violence of the world (Hobbes). And yet, the source of this violence was soon debated. Some argued that nature was the source of kindness, and culture its corruption (Rousseau). For others, the ways of nature show exactly how evil was just a misinterpretation of plainly common phenomena, which were instead to be read as the survival of the fittest (Spencer, Nietzsche). And even for others, it was precisely culture that could be fostered as a civilizatory feat to get us further away from our most basic instincts, in order to become better, peaceful beings (Elias, Pinker).

§ 2.1. In any case, the division of nature and culture is an artifice that sets a simplistic polarity. For humankind, nature is a culturally-defined horizon. We may think that education makes us better persons, but there is an inherent violence in every pedagogical apparatus that seeks to transform us into citizens of a given political entity (Althusser).

§ 3. If a definition of violence is impractical or outright futile—beyond the explicit acts of bodily harm—perhaps we could try to think how

ya organization, soon to be turned into *Hamas*, to pit them against Yasser Arafat’s *Fatah* faction (Higgins), or the Turkish government’s outlawing and criminalization of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) as a form of combatting them beyond the political field where they were active.

we usually go about it. That is, we can try to understand what we do when we encounter situations of belligerence or aggression, how do we usually approach them, and what we tend to miss out in our common conceptions. In this path, it is useful to acknowledge that violence has been a concern mainly in the field of the political. As Kleinman writes: “Wheresoever power orients practices —and that is everywhere— there is violence” (2001: 238). Violence is attached to power ineluctably, and as power itself, it is ubiquitous. This is very evident in the German language, where *Gewalt* means violence but also designates a force, implies coercion, even governance. Weber impregnated the contemporary understanding of the term with his plea for the State to become the monopoly of violence (the lesser of evils). Of course, this opened the doors for that creature to extend its might and achieve its goals through all means available: laws, institutions, vocabulary, social values and other social structures. Furthermore, *Gewalt* is exercised through a range of discourses —utterances, media, policies, behaviors, cultural practices, architecture, a multitude of signs and symbols, even thoughts— through which power slowly sifts. The monopoly of the State means therefore managing the usual political violence through tolerable doses. This is what Foucault meant when he inverted Clausewitz’s aphorism to state that “politics is the continuation of war by other means” (2003: 15-16).

§ 3.1. Because the nexus power-violence is pervasive, the intervention of other categories and explanations with specific weights is required: mimetic violence (Girard), symbolic violence (Bourdieu), structural violence (Galtung, Žižek), positive violence (Han), etc. These subtypes, which do not necessarily cancel each other out, allow a more detailed landscape of this complex phenomenon to emerge. However, power produces its own resistances too: techniques of power can be subverted, defied, and delegitimized. Power is experienced as a complex interplay of relations and contexts that are never unitary, but always diffuse; as such, they can be challenged and derailed, as they circulate within and through society. In that sense, violence should not be seen as the definitive outcome of a power relation. For as it has been stated in discussions on restorative justice practices, *violence is not the same as conflict* (Zehr, 1990: 183).

§ 4. Conflict shapes the everyday. But when does it turn openly into violence? The border is blurry. Conflict still presupposes a certain equality in difference, but violence shows that an equilibrium has been shattered. Social power is responsible for (and responds to) relevance and exigency. Hierarchy and inequality, which are so fundamental to social structures, serve to normalize violence, for they imply the continuation of domination through other means: the grounding of a hegemony (Gramsci). In this sense, following Bourdieu, Kleinman states:

Violence is what lends to culture its authoritativeness. [...] Violence, in this perspective, is the vector of cultural processes that work through the salient images, structures, and engagements of everyday life to shape local worlds. Violence, thus, is crucial to cultural processes of routinization, legitimation, essentialism, normalization, and simplification through which the social world orders the flow of experience [...] (2001: 238).

§5. Distinguishing violence from conflict can become a very first step in diminishing destructive outputs. In that sense, the correlation of power must be reassessed to articulate its links to conflict in general, which only resort to violence in specific cases. This implies a recentering of the political beyond the polarity of friend/enemy (Schmitt), or the “us” vs “them” reduction (the populist technique), to make space for the dynamics of power to develop as antagonism (Mouffe, Laclau) or disagreement (Rancière) between opponents or adversaries, confronted on specific issues. In this context, democracy cannot be seen as a field of consensus: dissensus should be seen as the basic ground for the co-existence of pluralities. Cultural homogeneity is an illusion fostered by tremendous hegemonic forces that set the stage to engage in violence upon the different, however slight its deviations and nonconformities. Instead, plurality is intrinsically conflictive, but it is not violent *per se*.

§6. If conflict is to be reckoned with while violence is to be deterred, the focus should be set on strategies to de-activate, de-escalate or dismantle possible forms of aggression and belligerence, enabling alternative forms to conflict-solving. One special tactic should be set on de-inflaming linguistic usages; avoiding, for instance, the generalized application of extreme categories as interchangeable shifters⁴, and in that sense, respecting the exceptionality of a specialized vocabulary. Violence is linked to language irrecusably: triggered by it, engulfed in it, but also many times appearing only through it.

§6.1. The fact that violence is linked to language reveals again the crossover of the public and the personal spheres: politics reencounters ethics. Since a speech act is concurrent with violence, we can explore the Kantian categorical imperative in a different dimension. We can recall its first formulation: “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (Kant, 2002: 30). The Kantian imperative was formulated as a one-directional flow — from an action to the instatement of a law— but it is recursive, for in human cognition, laws (grammar) become rules that guide actions (speech). This

4 As Edwards and Haslett argue, “Terms like emotional violence, psychological violence, and verbal violence become meaningful in some definitions of violence, but meaningless in others” (2011: 894).

is how a moral standard is produced, and in this case, it places a self-justified subject as the center of a moral world. Much harm has been done when this moral world is projected upon others who do not behave as oneself. A universal moral law is a perfect excuse to accuse others of deviation. In this sense, we can associate the Kantian imperative with another insight, this time from Wittgenstein, who stated that “the limits of my language mean the limits of my world” (Ibid., 56), to understand a moral scenario: *the limits of my categorical imperative mean the limits of my moral world*.

§7. The opposite of violence is not nonviolence. Violence exists in the world and is very concrete. Nonviolence is only the negation of violence, it is not a thing. Not even an idea. The antithesis of violence is closer to what we could deem as justice.

§7.1. But justice is an abstraction too. And indeed, a powerful one. And yet, however mighty, we cannot forget that justice implies more a desire and a horizon than an achievable state of affairs. If justice is not to be confounded with revenge (Hegel, Nietzsche, Girard), it should be recognized as the activity that proceeds by locating “wrongs,” and that implies being ready to stir new conflicts to produce tremors—at any given moment and with different degrees of force— on the status quo.

§7.2. We usually think that the opposite of justice is injustice. But this is just another convenient, binary reduction. However, it is indicative of something: injustice is quite close to violence. What form of injustice? Mainly a misinterpretation of the other in the form of prejudice or misjudgment. Indeed, these engender forms of epistemic injustice (Fricker), which are primal forms of violence: violence in the name of “truth”—a particular perspective of the world, a very personal categorical imperative. A democratic society that values pluralism can only be set from its opposite pole. For as Medina states:

The democratic sensibilities we need to cultivate to work toward epistemic justice are sensibilities that enable us to appreciate the epistemic value of dissent, sensibilities that encourage us not only to be open to contestation, but to actively search for dissenting viewpoints and to benefit from critical engagements with them.

§7.3. More than an event, violence is a culture. It is fostered through discourse and embedded in cultural, everyday practices. Yet wherever observers describe “violence-prone” areas, it is quickly assumed that social scripts of vengeance and hatred get mechanically translated into social action. These are the main tenets of models of violence contained, for instance, in the genealogical model of the feud (gangs, cartels, ethnic groups), in which agency is displaced from the person to a structural position. From this perspective, even collective forms of violence are seen as homogenous

collective behaviors enabled through modalities of identity-making, bravery and loyalty, as these are mobilized in popular representations.

§7.3.1. While that model might prove useful in some restrained instances, it also presents two elemental problems. Firstly, its uncritical generalization assumes that the violent is always the other, since our projections of a reductive moral world are always set afar, as impersonal and eccentric.

§7.3.2. And secondly, while that model may locate strong reasons and motivations to keep subjects hooked up in violent circuits, it seldomly recognizes the dominant ecology of fear upon which they perform, and which usually find no real alternatives among the factious forms of politics—even within democracies—which have not been able to purge ingrained forms of racism, sexism, ablist, and other forms of discrimination and minority misrecognition from their bureaucratic apparatuses. In that sense, politics is not just the continuation of war through other means, but becomes a form of communicational terrorism of the hegemonic order, of the law: the ominous condition of a moral empire.

§8. As an antithesis, a culture of peace can only be sustained through minute steps to de-activate destructive inertias. As such, it should be based on practices of mutual care: the open recognition of the other, the re-valuing of performative gestures of approach, the appreciation of reconciliation habits that do not seek to bring out a single or obliterated “truth”—be that of wrongdoers or victims—, and which aim to sustain instead a myriad of perspectives that may shape non-sectarian forms of justice and respect. A culture of peace is not only a matter of restitution and healing. Above all, it relies on the acknowledgment that a multicultural sociality is a difficult—maybe a utopian— task that requires engaging in processes of mutual freedom-giving (Balibar), traversed by minor practices of compassion and engagements that reflect the rather resilient, vulnerable, and courageous anti-heroic dimension of the everyday.

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ANDREAS WILMES

From Old to New Violence

In 1690, in his *Dictionnaire Universel*, Antoine Furetière defined violence as “Force used against someone to do him some injustice or damage” (1690). The three main dimensions of violence were the use of physical force, the perpetrator’s intention, and the damage suffered by the victim. As the history of Western philosophy attests, these three dimensions remained constant until the beginning of the 20th century. We find them in Hobbes’ depiction of the state of nature, in Sorel’s apology for the “general strike,” in Hegel’s “struggle for recognition,” in Clausewitz’s definition of “absolute war,” and, long before Furetière, in Machiavelli’s portraits of tyrants. To be sure, all these philosophers, and many others, had many major disagreements. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that the three dimensions of force, intent and harm constitute a minimum agreement between them. For them, these three dimensions made it possible to distinguish between what is violent and what is not.

The Crisis of the Traditional View of Violence

However, a growing distrust of the conventional view on violence builds in the first half of the 20th century and becomes quite noticeable in the late 1960s- early 1970s. Arendt, for instance, would somewhat depart from the ‘force component’ of the commonly accepted definition of violence. To her, indeed, “violence is by nature instrumental,” (Arendt, 1970: 4) to wit, violence is based on means-ends rationality and calls for implements that boost our “natural strength” (Ibid., 46) through artificial ways. Thallium, otherwise known as the ‘poisoner’s poison,’ is colourless, odourless, and tasteless and slow acting. Homicide by thallium poisoning is not an instance of violence according to the traditional view, but it certainly is according to Arendt. More importantly, her revision of the traditional definition was strongly related to the evolution of contemporary warfare. Like all her contemporaries, she could not ignore the atomic bomb.

She could not ignore the possibility of engaging in acts of mass destruction remotely. There is a deep intuition here that is worth dwelling on.

On the one hand, the evolution of military technologies means that our acts of destruction are becoming more powerful and more effective. On the other hand, it means a significant lessening of the direct physical involvement in the act of violence as well as an increase in the share of intellectual activities in that same act. If we consider actions independently of their effects, then flicking the switch on a light bulb and pressing the trigger button on a bomb are quite comparable operations. We might be tempted to say that the main difference lies in the consequences. But this is not self-evident. Let us suppose, for example, that I escape death because the barrel of

my assailant's pistol jams. It is easy to see that this is not sufficient grounds for concluding that my assailant did not behave violently. The action was violent because, by pulling the trigger, my attacker knew that my death was "foreseeable harm" (Barry, 2013:62). But then, if we stick to the traditional view, our assessment of the violence of a military operation such as aerial bombing will prove difficult, to say the least. It is true that, in the final analysis, the bombardment will depend on the simple actuation of a button or lever. Nevertheless, we are dealing with a complex technical operation involving interdependent actions. In particular, bombing depends on strategic planning and the approval given by the military hierarchy. So, there are only two possibilities. Either we limit violence to the direct actuation (and the smooth running) of the mechanism designed to drop the bomb, in which case we would be opting for an abstract (not to say inaccurate) description of a fundamentally complex military operation. Or we extend our definition of violence to the other necessary steps of the operation. The order to bomb is, of course, a particularly significant step. It is a speech act which (like strategic planning) aims at "foreseeable harm." Now, a speech act aiming at "foreseeable harm" is also an apt description of serious instances of psychological manipulation. On November 18, 1978, preacher and leader of the 'Peoples Temple' Jim Jones persuaded the members of his cult to perform a ritual suicide. The Jonestown massacre took 918 lives. Despite the obvious differences with our bombing scenario, we are nonetheless now driven to the conclusion that both Jim Jones' preachings and the order given by the general may be regarded as instances of violence which, however, do not directly involve the exercise of physical force. On a slightly different note, the general may claim that the whole operation would have been impossible without the efforts of the engineer who conceived the weapon. Could the latter have ignored that the instrument he designed implied "foreseeable harm"? 'This wasn't my fault', the engineer might claim. 'I was just commissioned to build that weapon. Whether and for what purposes it is used shouldn't be my concern.' Then, perhaps the people who commissioned him meant to use the weapon for "foreseeable harm"...

In summation, our instruments of destruction involve an unprecedented externalisation of force leading to complex scenarios involving multiple actors. These scenarios have nothing in common with that of someone hiring a contract killer. For none of the actors involved can be said to carry out a much more significant degree of physical force than the others. What is more, the interdependence of the different actors makes it hard to ascribe their respective levels of responsibility. Much more than "[t]he exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on, or cause damage to, persons or property," violence now seems more akin to the carrying out of a plan in view of actual or "foreseeable harm."

The crisis that shook the traditional view on violence was technological in essence. Attempts to redefine violence which only scratched the surface of that crisis were bound to fail. Only a technical redefinition of violence was meant to succeed.

Violence as Violation

In our aerial bombing scenario, we considered violence as the carrying out of a plan given actual or “foreseeable harm.” This means that a novel definition of violence might be entitled to include and go beyond physical force and the production of physical damage or harm. In 1968, Garver contended, “The idea of violence in human affairs is much more closely connected with the idea of violation than it is with the idea of force” (Newton, 1970: 355). A person may be violated in her fundamental right to her body and/or her autonomy.

In contrast to the traditional view centred on the features of the perpetrator’s behaviour, Garver’s definition of violence shifts the focus to the victim. Nonetheless, it is far from a Copernican revolution in our understanding of violence. First, Garver’s approach is disputable because it is committed to the highly debatable philosophical thesis of natural rights.¹ Second, notwithstanding this issue, the idea of violence as a violation boils down to a metaphorical extension of the traditional view. We may speak of violent persons as well as of violent thunderstorms. And there is only one coherent explanation for this. In the former case, we mean violence in the literal and traditional sense (i.e., as “intentionally inflicting forceful harm” (Jacquette, 2013: 293-322)). In the latter case, we mean that the thunderstone is figuratively violent. It is possible to do so by taking “an intentional stance toward the thunderstorm’s violence,” (Ibid., 301) in other words, by considering the thunderstorm as if it were a conscious agent causing physical damage. Centuries ago, Furetière also wrote that violence may be used “figuratively in moral matters.” Metaphors of violence are based on faulty analogies that we do not take entirely seriously. It is easy to see that those linguistic usages remain understandable to us because they somewhat echo the idea of force, intent, or harm (e.g., ‘Eva waved her arms about violently,’ ‘He did violence to this text,’ ‘The violent motions of the ship upset his stomach,’ ‘I have a violent headache,’ etc.). Whatever phenomenon is similar in one or more respects to violence in the traditional sense may be called violent figuratively. The same applies to the idea of violence as a violation. It highlights phenomena that can be described in terms of intention and harm

1 This is a difficulty acknowledged by Garver himself. See *ibid.*, 355.

(whether physical or psychological) and may, therefore, be regarded as violent thanks to a linguistic slippage. It further plays on the double meaning of the notion of force. Certainly, to force someone to do something amounts to giving him no other alternative. The rapist threatening his victim with his knife does so “*forcefully*” (hence violently). The blackmailer, however, does not force his victim *forcefully* (hence, though the victim’s autonomy is wronged, not violently on the traditional view’s account).

In the end, the idea of violence as violation poses no threat to the traditional view. To stick to that view, all that is required is to acknowledge the following (and quite unpleasant) conclusion, namely that

... we can intentionally produce harm without doing so violently, that violence is not simply coextensive with every type of wrongdoing, but that violence is only one specific way, among other, nonviolent, ways, in which morally responsible agents can deliberately choose to cause harm

(Jacquette, 2013: 308).

Violence is ... the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual

A genuinely new definition of violence cannot merely be an extension of the traditional view. Rather, it must encompass the latter while starting with a different logic. The difference between old and new violence must be a matter of incommensurability. In other words, there should be no common ground for the rational comparison and choice between them.

In 1969, Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung called for a “logical extension” (Galtung, 1969: 167-191) of the concept of violence. His starting point was the question of how to implement peace. Galtung suggested we stick to three principles to rid scientific research on peace of any dogmatic, idealist, and utopian dimension. The first principle is that of agreement: peace must correspond to a set of social aims that are agreed upon, if not “by most,” “at least ... by many.” The second principle is efficiency: the idea of peace beyond our human capabilities is deemed unacceptable; peace must match a set of social aims that are (perhaps difficult but reasonably) achievable. The third principle is that of privation: “Peace is the *absence of violence*” (Ibid., 167). This last principle must perfectly coincide with the two former. Hence, the idea of violence can no longer be purely descriptive. It must be an incentive. It must encourage us to act in line with our initial goal: peace.

In Galtung, *violence becomes a technical concept*; it must become a generally agreed-upon instrument for peace.

Now, on Galtung's account, peace has two facets. "Negative peace" is the absence of violence in the traditional sense. "Positive peace" is what, in 1964, he would refer to as the "integration of human society," "a sphere of amity and mutual aid," (Ibid., 2) and what he would later, more simply put, call "social justice" (Ibid., 183-186). Given that "*peace is the absence of violence*," this calls for a thorough revision of the concept of violence as we knew it. Henceforth, violence's defining trait is "*the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual*." Whether through the exercise of physical force or by other means, violence is what extends the gap between the potential and the actual or prevents this gap from narrowing. Human potential is twofold: somatic and mental, which is to say that violence can be both physical and psychological. From now on, *anything* that harms the realisation of a human being's potential can be characterized as violent.

That is why violence is best described in terms of *influence*. As Galtung put it: "*violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realisations are below their potential realisations*" (Ibid., 168). Which, applied to our aerial bombing scenario, makes for an apt description. Influenced by the technological means designed the engineer, the strategist forwards his plans to influence the general whose order will ultimately influence the pilot to press the release button of the bomb. In the end, indeed, it makes sense to describe the bombing as the result of an interplay of influences. *'Influence' departs from, but at the same time encompasses, the 'force' component of the traditional definition of violence.*

What is more, violence *is no longer necessarily dependent on intent*. Indeed, on Galtung's account, it is admissible to label violent any given social structure generating "unequal power ... and life chances." Violence, in other words, may also very well be "structural." For instance, "in a society where life expectancy is twice as high in the upper as in the lower classes, violence is exercised even if there are no concrete actors one can point to directly attacking others, as when one person kills another" (Ibid., 171).

Finally, *violence may or may not involve harm*. While any inequitable division of resources, opportunities, and privileges in society may be described as both unfair and violent, it is not a priori true that any kind of pattern of disadvantage will be experienced as harmful. In summation, it is henceforth possible to consider instances of violence that involve neither force, nor intent, nor harm. Galtung's extended concept of violence cannot be considered as a

linguistic slippage. Its difference with the traditional view is a matter of incommensurability. What is more, in contrast to the latter, it can aptly account for technological scenarios involving violence. In short, Galtung's

redefinition of violence is akin to a paradigm shift. This is where the era of *New Violence* starts. This is the age in which we live.

New Violence Today

Prior to Galtung, extensions of the concept of violence could be taken as figurative. After Galtung, many of our current and expanded linguistic usages of the word violence are to be taken seriously. Many hitherto metaphorical extensions of the idea of violence are now warranted precisely because he did not extend the concept of violence metaphorically. Today, talking about hybrid warfare is just as warranted as the claim that ‘Words are violence.’ Analysing the psychological violence exercised by the psychopath is just as admissible as studying the ‘pervasive violence of the male gaze.’ Considering the idea of ‘the systemic violence of capitalism’ is as normal as reflecting on ‘slow violence,’ ‘environmental violence,’ or the ‘violence of cultural appropriation.’ And so forth.

In order to advocate his new definition of violence, Galtung often strived to make the characterization of human ‘potential’ as objective as possible. To do so, he often tended to privilege illustrations from the medical field. Incidentally, he sometimes compared the work of the ‘peace researcher’ to that of his father and paternal grandfather, both physicians. By his admission, nothing is deeply philosophical about “*the difference between the potential and the actual,*” which amounts to a difference “between what could have been and what is.”

Thus, if a person died from tuberculosis in the eighteenth century, it would be hard to conceive of this as violence since it might have been quite unavoidable. However, if he dies from it today, despite all the medical resources in the world, then violence is present according to our definition (Ibid., 169).

At least from the perspective of the somatic, the “potential level of realisation” can be based on a fairly objective estimate of what can be done with “a given level of insight and resources” (Ibid., 169).

This suggested that determining what is violent and what is not may be linked to a specific level of technical expertise. In 2019, Western leaders declared war on COVID-19. In most parts of the world, lockdowns and vaccine policies were implemented. The virus was subject to constant statistical monitoring and mathematical modeling. The “difference between the potential and the actual” could be checked almost in real-time. ‘Anti-vaxxers’ were quite often labeled ‘psychopaths,’ ‘killers,’ or ‘terrorists.’ Notably, in Brazil and the United States, the question has been raised whether “ignoring Covid-19 is a crime against humanity” (Kirby, 2021).

Shortly afterward, anti-vaxx campaigners and others turned these accusations against the pharmaceutical industry and health policymakers ... Whatever side of this debate, this is certainly one of the most emblematic cases of the great change in our general conception of violence. The various reactions to the pandemic show the extent to which Galtung has captured our current *Zeitgeist*.

...

In his science-fiction novella “The Minority Report,” Philip K. Dick (2016) depicted a society in which “precogs,” mutants plugged into a great machine, predict crimes and thereby help the police to stop suspects before they break the law. How may a society with a “Precrime Division” understand violence? That question, to my knowledge, has never been raised. It is most likely a society in which the traditional view on violence has become outdated. The pain of a slap, a punch or a stab can no longer serve as reference points. The work of the “Precrime Division” consists of entirely eliminating the “*difference between the potential and the actual*” by using their unprecedented “level of insight and resources.” Whoever would like to unplug the precogs would make the whole crime prevention system collapse. He or she wouldn’t technically use force so as to kill, injure, or harm. His or her action would be violent in terms of *influence*.

Our world, of course, is not that of Dick’s science fiction novella. It is, however, a world in which multinational technology corporations like IBM intend to provide law enforcement agencies with all the resources of artificial intelligence “to fight crime faster.”² In today’s world, the automated electronic information system HealthMap has become “an established global leader in utilizing online informal sources for disease outbreak monitoring and real-time surveillance of emerging public health threats.”³ The World Economic Forum’s Climate Technology Team launched “FireAID,” a project which combines “artificial intelligence, data and fire-fighting resources to mitigate wildfire risks throughout the world.”⁴ In 2019, it has been reported that “After successfully predicting laboratory earthquakes, a team of geophysicists has applied a machine learning algorithm to quakes in the Pacific Northwest” (Smart, 2019).

2 IBM, “Predictive Crime Fighting,” <https://www.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/crimefighting/> (Accessed June 4, 2023).

3 HealthMap, “About HealthMap,” <https://healthmap.org/about/> (Accessed June 4, 2023).

4 World Economic Forum, “FireAid: AI to predict and fight wildfires,” <https://www.weforum.org/projects/fireaid-ai-to-predict-and-fight-wildfires> (Accessed June 4, 2023).

In 1969, Galtung already wrote:

... the case of people dying from earthquakes today would not warrant an analysis in terms of violence. However, the day after tomorrow, when earthquakes may become avoidable, such deaths may be seen as the result of violence.

Algorithms are on the rise. The traditional view of violence is over. *New Violence's future looks bright.*

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ZONA ZARIĆ

The Rape-ability and Take-ability of Bodies and Lands

What do we talk about when we talk about rape? Or something being “there for the taking,” “up for grabs”? What kind of thing, object, body, or person is readily available, somehow ontologically different, less worthy?

To properly answer these questions, one would have to start with the history, or at least the genesis of the process of “othering.” The process of “othering” is a complex sociocultural phenomenon rooted in the construction of hierarchies that separate individuals or groups into distinct categories, often positioning one as the norm and the other as deviating from that norm. This process is deeply interwoven with various forms of discrimination, including racism, misogyny, imperialism, colonialism, and the environmental crisis. At its core, othering is a mechanism of exclusion that establishes and perpetuates power imbalances, fostering a sense of superiority among the group in power while marginalizing and devaluing those who are deemed different. It reinforces power dynamics that enable the exploitation and marginalization of certain groups, perpetuating social, economic, and ecological injustices. To designate a fellow human being as the “Other,” the less-than-human, one would have to start with a deconstruction of compassion and recognizing the common humanity that it implies. This intricate process can be traced from how it permeates language up to the violence it ‘normalizes’ and the legal structures it permeates. Historically, those designated as “others” have been excluded from shared humanity and dignity through socially constructed categories such as class, race, gender, and sexuality. This article focuses on the connection between the materiality of gender and the treatment of “Nature.” By analyzing recent works such as Nancy Fraser’s *cannibal capitalism* and Erin Rennie’s examination of online misogyny, the article aims to bridge the theoretical and practical aspects of the discussed issues.

The concept of rapeability and takeability delves into the profound implications of materialist feminism, exposing the intricate web of power relations that underlie the treatment of bodies and lands as objects for exploitation. By examining online misogyny, rape, and feminist struggles within democratic frameworks, we aim to unfold a nuanced narrative closely intertwined with the exploitation on land, a new form of imperialism – ecological imperialism. The environmental crisis is intricately linked to othering, particularly in the exploitation of natural resources and the treatment of the environment as an “other.” The perception of nature as an entity separate from humans has facilitated the exploitation and degradation of ecosystems. This separation has led to a mindset that sees nature as a resource to be exploited rather than a complex web of interconnected life. Environmental othering becomes evident in practices such as deforestation, pollution, and over-extraction of resources, where marginalized communities often bear the consequences. Many scholars and activists

thus privilege the term Capitalocene to that of the Anthropocene, as it places the blame on certain humans and certain systems, and not humans (*anthropos*) indistinctly.

Another term proposed as a substitute for the Anthropocene is Wasteocene, articulated by the Italian historian Marco Armiero, a salient illustration provided through the lens of global eco-apartheid. This phenomenon intricately intertwines with the broader systemic frameworks of the Anthropocene. This eco-apartheid system perpetuates the disproportionate distribution of climate vulnerability, delineated along the contours of the global racial empire and the tenets of capitalism. The bifurcation it engenders classifies individuals into categories of “valuable humans,” encompassing the global North, non-colored populations, and elites, and “disposable humans,” comprising BIPOC, denizens of the global South, and the economically disenfranchised. Rooted in racial and capitalistic mechanisms, this eco-apartheid leverages profit from the exploitation of natural resources and the devaluation of life to serve the imperatives of economic growth. Consequently, subaltern communities bear the brunt of environmental degradation.

Armiero’s conceptualization of the Wasteocene extends beyond the traditional Anthropocene discourse, providing a theoretical framework explaining how capitalism, colonialism, and racism coalesce to engender “othering” relationships. This intricate web of “othering” begets wasteful dynamics, giving rise to marginalized and discarded spaces, as well as a subaltern demographic of wasted individuals. Central to Armiero’s elucidation of the Wasteocene is the notion of “toxic narratives,” constituting discursive constructs that invisibilize violence, normalize injustice, and obliterate alternative narratives. Operating as agents of epistemicide, these narratives aim to eradicate, erase, or devalue knowledge systems, specifically those that underscore the intersections of colonialism, racism, and capitalism with the epochal transformations wrought by climate change. By depreciating the lives, narratives, and voices of BIPOC and colonized communities, these narratives serve to uphold the imperatives of economic growth and the global racial empire.

This invisibilisation of different voices and knowledge is all too familiar to feminist as well. Feminist struggles have always been attentive to the presence of women in the public space, at the heart of institutional politics but also in counter-public spaces. Both the dominant public space and the counter-public spaces are meant to be democratic and should include women as citizens. However, there is a contradiction in democracy: it claims to be inclusive and yet it excludes. If there is no explicit exclusion of women in public spaces, there is however a series of implicit mechanisms that keep women away from institutional political life and that make men better

represented and advantaged. It is true that political careers are increasingly feminized (in parliaments, ministries and as heads of state), but this does not lead to true equality in places of power and within institutional political life, which remain marked by the manifestation of male domination, ordinary misogyny and sexist and sexual violence.

The fundamental theoretical aim of this article is to identify the gap in present-day capitalist democracies between procedural blamelessness and persistent substantive injustices. To fulfill this aim, we bring together and interweave what might seem as epistemologically and normatively incompatible elements: Marxist-feminist theorization of the uncommodified conditions of possibility of capitalism with the deontological norm of “participatory parity” as the essence of emancipation, as well as critical ecology. While examining the ideological essentializing effects of concepts found in many radical standpoints, and insisting on the structural nature of all forms of social domination.

The Materialist Feminist Lens

Materialist feminism emerges as a crucial theoretical framework to scrutinize how economic and social structures contribute to the oppression of women. In the 1970s, the feminist outcry against rape propelled it from a silent topic to a public concern. However, the contemporary cultural landscape bombards us with fears and fascinations of rape, prompting an examination of its implications on hegemonic discourse. This section delves into the material conditions shaping the oppression of women and explores how materialist feminism contributes to understanding and addressing gender inequality.

In the 1970's, with the second-wave feminist movement, sexual violence became a forefront topic in feminist studies and it continues to trouble the boundaries between disciplinary studies. When I refer to rape, I consider it a criminal act, a violent sexual invasion on the body in connection to hegemonic discourse, resulting in sexual victimization. Looking at the cultural representation of rape in literature allows us to understand the cultural fears and fascinations with rape while respecting the victims of assault. Looking at novels beginning in the late 1930's and continuing to the present, I hope to deconstruct the hegemonic discourse surrounding rape. Through the corporeal acts of sexual violence, we can understand ways the writer socially constructs sexuality, race, and gender and ways fictional assault both is scripted by and scripts cultural norms.

Materialist feminism constitutes a robust theoretical framework grounded in a socio-economic analysis that meticulously investigates the

intricate interplay between material conditions, encompassing economic and social structures, and the systemic oppression experienced by women. This theoretical perspective, which transcends conventional feminist paradigms, underscores the pivotal role of capitalism and class struggle in comprehending and redressing gender inequality. Beyond a unidimensional focus on gender dynamics, materialist feminism discerns the indispensability of incorporating nuanced considerations related to race and ethnicity within its analytical purview. Central to the tenets of materialist feminism is the contention that the thorough examination of the material realities governing women's lives is paramount for effecting substantive social change. In this vein, materialist feminists assert that the oppressive forces shaping women's experiences are deeply embedded in the socio-economic fabric, wherein economic structures and class dynamics intersect with gendered hierarchies. By scrutinizing the tangible circumstances that influence and constrain women's agency and opportunities, materialist feminism extends its analytical reach beyond the realm of mere gender relations, embracing a holistic understanding of the multifaceted nature of women's subjugation.

The materialist feminist perspective is distinguished by its emphasis on unraveling the intricate connections between economic systems, social structures, and the perpetuation of gender-based inequities. It posits that capitalism, as a dominant economic paradigm, plays a central role in shaping the contours of women's oppression. Furthermore, materialist feminists contend that class struggle, inherent in the socio-economic framework, contributes significantly to the perpetuation of gender disparities. Within this analytical framework, considerations of race and ethnicity emerge as integral components, acknowledging the intersectionality of oppression and advocating for a comprehensive understanding of the diverse and layered experiences of women. In the broader context of feminist discourse, materialist feminism serves as a critical lens through which to scrutinize the structural foundations of inequality. It urges a nuanced examination of power dynamics, highlighting the interconnectedness of economic, social, and gendered forces.

Nancy Fraser, a renowned proponent of the materialist feminist perspective, grounds her approach in a democratic-socialist critique of the capitalist political economy, combining sharp analytical reasoning with a normative commitment to human equality and solidarity. Thinking from the ground up gives her work a complexity that has sometimes been criticized as compromising the systematic quality and coherence of her theoretical categories. But her approach has led to a powerful interpretive framework that highlights the mutually constituting or intersecting symbolic (ideational) and material dimensions of social domination (race, gender and class), and to novel and fruitful explorations of the necessary conditions for

substantive democratic politics. She deals systematically with the tension between different truth and justice claims – recognition justice and redistributive justice – that have arisen in society and that bedevil critical theory, where divisions have hardened over the politics of recognition (“identity politics”) and egalitarian redistributive frameworks of analysis and action. She has written widely on the philosophical conceptions of justice and injustice; and is a long-standing critic of liberal feminism, and of how identity politics displace a structural critique of capitalism. In her most recent book “Cannibal Capitalism: How Our System Is Devouring Democracy, Care and the Planet – And What We Can Do About It,” Fraser sheds light on capitalism as an economic system based on the extraction and accumulation of profit, which externalizes (that is, erases) the vast nexus of resources on which it both depends, and yet destroys. Fraser argues that “the political, ecological, and social-reproductive strands of crisis are inseparable from racialized expropriation in both periphery and core ... In short, economic, ecological, social, and political crises are inextricably entangled with imperialism and oppression – and with the escalating antagonisms associated with them” (2022: 16).

The perceived ability to take without the obligation to replenish pertains both to the private sphere and the environment, as both have been perceived as sources and places of “taking” without limit and with impunity. The feminist critique of the “double shift” of waged work outside the home, and the lion’s share of unpaid reproductive labour is compared in *Cannibal Capitalism* to the ways in which capitalism has been expropriating resources. This naturalization of violent taking, with its powerful interplay between exploitation and expropriation is what inspired the title of this article.

“Women’s sexuality is, socially, a thing to be stolen, sold, bought, bartered, or exchanged by others. But women never own or possess it, and men never treat it in law or in life, with the solicitude with which they treat property” (MacKinnon, 2016: 43).

The examination of gender politics inherent in discussions surrounding rape rhetoric reveals that the crux of the matter extends beyond the act of rape itself. Instead, the focal point shifts towards the polarized gender boundaries that cast women as inherently passive, consequently rendering them susceptible to rape, while men are characterized as intrinsically aggressive, assuming the role of perpetrators. Rape, both in its actual occurrence and its fictional representations, emerges as a conduit for delving into a broader sexual culture that accentuates and dramatizes gender politics. Catharine MacKinnon’s seminal work, “Rape: On Coercion and Consent,” featured in the 1997 compilation of essays titled “Writing on the Body: Female Embodiment and Feminist Theory,” directs attention to the nuanced examination of the definition of rape, or the lack thereof, within societal

discourse. MacKinnon, whose body of work spans various aspects of sexuality, predominantly engages with legal issues and pornography, offering a distinctive perspective on sexual violence, and more recently a blistering critique of the notion of consent, often used to defend and justify sexual encounters with power imbalances.

The intentional focus on women in this discourse does not stem from a dismissal of the fact that men can be victims of rape, it is rooted in the acknowledgment that the conceptualization of “woman” has transcended mere subjecthood to embody a distinctive position. Within the confines of a robust cognitive gender system, the term “woman” becomes emblematic of a realm characterized by passivity – by its ‘take-ability’ and ‘rape-ability’. Consequently, if a man were to experience the traumatic act of rape, this occurrence forcibly thrusts him into the predefined position of “woman,” underscoring the rigidity and implications of the prevailing gender hierarchy. The ways society positions women as inherently rapeable and how rape consciousness and fictional representations of sexual victimization reinforce the cognitive system that designates women as rapeable play a pivotal role in the way we assess rape but also in the way we process it. One striking example is the neologism “rapefugee,” coined by Europe’s far-right to propagate xenophobia and link refugees to an alleged propensity for rape. This term reveals the power of language in perpetuating notions of sex, gender, nationalism, and xenophobia. The historical evolution of “othering” forms the backdrop against which contemporary discussions on rape and exploitation unfold.

Democracy and Gender Inequality

Current societies that call themselves democratic are experiencing a “crisis of erosion” – or a “crisis of care” as referred to by Nancy Fraser – of their practices and institutions, causing a generalized individual and collective discontent embodied through different forms of claims in the public space, which poses the following questions: to what extent do feminist movements contribute to the emergence of a new form of democracy? By relying on militant experiences, does feminism propose to lay the foundations of another power relationship and a new democratic model? And what about ecofeminism? Can it initiate another future of democracy? A counter-model of the existing patriarchal democracy, one according to which there would no longer be a feminist centre and peripheries but rather a circulation of figures, theoretical influences and modalities of mobilizations. Democracy could then be rethought from the postulate of equality by refusing that the existing differences are a factor of social and political hierarchization. Thus,

universalism could give way to a vision of gender equality that would imply the existence of differences as the engine of another democracy. In this sense, feminist struggles impose themselves as one of the conditions of possibilities necessary to the renewal of democracy. This theory can be found in the unorthodox marxist/materialist feminism of Nancy Fraser. Fraser's engagement with feminist theory and praxis has a strong focus on the intersections of gender and class and the critique of a capitalist political economy that subordinates women at both material and symbolic levels. The shift in feminist theories of gender from quasi-marxist, labour-centered conceptions to post-marxist culture and identity-based conceptions, demonstrate what is unique about Fraser's feminism. Fraser refutes arguments that cast concerns of socialist feminism as incompatible with those of newer paradigms centered on discourse and culture, and allows for an analysis of gender broad enough to capture the full range of feminist concerns, those central to the old socialist-feminism as well as those rooted in the cultural turn, thus legitimating issues of representation, identity, and difference. Aiming for justice and equality, and hence an expansion of the frontiers of freedom (freedom from domination and freedom to be self-determining actors of one's own fate) through a "systematic reconstructive thinking about the welfare state" in a socialist feminist perspective, Fraser has sought to define the pathways and steps (universal caregiving, universal material security) towards utopian goals: transcending maldistribution and misrecognition through a program of transformative theory and politics. While the analytic framework Fraser proposes in *Justice Interruptus* has generated broad and often heated debate (see *Adding Insult to Injury*) from critical theorists of various persuasions, her effort to produce a unified understanding of the forms of domination in late capitalism has been a fundamental contribution to contemporary feminism. By evidencing the inextricably linked, indeed symbiotic character of symbolic and material domination, clarifying the terms of the conceptual debate, and hence identifying the need for a renewed corpus of ecological-socialist-feminist theory, Fraser has opened new pathways for critical thought and socio-political praxis. The model of recognition Fraser proposes is stretched by an interrogation of the political arrangements that prevent some members of the political community from being the peers/equals of others.

While Marxist analysis provides insights into laws concerning history and the economy, it fails to understand the dynamics of sexism. Nonetheless, we must use Marxist analysis for its strength in understanding economic laws of motion, and feminist analysis and feminism for its strength in understanding the particular predicament of women. Since the material base of patriarchy and capital is not only rooted in the economic aspects of the division of labour but also by gender and the family.

In recent decades, recognition claims have been at the forefront of political and scholarly conversations and debates, decentering redistributive claims that traditionally were generally not sensitive to symbolic discrimination and domination. The recognition turn has been extremely important for women, ethnic and racial minorities, as well as sexual minorities, valuing group identities and giving public voice to long-dominated social groups whose self-affirmation has become one of the main features of social and political life in western societies, with transnational impacts beyond the “West.” *Me Too* and *Black Lives Matter* (BLM) have been prominent examples of transnational circulations which, while uneven due to specific national histories and experiences and often repressive local cultural and political factors, touch all continents. BLM, for instance, has echoed with longstanding minority struggles in Brazil and India, and has been appropriated in many African countries as a means to connect anticolonial histories with postcolonial Black liberation emancipatory politics. *Me Too*, likewise, has become a tool of women’s struggle in difficult contexts in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East. Identity affirmation has thus generated worldwide consciousness and powerful critiques of systemic racism and state violence. Yet, as Fraser and others (Angela Davis is notable here) have pointed out, the new recognition paradigm of social justice falls short from undermining the mechanics of capitalist exploitation and class structure reproduction, at global or local levels. To transcend the divide between ostensibly opposing equally valid justice claims, Nancy Fraser proposes a ‘perspectival dualism’ in which distinct ‘economic-redistributive’ (maldistribution) and ‘cultural-recognitive’ (misrecognition) logics of justice are analytically distinguished and then recombined in a conceptual framework that opens new spaces for left-critical praxis. This approach understands the political economy as an ideological objectification of social structures that naturalize relations of raced, classed and gendered domination. The intersection of class, race and gender requires a reformulation of the aims of emancipation, a framework that synthesizes democratic socialism and anti-racist and feminist thought and practice.

Nonetheless, some critics have argued that Fraser’s ‘perspectival dualism’ inadvertently instantiates ‘methodological whiteness’ and underestimates the weight of representations and pervasive symbolic violence, not reducible to class analysis. This critique can certainly be leveled at many of the older strains of socialist thought that conceptually ordered different types of domination and struggles into hierarchical categories, the material class foundations of oppression being prior to all else. However, Fraser’s work should not be assimilated to this kind of reductionist materialism. To the

contrary, by investigating and highlighting the interactions of the symbolic and material dimensions of classed, raced and gendered power relations in capitalist societies she has opened new vistas for critical theorisations of the complexities of domination, contributing significantly to the revival of socialist and democratic perspectives in the post-socialist world. *Justice Interruptus* and her later works offer a way out of contradiction through dialectical synthesis, necessary for making sense of today's and (yesterday's) dynamics of international politics. By exploring the intersectionality of gender, class, and race, we gain insights into the power dynamics that sustain the oppression of women and the commodification of their bodies and lands.

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Annexes

CAS SEE Fellows through years

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2024

DANIJEL MATIJEVIĆ (Center for Holocaust and Genocide Research in Southeast Europe, University of Rijeka) - Project title: "The rescue of Jewish inmates of Kapor concentration camp"; BORIŠA MRAOVIĆ (Association for Culture and Art Crvena, Sarajevo) - Project title: "Democratizing fiscal policies: Lessons from socialist Yugoslavia"; IVANA ANGELOVA (Meiji University, Tokyo) - Project title: "Corridors that generate life. Emancipation, solidarity and collegiality as common threads that connect. The case of two flows: Vardar and Ljubljana"; KARLO KRALJ (Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb) - Project title: "Strategic predicaments of new left movement parties' Development in ost-yugoslav space: Insights from Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia"; ELONA GJATA (Albanian Institute of Cultural Studies (NGO), Pristina) - Project title: "Bilingualism: An instrument for destroying the line of nationalism in Albanian community of North Macedonia as a case of study"; MILICA BOŽIĆ MAROJEVIĆ (Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade) - Project title: "Back to the future or how to make peace with the past in order to create a better tomorrow together"; ANA ĐORĐEVIĆ (Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade) - Project title:

"Political emotions and participation of the regional youth: What matters to them and what do they strive for?"; JOSEF DJORDJEVSKI (National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, Washington) - Project title: "Remembering wounded landscapes: Environments as shared memory sites commemorating war destruction in the former Yugoslavia (reminded)"; KRITON KUCI (Mediterranean University of Albania, Tirana) - Project title: "Redefining tourism narratives: Navigating beyond banal nationalism in Southeast Europe"; VALENTINA OTMAČIĆ (Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Rijeka) - Project title: "Memory of good things: Mobilizing legacies of inter-ethnic solidarity and collaboration to support culture of shared future"; PETER KREKO (Political Capital Institute) - Project title: "Breaking filter bubbles in informational autocracies"; ALEKSANDAR BOŠKOVIĆ (Columbia University) - Project title: "Nothing (: Made in Yugoslavia"; SOPHIE GUEUDET (London School of Economics and Political Science) - Project title: "Power dynamics, politico-military relations and contested statehood in the Yugoslav wars"

2023

TAMARA BANJEGLAV (Institute of Economics, Zagreb) - Project title: "Give peace a chance: Remembering slow-moving changes in the age of fast commemorations in a post-conflict environment"; MARINA

- CHRISTODOULOU (Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences) - Project title: "How to Kill a Woman in the Real and in Fiction and "Non-Fiction"";
- CHRISTIAN COSTAMAGNA (Università del Piemonte Orientale, Vercelli) - Project title: "How to End a War: the Case of the NATO Intervention Against the Yugoslav Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999";
- GIUSTINO DE MICHELE (Université Paris 8) - Project title: "Negotiating with Violence: From the Economy of Violence to the Violence of Economics, Following Deconstruction";
- JAVIER TOSCANO GUERRERO (Center for Advanced Internet Studies, Bochum) - Project title: "Violence. Understanding the Elementary Forms of Social Aggression";
- LETIZIA KONDERAK (Università degli Studi di Bari) - Project title: "Politics, War, and Violence. A Reading Between Arendt and Schmitt";
- TOMÁŠ KORDA (Charles University, Prague) - Project title: "Inter-state Misrecognition and Violence According to Hegel";
- ENDI TUPJA (Research Fellow at Künstlerhaus Büchsenhausen, Innsbruck) - Project title: "All the Missing Caregivers";
- ANDREAS WILMES (Pázmány Péter Catholic University / West University of Timișoara) - Project title: "The 'New Violence'. An Essay on Johan Galtung and the Technological Society";
- MIKHAIL BUKHTOYAROV (Siberian State Aerospace University / Krasnoyarsk State Technical University, Russia). Project title: "Connected learner, augmented learner: seamlessness of educational data flow inside the transhuman educational system";
- ALEXANDER MOSKALENKO (National Scientific Centre "Hon. Prof. M.S. Bokarius Forensic Science Institute" Kharkiv). Project title: "From candidacy to membership - (Comparative analysis of the EU political conditionality for Ukraine and Western Balkan countries)";
- OLHA NYKORAK (Department of Constitutional Law, Ivan Franko National University of Lviv). Project title: "Role of constitutional identity in national security and European Union enlargement: examples of Ukraine and Southeastern Europe";
- OLEKSEY POLUNIN (National University of Life and Environmental Sciences of Ukraine in Kyiv). Project title: "The manipulability theories of causality in the space of the multiple mental representations of time flow: can we produce and then break a reliable causality representation?";
- EKATERINA PURGINA (Ural Federal University, Ural Institute for the Humanities, Ekaterinburg). Project title: "Boundaries and Boundary-Crossing in Digital Narratives of Russian Emigrants after 24 February 2022";
- LEDA SUTLOVIĆ (University of Vienna) - Project title: "Contemporary Feminist Activism in the Post-Yugoslav Region".
- SERGEI SHEVCHENKO (Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences). Project title: "Refugee Cognitive Ecology. Towards an Ethics of Oblivion";

DMITRII TRUBNIKOV (Department of Management, St. Petersburg School of Economics and Management, HSE University). Project title: "Russian Cyberspace: A Rent-Seeking Road to the Digital Gulag"

2022

ZALA PAVŠIĆ (European University Institute, Florence) Project title: "The personal is political: Solidarity, friendship, and other resistance narratives in Rijeka in the times of hybridization"; NICOLA CAMILLERI (Freie Universität Berlin) Project title: "Shooting for the Empire. A Cultural and Social History of Shooting Associations in Imperial Germany"; ISTVAN MIKLOS ZALA (Central European University) Project title: "Climate Justice and the Polluter Pays Principle: A Tort Law Perspective"; CHRISTIAN COSTAMAGNA (University of Eastern Piedmont, Italy) Project title: "The Causes of the Kosovo war and NATO intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: a preliminary exploration of Yugoslav and the USA declassified political and military documents"; ACHILLE ZARLENGA (University of Molise, Italy) Project title: "Philosophy of frontiers and identity's construction: the INCONTRO with the other; ALENKA AMBROŽ (École normale supérieure (ENS), Paris) Project title: "Democratizing desire: In search of the 'female gaze'"; DAMIR ARSENIJEVIĆ (De Montfort University, UK) Project title: "Degraded Bodies, Degraded

Environments"; EMILIA MARRA (University of Trieste, Italy) Project title: "Token Crushing Token: from Cryptocurrencies to Capabilities"; NIKOLINA ŽIDEK (Complutense University of Madrid, Spain) Project title: "Fitting like a glove: the (ab) use of the European memory framework in contemporary Croatia's memory politics"; PAUL BLAMIRE (Aberystwyth University, UK) Project title: "Abstraction and Universality in Political Theology"; TENA PRELEC (Sussex University, UK) Project title: "Captured islands: what is the impact of illicit finance on local communities? The case of the Cres-Lošinj Archipelago"; TOMISLAV FURLANIS (University of Rijeka, Croatia) Project title: "Robotic bias: conceptualizing the phenomena of robotic facilitated discrimination"; VALERIO FABBRIZI (University of Rome "Tor Vergata", Italy) Project title: "The populist upsurge in contemporary liberal societies. Implications for constitutional democracy"; ZONA ZARIĆ (École normale supérieure (ENS), Paris) Project title: "The Rapeability and Takeability of Bodies and Lands"

2021

VALERIA GRAZIANO (Queen Mary University of London, UK) Project title: "Get Along Comrade Tinkering as Care for Freedom"; TENA PRELEC (PhD, Sussex University, School of Law, Politics and Sociology) Project title: "Balkan Kleptocracy: Mapping the Linkages Between Home-Grown

State Capture and Global Enablers in South East Europe”; KATARINA KUŠIĆ (Aberystwyth University, UK) Project title: “Subjects beyond intervention: The politics of improvement in Serbia”; ANDREA COLOMBO (University of Padova, Italy) Project title: “Beyond the Environmentalism Paradigm: Greenwashing as an Assault on Democratic Norms and Decision-Making”; GABRIEL REZENDE DE SOUZA PINTO (Université Paris 8 – Vincennes Saint Denis, France) Project title: “Channelling democracy: recent transformations of the legal system”; GABRIELE GIACOMINI (University Vita-Salute San Raffaele in Milan, Italy) Project title: “Democracy in the age of online polarisation. Developing new policy proposals to promote dialogue”; MILOŠ ĆIPRANIĆ (Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Serbia) Project title: “The Statutes of Eastern Adriatic Communes in Space”; MARKO LUKA ZUBČIĆ (University of Rijeka, Croatia) Project title: “Institutional Epistemology of Open Order”; DESARA DUSHI (University of Bologna, Italy and University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg) Project title: “The Impact of Judicial Reform and New Judicial Institutions in the Rule of Law and EU Integration in Albania”; NIKOLINA ŽIDEK (Complutense University of Madrid, Spain) Project title: “The Genie Out of the Bottle: Engagement of the Argentinean-Croat Diaspora in Homeland Politics (1990-to-day)”; BOJAN BILIĆ (University College London, UK) Project – title: “Unexpected Challenges to Trans

Freedom: Transphobia in Serbian Leftist Activism”; VIKTOR PÁL (University of Tampere, Finland) Project title: “Red Trash. The Concept of Waste in Communist Eastern Europe”; MILOŠ ĆIPRANIĆ (Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Serbia) Project title: “The Statutes of Eastern Adriatic Communes in Space”; MARKO LUKA ZUBČIĆ (University of Rijeka, Croatia) Project title: “Institutional Epistemology of Open Order”; GABRIELE GIACOMINI (University Vita-Salute San Raffaele in Milan, Italy) Project title: “The Utopia of “Rousseauian Democracy” in the Digital Age: A Liberal Critique”

2020

TANJA ANĐIĆ (University of Minnesota, USA) Project title: EU Accession and Energy Competition: The Future of the Western Balkans in the “Laboratory of Conditionality”; KEVIN KENJAR (UC Berkeley, USA) Project title: “Fool, This is a Post Office”: The Dynamics of Linguistic Landscape Intervention in Post-Yugoslav Space; VALENTINA FAGGIANI (University of Granada, Spain) Project title: The Reform of the Common European Asylum System; FILIP BALUNOVIĆ (Scuola Normale Superiore, Italy); Project title: The Fresh Air of Eco-Mobilizations in Former Yugoslavia: Systemic Critique or (another) Narrow Field of Contestation?; FRANCESCA ROLANDI (University of Turin, Italy) Project title: Doš'o sam u grad iz pasivnog

kraja. Internal Migration, Settlement Dynamics and Social Practices in post-World War II Rijeka; VALENTINA MORO (University of Padova, Italy) Project title: Feminist Movements Embodied in the Structure of Liberal Democracies; ONDŘEJ ČÍSAŘ (Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic); Project title: Changing Climate: Varieties of Environmental Political Mobilization; XENIA CHIARAMONTE (University of Milan, Italy) Project title: Instituting the Rights of Nature: A Fictional and Casuistic Approach to Law and Social Movements; FEDERICA PORCHEDDU (University of Macerata, Italy); Project title: Food Sovereignty: A Challenge to the Global Food Regime; ALESSANDRA SCOTTI (University of Naples, Italy) Project title: From a Bodily Ecology to an Environmental Ethic. Merleau-Ponty's Legacy in Ecological Thinking; GUGLIELMO FEIS (University of Milan, Italy) Project title: Digital Humanities: How (a Bit of) Programming Can Make us Better

2019

BOJAN BAČA (York University, UK) Project title: "Digitalization of the Marketplace of (Reactionary) Ideas: The Alt-Right as a Political Ideology, Social Movement, and Counter-Culture" MONICA CANO ABADIA (University of Zaragoza, Spain) Project title: "New Materialist Cartographies of Patterns of Exclusion in Digital Environments"; GUGLIELMO FEIS (University of

Milan, Italy) Project title: "Channeling Social Justice through the Blockchain? A Critical Review of the Potentiality of Distributed Ledger Technology (DTL) in Reducing Financial Inequalities and Improve the Access to Financial Information"; IVAN FLIS (Utrecht University, Netherlands) Project – title: "Open Science as a Movement of Digital Disruption"; GRETA FAVARA (University of Milan, Italy); Project title: "Normative Political Theory and the Public Role of the Theorist"; NATASHA JANKOVIC (University of Belgrade, Serbia) Project title: "Rijeka: an experimental field of concrete utopia"; NILAY KILINÇ (University of Surrey, UK) Project title: "Highly-Skilled Turkish Migrants' Search for Alternative Diaspora Spaces in Europe: How They Build (Digital) Social Networks Beyond the 'Culture of Rejection'"; DRAGANA KOVAČEVIĆ BIELICKI (University of Oslo, Norway) Project title: "Mapping the anti-migrant protests in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina through their online media coverage (2015-present)"; MASSIMO LEONE (University of Fribourg, Switzerland) Project title: "Democracy and Trolling in Internet Threads (DETROIT)"; ANDREY MENSHIKOV (Ural State University, Russia) Project title: "Unequal Distribution of Religious Freedom in the Discourse on Human Rights"; VALENTINA MORO (University of Padova, Italy) Project title: "Deconstructing Languages of Rejection: a Political Theory Analysis of Feminist Discourses and Methodologies"; SABINO PAPARELLA

(University of Bari, Italy) Project title: "Political Disintermediation in the Digital Era"; Jelena Petrović (ISH Ljubljana, Slovenia) Project title: "The Politics of Error: Social Glitches, (Post)Human Utopia, and Art today"; ROBERTO ROCCU (LSE, London, UK) Project title: "Comparative Political Economies of Lost Hope: Subaltern Trajectories of Inequality, Transformation and Rejection from the Arab Uprisings to Crisis Europe"; OSZKAR ROGINER (University of Graz, Austria) Project title: "Cultures of Rejections – (self)perception of minorities and knowledge production"; FRANCESCA ROLANDI (University of Milan, Italy) Project title: "Doš'osam u grad iz pasivnog kraja. Internal Migration, Settlement Dynamics and Social Practices in post-World War II Rijeka"; SNEZANA VESNIC (University of Belgrade, Serbia) Project title: "Positive European Futures: Creating New Concepts for the Transformation and Redefinition of Digital European Values Case study: Rijeka Between Analog and Digital"

2018

ROSWITHA KERSTEN-PEJANIĆ Project title: "Linguistic Landscapes at the margins: Performativity of ethnic belonging and memory politics in Croatian postconflict border regions" JELENA BELIĆ Project title: "What is Wrong with Withdrawing from an International Cooperation?"; NATAŠA JANKOVIĆ Project title: "Re/I:translating terRI[s]tories:

architectural stories about Rijeka's territory"; MÓNICA CANO ABADÍA Project title: "Risky Vulnerability. The Rise of Neo-Fascist Discourses and the Possibilities of Political Transformation in Judith Butler"; LINA DOKUZOVIĆ Project title: "The Financialization of Knowledge and Its Impact on Cityscapes Translocally"; RORY CYRIL ARCHER Project title: "Postsocialist Croats in postcatholic Ireland: Comparing worlds of work in contemporary variants of neoliberalism" ARIANNA MARIA BAMBINA PIACENTINI Project title: "Non-Alignment and Youth's Political Engagement in Bosnia Herzegovina and Macedonia"; DANIELA BRASIL (Bauhaus-Universität Weimar, Germany) Project title: Emancipatory Learning: New Schools and Artistic Platforms for Social Change; FRANCESCA FORLÈ (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Italy) Project title: Rythmòs in Acting Together. Reinforcing Joint Actions, Improving Stability, and Orienting Power Hierarchies; FILIP MILACIĆ (Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany) Project title: The emergence of identity politics cleavage and its effect on social movements; POLONA SITAR (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia) Project title: Global Menstrual Movements as New Forms of Social Engagement; TIZIANO TORACCA (University of Perugia, Italy; University of Ghent, Belgium) Project title: Metamorphosis of Labour. The Movement for a Basic Income in the Light of the Modern Paradigm of Labour; BARBARA TURK NISKAC

(University of Ljubljana, Slovenia)
 Project title: "Life is all about work":
 Growing Food as Lifestyle Politics;
 PAVAO ŽITKO (University of Perugia,
 Italy) Project title: Ultramodern Man
 as a State of Consciousness

2017

MÓNICA CANO ABADÍA (University
 of Zaragoza, Spain) Project title:
 The Re-Radicalization of Critical
 Thinking: Toward a Global Social
 Justice; NATAŠA JANKOVIĆ (University
 of Belgrade, Serbia) Project title:
 Architectural terRI[s]tories[1]:
 Mapping the process of city transfor-
 mation; OLIMPIA GIULIANA LODDO
 (University of Cagliari, Italy) Project
 – title: Investigation on the Ontology
 of Normative Pictures; DAVIDE
 PALA (University of Torino, Italy)
 Project title: World Poverty and Neo-
 Republicanism; GERRIT WEGENER
 (Technical University Berlin,
 Germany) Project title: Continuous
 architecture. The most living act of
 memory; CARLO BURELLI (University
 of Milan, Italy) Project title: A Theory
 of Order; MIŠO KAPETANOVIĆ
 Project title: Regulation of Informal
 Construction in Anticipation of the
 European Capital of Culture Rijeka
 2020; GREGOR MODER (University
 of Ljubljana, Slovenia) Project title:
 Truth in Politics; GRUIA BĂDESCU
 (Oxford University, UK) Project title:
 Spatializing Cultural Policies and
 Activism in Croatia and Romania: A
 Comparative, Transnational Study;
 MAREK SZILVASI (Budapest, Hungary)

Project title: Between Commodity
 and Common Public Good: Access
 to Water and its Relevance for Roma
 People in Europe; MARIJA OTT
 FRANOLIĆ (Zagreb, Croatia) Project
 title: Read, Think, Act; MATEJA
 KURIR (Ljubljana, Slovenia) Project
 title: Architecture as ideology: The
 perspectives of critical theory from
 modernism to the present; NATASHA
 SARDŽOSKA (Skopje, Macedonia)
 Project title: Mapping of Spatial
 Memory in Limitrophe Cities: Border-
 Landscapes and Border-Bodies

2016

ANDREW HODGES (Birmingham,
 UK) Project title: Social Inequalities
 on the Urban Periphery? Vocational
 Education, Ultras' Participation
 and Cultures of Resistance in
 the Classroom; MARIKA DJOLAI
 (Brighton, UK) Project title: When
 the Rooftops became Red Again:
 Post-war Community Dynamics in
 Bosnia and Herzegovina; DEANA
 JOVANOVIĆ (Manchester, UK) Project
 title: Industrial Urban Spaces: after
 Yugoslavia; CARLOS GONZÁLEZ
 VILLA (Madrid, Spain) Project title:
 The Slovene Reaction to the European
 Migrant Crisis: Class and Ideology
 at the edge of Schengen; ANTON
 MARKOČ (Budapest, Hungary)
 Project title: It's Not the Thought that
 Counts: The Irrelevance of Intentions
 to the Moral Blameworthiness of
 Actions; ERNESTO C. SFERRAZZA
 PAPA (Torino, Italy) Project title:
 Walls and bodies: a Philosophical

Research on the Material Government of Human Mobility; MATE NIKOLA TOKIĆ (University of Pennsylvania, USA) Project title: “For the Homeland Ready!” Émigré Croat Separatism and Transnational Political Violence in the Cold War; ALFREDO SASSO (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain) Project title: From the Crisis to a “Third Yugoslavia”. The political project of Ante Marković and the Alliance of Reformist Forces (1989-1991); ALI EMRE BENLI (LUISS Guido Carli, Rome, Italy) Project title: Towards a more just Common European Asylum System: A social choice approach; NURI ALI TAHIR (University of Trieste, Italy) Project title: Controlling the Borders of “Borderless” Europe in the Age of Migration; DANE TALESKI (Central European University, Hungary) Project title: From Armed Boots to Polished Suits: A Precarious Predicament for Peacebuilding and Democratization?; VLADIMIR UNKOVSKI-KORICA (University of London, UK) Project title: City Partnerships in the Cold War: Twinning Zagreb and Bologna, 1963-1991

2015

ALEKSANDRA DJURASOVIC (University of Hamburg, Germany) Project title: Rethinking large-scale development projects in Belgrade and Zagreb; FRANCESCO MARONE (University of Pavia, Italy) Project title: The Social Organization of

Migrant Smuggling from Libya to Italy; GIULIA CARABELLI (Queen’s University Belfast, UK) Project title: The Ties That (un) Bind: Affect and Organization in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Protests, 2014; JEREMY WALTON (University of Chicago, USA) Project title: Spatial Practices of Muslim Minoritization in Turkey and Croatia; JULIJA SARDELIC (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia) Project title: Acts of Citizenship from the Margins: Romani Minorities and Social Movements in Southeastern Europe; VERA TRIPODI (University of Rome “La Sapienza”, Italy) Project title: Epistemic Injustice, Prejudice and Inequalities of Social Power; PIRO REXHEPI (University of Strathclyde, UK) Project title: Unmapping Islam in Eastern Europe: Periodization and Muslim Subjectivities in the Balkans

2013–2014

JAN MUŚ (Institute of East Central Europe in Lublin, Poland) Project title: Economic Development and Ethnopolitics. Study of Dependency; MARCO ABRAM (University of Rome 3, Italy) Project title: Integrating Rijeka into Socialist Yugoslavia: the Politics of National Identity and the New City’s Image (1947-1955); MARCO BRESCIANI (University of Pisa, Italy) Project title: In the Shadow of the Habsburg Empire. Postwar crisis, National Conflicts and New Fascist Order; MARCELLO BARISON (Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane, Naples; Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg,

Germany) Project title: Types of Spaces. Philosophy of Architecture; MARIAGRAZIA PORTERA (University of Florence, Italy) Project title: Evolutionary Aesthetics. A bridging discipline between the life and human sciences; ARON SCHUSTER (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium) Project title: How to Research Like a Dog: Kafka's New Science; TAMARA CARAUS (University of Bucharest, Romania) Project title: The East European Dissidence in Transnational Perspective

CAS SEE Events

2023

- § Workshop, Cres, 22-25, May 2023 "NETWORK FOR SOUTHEASTERN EUROPEAN JEWISH STUDIES" in collaboration with the Rothschild Foundation and the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory at the University of Belgrade.
- § Workshop, Cres, 5-6 June, 2023 "2nd Social Research in Societies in Transition" in collaboration with the University in Ljubljana and the Institute of Philosophy and Social Theory at the University of Belgrade.
- § Conference, Cres, 7-11 June 2023. "Far-Right and the War in Ukraine: New Far-Right Landscapes in (Southeast) Europe?" Organized by Friedrich-Ebert Foundation Dialogue Southeast Europe (FES-SOE), and the Institute for Democratic Engagement Southeast Europe (IDESE).
- § Symposium, Cres, 21-25 June, 2023. "Europe's Futures Symposium 2023" in collaboration with IWM Vienna and ERSTE Foundation.
- § Conference, Rijeka, 3-7 July, 2023. "Sexual and Gender-based Violence Prevention in Education / hybrid event on Campus" organized by Social Justice Education and the Centre for Media, Culture & Education, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education University of Toronto, Canada; the University of Rijeka Centre for Advanced Studies Southeast Europe, Croatia and the City of Rijeka. With support from the Canadian Embassy to Croatia and Kosovo,
- § Summer School, Cres, 10-14 July 2023 "The European Face of Political Epistemology".
- § Exhibition, Cres, 12 August, 2023. "Living Water" exhibition of ceramics by the author Bojana Vuksanović.
- § Research intensive, Cres, 18-23 August 2023. "Institutional Analysis" organised in collaboration between the Center for Institutional Analysis (Goldsmiths, Department of Visual Cultures) and the Center for Advanced Studies of Southeast Europe at the University of Rijeka.
- § Panel discussion, celebration, Cres, 15-25 October 2023. "Community Engagement - 50 years of UNIRI and 10 years of CAS SEE UNIRI", panel discussion: "The path

towards a culture of shared future in Southeast Europe” joined by Christian Hellbach, Ambassador of Germany, Simon Thomas OBE, Ambassador of the United Kingdom, and Ole Frijs-Madsen, Ambassador of Denmark.

- § Seminar cycle, Online, 14 December 2023 “Regional Perspectives on Palestine” the series is a joint initiative of the Centre for Advanced Studies Southeast Europe CAS SEE and the Centre for Peace Studies and Conflict Studies at the University of Rijeka. Hosts and organizers: Sanja Bojanić, Valeria Graziano, Piro Rexhepi, Nebojša Zelić.

2022

- § Workshop, Cres, 2-6 March 2022 “Academy in the wild” in collaboration with Multimedia Institute MaMa Zagreb.
- § Erasmus+ project gathering, Rijeka and Cres, 18-22 April 2022 „Balkan Route(s). Entangled Mobilities in Rijeka and Beyond” in collaboration with Universities in Leipzig, Nova Gorica and Osnabrück.
- § Summer School, Cres, 3-7 May 2022 “The Project of Theory” in collaboration with DELTA lab at the University of Rijeka
- § Panel Discussion, Rijeka 10, June 2022 “Children’s Daycares - Laboratories of Change in the Community” in collaboration with Manuela Zechner, Koko

Lepo Association, and SIDRO Association.

- § Workshop, Cres, 12-14 June, 2022 “Social Research in Societies in Transition” in collaboration with University in Ljubljana and Institute of the Philosophy and Social Theory at the University of Belgrade.
- § Symposium, Cres, 15-19 June, 2022 “Europe` s Futures Symposium 2022” in collaboration with IWM Vienna and ERSTE Foundation.
- § Conference, Online, 1-2 September, 2022 “The Politics of Translation: Translation, Nation and Gender”. Speakers: Rada Iveković, Etienne Balibar, Françoise Vergès, Verónica Gago, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Naoki Sakai, Nivedita Menon, Boris Buden, Paul Stubbs, Jon Solomon, Nadežda Čaćinović, Seid Serdarević, Manuel Rébon, Sanja Bojanić, Aleksandar Pavlović, and Saša Hrnjez. In collaboration with the Institute of the Philosophy and Social Theory at the University of Belgrade. Conference was organized through University of Rijeka project “Creative Engagement in Arts”.
- § Masterclass, Cres, 1-4 September, 2022 Creative Writing Masterclass with Ivana Bodrožić: “A, kako vama zvuči “žensko pismo”?”. Masterclass organized through University of Rijeka project “Creative Engagement in Arts”.
- § Masterclass, Cres, 12-17 September, 2022 Masterclass with Rajko Grlić “Documenting

Democracy”. Masterclass organized through University of Rijeka project “Creative Engagement in Arts”.

- § Conference, Cres, 26-30 September 2022 “The Academy of Archipelagos of the Living” collaboration with the Institute for Innovation Research in Paris.
- § Exhibition and ceremony, Rijeka, 28 Oct - 6 Nov 2022 “Performing Democracy” and “Erhard Busek Award for Engaged Art”. The exhibition’s authors are Ana Adamović and Milica Pekić. The editorial team includes Ana Adamović, Eroll Bilibani, Iskra Geshoska, Veton Nurkollari, Milica Pekić, and Artan Sadiku. Rajko Grlić, Branka Cvjetičanin, and Eroll Bilibani are recipients of the Erhard Busek Award for engaged art (Erste Foundation) presented by CAS SEE UNIRI.

2021

- § Lecture by the prof. Dominique Kirchner Reill, Online, 14 January, 2021
- § “The Fiume Crisis” Conference, Rijeka, 29 January 2021 “The Epistemic Circumstances of Democracy” in collaboration with the Institute of Philosophy and Social Theory at the University of Belgrade and Hana Samaržija.
- § Lecture by prof. Narine Harutyunyan Brod, Online, 22 April, 2021. “Regulating Genetic Technologies: The Future of Human Reproduction”
- § Opening of the Virtual Exhibition, Cres, 27 April 2021 “Graffitied Memoryscapes”
- § Conference, Cres and online, 28-29 May 2021 “Semiotic Landscapes of Southeastern Europe” in cooperation with the University of Humboldt, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Zagreb
- § Conference and workshop, Cres, 14-16 June 2021. “More dostupno svima”
- § Conference, Cres, 22 June, 2021 “Moise Dialogues: Re-Thinking Democracy After Pandemics” in cooperation with Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory at the University of Belgrade under the auspices of Erste Foundation
- § Conference, Cres, 24 June, 2021 “European Forum - Cres: Dialogue on Regional Cooperation in Western Balkans”
- § Summer School, Cres, 12-16 July, 2021 “Equality and Citizenship 2021”
- § Congress, Cres, 15-23 July 2021. “Congress of Contemporary Russian Philosophy” in collaboration with University of Moscow, University of Yekaterinburg, and University of Klagenfurt
- § Artists Residency, Cres, 29 Sept - 3 Oct 2021 Residency organized by the “Domino” Association as part of the Island Connect project.
- § Lecture by prof. Liz David-Barrett, Online, 18 November, 2021. “Re-thinking state capture and moving beyond”

Covid Seminars: Dragana Kovačević Bielicki - Mapping The Anti-migrant Protests In Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina Through Their Online Media Coverage (2015-present); Sabino Paparella - About E-selfing: From Self-branding to Quantified Self; Guglielmo Feis - Coding for Humanities; Snežana Vesnić – Altered Time and Memory: Analog(y) of the Digital; Valentina Moro - Staging Gender in Antiquity: Why is this Archive Still Crucial for Feminist Theory? The Case of the Study of Kinship; Andrey Menshikov - Political Emotions, Religious Feelings and Human Rights; Oszkár Roginer - Self/perception Of Minorities and Knowledge Production; Alessandra Scotti - From a Bodily Ecology to an Environmental Ethic. Merleau-Ponty's Legacy in Ecological Thinking; Federica Porcheddu - Food Sovereignty: A Challenge to the Global Food Regime; Xenia Chiaramonte - Instituting the Rights of Nature: A Fictional and Casuistic Approach to Law and Social Movements; Valentina Moro - Feminist Movements Embodied in the Structure of Liberal Democracies; Ondřej Císař - Changing Climate: Varieties of Environmental Political Mobilization; Francesca Rolandi - Doš' o sam u grad iz pasivnog kraja. Internal Migration, Settlement; Dynamics and Social Practices in post-World War II Rijeka; Roswitha Kersten-Pejanic - Linguistic Landscapes at the margins: Performativity of ethnic

belonging and memory politics in Croatian post-conflict border regions; Vedran Džihic (University of Vienna)- Isolation „Zoom Meeting“; Adriana Cavarero (University of Verona) - Democrazia sorgiva. Note sul pensiero politico di Hannah Arendt; John Keane (University of Melbourne)- The New Despotism; Kateřina Vráblíková (University of Bat) - What Kind of Democracy?: Participation, Inclusiveness, and Contestation Ondřej Císař - Changing Climate: Varieties of Environmental Political Mobilization; Barbara Prainsack (University of Vienna) - Solidarity In Times Of Pandemics; Olivia Guaraldo (University of Padova) - Linguistic Landscapes at the margins: Performativity of ethnic belonging and memory politics in Croatian post-conflict border regions; Mauro Carbone (University Jean Moulin Lyon 3) - Philosophy-Screens; Giovanni Maddalena (University of Molise) - The History and Theory of Post-Truth Communication; Bonnie Honig (Brown University) - Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics; Glenn Weyle (Harvard University) - Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society; Gergana Dimitrova (University of Cambridge)- Democracy beyond Elections.

2019

§ Seminar presentations of the 8th generation of visiting researchers - postdoctoral fellows at the

- Center for Advanced Studies of Southeastern Europe, University of Rijeka, 28-30 January 2019.
- § Conference, Rijeka, 11 February 2019 “Rijeka Industrial Heritage – Education for Tourism Professionals” in collaboration with the Center for Industrial Heritage, as part of the project “Tourist Valorization of Representative Monuments of Rijeka Industrial Heritage”.
- § Training for educator, Bratislava, 20-25 May 2019 “Labour Rights of Youth – Phenomena Endangering them and Mechanisms of Protection” in collaboration with the Youth Development Center, Trade Union Education Center, and the Union of Administration of the Republic of Srpska, Union of Administration of the Republic of Serbia, UPOZ Macedonia Union, Coalition of Youth Organizations SEGA, Union of Administration and Judiciary of Montenegro, Budva Foundation, and the association YouthWatch from Slovakia.
- § Lecture by prof. Ulf Brunnbauer, Rijeka, 30 May 2019 “What Shipyards Can Tell about Late Socialism and Post-Socialism (and What They Cannot), on the Example of Uljanik,” in collaboration with the Department of Cultural Studies at the Faculty of Philosophy in Rijeka.
- § International Summer School, Rijeka, 10-14 July 2019 “Equality and Citizenship V,” in collaboration with the Department of Philosophy at the Faculty of Philosophy in Rijeka.
- § International Conference, Rijeka, 10-12 July 2019 “Cities and Regions in Flux after Border Change: Reconfiguring the Frontier, Reshaping Memory and Visualizing Change in Twentieth Century Europe” in collaboration with the University of British Columbia, Okanagan, the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, the association Rijeka 2020 - European Capital of Culture, the research group “Empires of Memory: The Cultural Politics of Historicity in Former Habsburg and Ottoman Cities,” and the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity.
- § Inauguration of Fellows and the lecture by prof. Bernard Stiegler as a part of the “Open Doors Day at the Moise Palace”, Cres, 1 October, 2019.
- § Conference and consortium meeting, Belgrade, 28-30 November, 2019 Erasmus+ Project “Rights at Work, Work on Rights” in collaboration with the Youth Development Center, Trade Union Education Center, and the Union of Administration of the Republic of Srpska, Union of Administration of the Republic of Serbia, UPOZ Macedonia Union, Coalition of Youth Organizations SEGA, Union of Administration and Judiciary of Montenegro,

Budva Foundation, and the association YouthWatch from Slovakia. 2020.

2018

- § The interdisciplinary seminar-Society of Architects Rijeka, 8 February, 2018.
- § “Rules without Words” - featuring presentations by visiting postdoctoral fellow scholarship recipients: Olimpia Giuliana Loddo, Davide Pisu, Carlo Burelli, Mónica Cano Abadía, Davide Pala, Milorad Kapetanović, Nataša Janković, Gerrit Wegener.
- § International conference - Rijeka, 16-17 April 2018. “Peace and Conflict Studies”
- § Seminar by visiting postdoctoral fellow scholarship recipient Francesca Forlè, Rijeka, 10 May 2018.
- § “Rythmos in Acting Together. A Tool to Improve Stability and to Orient Power Hierarchies”
- § Hosting the event - DeltaLab Rijeka, 8-9 June, 2018.
- § “Fashion Week – Spring 2018” co-organize with the programming direction Sweet and Salty, as part of the Rijeka – European Capital of Culture 2020 project.
- § The International Summer School - Rijeka, 18-22 June, 2018 “Critique of Violence Now: From Thinking to Acting Against Violence” was held in collaboration with the Center for Advanced Studies

of Southeastern Europe at the University of Rijeka.

- § The international summer school - 25-29 June, 2018 “Equality and Citizenship V”
- § The International Summer School - Rijeka, 16-29 September, 2018 “Summer School on Innovative Interpretation of Industrial Heritage” in collaboration with the Center for Industrial Heritage at the University of Rijeka, and the Culture Hub Croatia platform and the organisation European Heritage Volunteers.
- § The International Summer School - Rijeka, 7-9 October, 2018 “The Rise of Nationalism in Europe: Causes, Effects, and Comparison Between Western and Eastern Europe” is a collaboration with the Center for Advanced Studies of Southeastern Europe in Podgorica, Montenegro.

2017

- § Lecture by visiting postdoctoral fellow Carlos Gonzales Villa - Rijeka, 31 January, 2017.
- § “The Slovene Reaction to the European Migrant Crisis: Class and Ideology at the Edge of Schengen”
- § Lecture by visiting Prof. Emeritus Dr. Rastko Močnik (University of Ljubljana), Rijeka, Rijeka, 31 January, 2017. “Fascisms: Historical, Neo-, and Post-”

- § Lecture by visiting postdoctoral fellow Deane Jovanović, Rijeka, 15 February 2017.
- § “The Thermodynamics of ‘muljavine i pizdarije’: State, Infrastructure, and Moral Economy of District Heating in Bor (Serbia) and Rijeka (Croatia)”
- § Lecture by visiting postdoctoral fellow Anton Markoč, Rijeka, 15 February 2017 “Are there Genuine Reasons Against Intending Harm?”
- § Organisation and conference hosting-Rijeka, 22-23 May 2017 “19th International Conference on Contemporary Philosophical Topics by the Center for Advanced Studies at the University of Rijeka”, featuring guest Prof. Emeritus Dr. John Searle from the University of California, Berkeley.
- § Summer School - Rijeka, 11-17 June, 2017 “The New Left” in cooperation with Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Dialogue Südosteuropa.
- § Workshop- Belgrade, 26-28 June 2017 “Building Strategies in Art and Culture (Post)Graduate Student Initiatives” led by Dr. Peter Purg from the University of Nova Gorica and Danica Bojić from the Faculty of Dramatic Arts, University of Belgrade.
- § Lecture by Prof. Dr. Francis Fukuyama - University of Sarajevo, 4 July 2017 “Liberal Democracy in the West / the End of History 25 Years Later”- co-organized by the Center for Advanced Studies at the University of Rijeka, Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Sarajevo, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory (IFDT) at the University of Belgrade, and the Center for Ethics, Law, and Applied Philosophy (CELAP) in Belgrade.
- § International Summer School - Rijeka, 3-7 July, 2017 “Equality and Citizenship IV”
- § Summer School - Dubrovnik, 11-15 September, 2017 “Between Intellectual and Sensory Reason: Towards an Epistemology of Architecture” in collaboration with IUC Dubrovnik.
- § International Conference - Belgrade, 18 December, 2017 “Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities” with the participation of visiting postdoctoral researchers from the Center for Advanced Studies at the University of Rijeka, co-organized with the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory (IFDT) at the University of Belgrade.

2016

- § Presentation of the book “The Second Sex” by Simone de Beauvoir and a lecture by Mira Furlan - Rijeka, 17 March, 2016
- 2nd Lecture by visiting postdoctoral fellow: Mate Nikola Tokić - Rijeka, 29 March, 2016 “Za dom spremni! For the Homeland Ready!’ Transnationalism, Diaspora Politics, and Croatian

- Separatist Terrorism” Lecture
by visiting postdoctoral fellow:
Dane Taleski - Rijeka, 30 March,
2016. “From Armed Boots To
Polished Suits: A Precarious
Predicament For Peacebuilding
And Democratization?” Lecture
by visiting postdoctoral fellow
Vladimir Unkovski Korica - Rijeka
25 April, 2016. “City partnerships
as détente from below? Twinning
Bologna and Zagreb” Lecture by
visiting postdoctoral fellow Nuri
Ali Tahir - Rijeka, 25 April, 2016
“Controlling The Borders Of
'Borderless' Europe In The Age Of
Migration”
- § Co-organization of the 4th inter-
national conference - Rijeka, 4-5
May, 2016 “Social Justice: New
Perspectives, New Horizons”
Initial meeting within the awarded
EU project - Rijeka, 9 May, 2016
“Impulse – The New Cooperation
Programme for Higher Education
project ‘Gender in the Changing
Society”
 - § International Conference of the
Center, Rijeka, 26 -28 May, 2016
“Playing by the Rules - Institutions
in Action: The Nature And The
Role Of Institutions In The Real
World”
 - § Photo exhibition, Rijeka Faculty
of Humanities and Social Sciences,
16 September 2016 “Out of Sight:
Poverty, Rurality, Gender”
 - § Exhibition and workshop - Rijeka,
19-20 December 2016 “SWEET AND
SALT project, EPK 2020 Fashion
Week”
 - § Lecture with Prof. Tomoji
Onozuk - Rijeka, June 3, 2015
“Internationality And Simultaneity
Of Popular Music: Experiences
Of The Japanese Labour And
Socialist Movements In The Late
Nineteenth And Early Twentieth
Centuries”
 - § Workshop - Rijeka, 10 June, 2015
Across The National Borders:
Making And Remaking The
Multicultural Adriatic Area
 - § Conference - Rijeka, 23-26
June, 2015 Internationality And
Simultaneity Of Popular Music:
Experiences Of The Japanese
Labour And Socialist Movements
In The Late Nineteenth And Early
Twentieth Centuries
 - § Seminar-Beograd, 25 June, 2015
“Wolfgang Merkel in Dialogue
with CAS See Fellows”
 - § Summer School: “Equality and
Citizenship” - Rijeka, June 29 - July
3, 2015.
 - § Syposium-Rijeka, 3 July, 2015
“Lubitsch in Rijeka”
 - § Symposium - Online, 31 August,
2015 Authoritarianism On the
Rise: A New Global Competitor for
Democracy
 - § Workshop - Rijeka, 9-10 October,
2015 “Generation On the Move
Children of the 90s In Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo,
and Serbia” Roundtable - Rijeka, 3
November 2015.
 - § Avner de Shalit “Inequality in The
City: What’s wrong with how it is
measured?”

- § Conference - Beograd, 19-21 November, 2015. "How to Act Together?"
- § Lecture with Prof. Shalini Randeria-Rijeka, 24 November, 2015 "Fragmented Sovereignties in An Era of Globalisation: Challenges For Cunning States And Citizen"
- Podgorica, December 10-13, 2013 "Perspectives of Regional Academic Cooperation".
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2014

- § "Summer School Equality and Citizenship I" – Rijeka, June 30 - July 5, 2014.
- § "Democracy in the Danube Region -- EU's Danube Strategy and its Vision of an Integrated Danube Region" Roundtable: "European Foundations and Institutes of Advanced Studies in Talk– Chances and Opportunities for the Center for Advanced Studies Southeast Europe" Conference: (New) Challenges for Europe in a Changing a World/ Knowledge for Europe" - Rijeka, October 20-21, 2014. Lecture and Seminar with Prof. Barry Smith May, 8.

2013

- § Founding conference of the Center-Rijeka, October 16-18, 2013
- § "New Challenges for Democracy - Crisis of Trust and Democratic Legitimacy in Europe" conference at "St. Cyril and Methodius" University in Skopje and the University of Montenegro- Skopje,

List of CAS SEE Partners

City of Cres and the *public institutions*
Ministry of Culture of the Republic
of Croatia
Ministry of Science and Education of
the Republic of Croatia
Primorje-Gorski Kotar County
(Annex 22)
Inter-University Centre
Dubrovnik (IUC)
Tourist Board of the City of
Cres (TZC)
Island Development Agency (OTRA)

private foundations:

ERSTE Foundation
ERSTE Bank Vienna
Friedrich Ebert
Foundation Zagreb
Regional Friedrich Ebert Foundation
Heinrich Böll Foundation Berlin
Compagnia San Paolo Turin
European Fund for the
Balkans Brussels
Open Society New York
Volkswagen Foundation Frankfurt
Rockefeller Brothers Fund

Regional, European, and non-European universities partners:

IFDT Institute for Philosophy and
Political Theory
University of Belgrade
IDESE Institute for Democratic
Engagement in Southeast Europe
University of Ljubljana
The American University of Paris
University of Turin
Polytechnic University of Milan
Polytechnic University of Bari
Polytechnic University of Turin
University of Trieste
University of Udine
University of Graz
University of Vienna
University of Klagenfurt
Hertie School in Berlin

Preface: Sanja Bojanić – Transformative
Commitments: Reflecting on Ten Years of CAS SEE

Introduction: Jeremy F. Walton – On the Generality
of Violence and the Violence of Particularity

PART I

**Exploring Regional Realities:
Insights from the Southeastern
Frontier**

Damir Arsenijević – Recuperating
the social: challenging environmental
violence through art-activist practices in
Bosnia and Herzegovina

Tamara Banjeglav – Give peace a
chance: Breaking the silence about
peace initiatives in memorialisation of
conflicts

Christian Costamagna – Understanding
the end of the Kosovo war: historical
insights, new archival sources and
lessons learned

Leda Sutlovic – Temporalities, Inclusivity,
Affect – notes on the latest feminist
generation

Endi Tupja – All The Missing
Caregivers or Fascism all'Acqua di Rose.
Approaching performativity in (auto)
biographic storytelling

Achille Zarlenga – Frontiers and
identity: new approaches for old
problems

Nikolina Židek – Fitting like a glove:
the (ab)use of the European memory
framework in contemporary Croatia's
memory politics

PART II

**Reimagining Power and
Possibility: Essays in
Political Thought**

Alenka Ambrož – Gender and the (Bio)
politics of Translation

Paul Blamire – The Political Theology
concealed within Political Theory

Giustino de Michele – Negotiating with
Violence

Valerio Fabbrizi – The Populist Upsurge
in Contemporary Liberal Societies.
Implications for Constitutional
Democracy

Letizia Konderak – Building Bridges
versus Building Walls

Tomáš Korda – Is the World at War still
Constituted for Moral Being?

Emilia Marra – Token Crushing Token:
Cryptocurrencies to Capabilities

Javier Toscano – Thesis on Violence

Andreas Wilmes – From Old to New
Violence

Zona Zarić – The Rapeability and
Takeability of Bodies and Lands